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ABSTRACT 
This study aims at examing the relevancy of the 
application of the prospect theory in risk-handling 
strategies in relation to political risk assessments. The 
particular political situation in Hong Kong is used as the 
background for the study. 
Political Risk 
in Hong Koncf 
As the unknowns of the political developments in the 
British colony of Hong Kong unveil themselves, and as the 
date draws closer to June 31, 1997 when Hong Kong reverts 
to Chinese rule, companies find themselves in a turbulent 
political situation. Executives are compelled to face 
these turmoil -- to interpret events, make forecasts on 
the future of Hong Kong, assess the possible effects on 
the company and to map feasible strategies. This is 
especially important for the executives who are working in 
foreign subsidiaries. They have to mediate between 
headquarters objectives and host country needs; they have 
to assess the local conditions against that of other 
countries; they have to recommend strategies for the 
subsidiary in Hong Kong as well as units outside of Hong 
Kong that might be affected by the change in political 
environment in the city. A change in the operations of 
the Hong Kong subsidiary can have impacts on other 
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subsidiaries in different cities. 
Studies on political risk suggested various ways to 
evaluate the investment climate of a country, including 
its political risk. Some propose using indices, others 
prefer qualitative approaches. Few of the methods seem to 
be able to accurately predict the unknown future. Whether 
the assessment is accurate or not, after the initial 
evaluation comes the formulation of strategies. Research 
of the literature shows that academicians did provide a 
long list of possible strategies, as far as meeting 
political risk is concerned. However, there are few 
guidelines as to which strategy is best under what 
conditions. 
The early studies of political risks in Hong Kong 
were conducted in the 1980»s. Cheng and Tam (1990) note 
that executives are generally of the opinion that economic 
conditions in Hong Kong will deteriorate after 1997. 
Similarly, this present study reveals that executives 
currently hold certain apprehension, such as the cost of 
labor in Hong Kong and the relationship between Hong Kong 
and China; but, overall, Hong Kong is regarded slightly 
more favorable when compared to other neighboring cities. 
Broadly speaking, the executives are keenly aware of the 
political risk that is brought about in the anticipated 
handover of the colony. 
Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the study is to examine the 
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relationship between political risk assessment and 
political risk handling strategies. These two issues have 
been discussed separately and are deemed to be important 
for business executives. This study hopes to identify the 
relationship between the two and to explain the rationale 
behind this relationship. 
Prospect theory is used as a theoretical framework to 
hypothesize the relationship. Based on the theory and 
certain necessary adaptations of the theory in the 
business setting, it is surmised that firstly, more 
offensive (risk-taking) strategies are preferred by 
executives who deem the risk to be higher (reflected by a 
pessimistic evaluation of the future of Hong Kong) than 
those who view the risk as lower. Secondly, the 
performance target set by headquarters has an effect on 
the choice of strategy. Thirdly, offensive (risk-taking) 
and defensive (risk-averse) strategies are affected by 
different factors within the political risk evaluation. 
Offensive strategies are surmised to be affected by 
intranational and international relations, whereas 
defensive strategies are deemed to be affected by the 
conditions in Hong Kong and in China. The difference is 
caused by the nature of the two types of strategies ~ 
offensive strategies are more outward looking and are 
likely to be affected by features outside the city. 
Relatively speaking, defensive strategies are more inward 
looking and are likely to be affected by developments 
t 
V 
w i t h i n the city. Fourthly, company and personal 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are moderating variables in this 
relationship. 
Executives from American, Japanese and French 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong were interviewed. Their 
personal perceptions of risk assessment in Hong Kong and 
personal preferences fors trategies were collected. Other 
information such as demographics, company characteristics 
and so on were also included in the questionnaire. 
Risk-handling Strategies; 
Implications 
A range of strategies have been considered by 
academicians. They can be broadly categorized into 
offensive and defensive strategies. The data showed that, 
generally, there is a preference for defensive strategies. 
Offensive strategies such as lobbying for changes receive 
less support. 
The preference for defensive strategies reflects the 
risk-averse attitude of most subsidiary managers. In view 
of the perceived political risk, the executives want to 
make minimal changes within a minimal budget. This 
alternative is preferred since it requires less changes 
and does not necessitate the involvement of headquarters. 
Even though defensive strategies are preferred, on 
examining the offensive strategies, it is found that 
executives who regard the investment climate in Hong Kong 
as less attractive than its neighboring countries are more 
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p r o n e to favor o f f e n s i v e s t r a t e g i e s than their 
counterparts, who regard Hong Kong more favorably than 
n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . This s u p p o r t s the first 
hypothesis. 
In examining the role of the headquarter‘s targets in 
the relationship between risk assessment and risk handling 
strategies, we find its role to be an independent 
variable, and not a mediating factor. In prospect theory, 
the reference point is a frame to be determined by an 
i n d i v i d u a l , and h e n c e , a m e d i a t i n g variable. 
Nevertheless, the results of the study indicate that 
targets are different from reference point in prospect 
theory. One plausible explanation is that under business 
conditions, targets are set and are regarded as a 
confining factor, hence, an independent variable. This 
gives support to the second hypothesis. 
The study also suggests that defensive strategies are 
significantly affected by perceived political risk. It 
has been shown 七hat defensive strategies are highly 
responsive to political changes. On the other hand, 
offensive strategies which are different from defensive 
strategies are less affected by perceived political risk. 
The study also indicates that offensive strategies are 
more affected by how an individual executive views the 
target and also by his personal coimitment to the target. 
Under such circumstances, executives who are more 
committed are more likely to prefer offensive strategies. 
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This implies that executives are willing to take up high-
risk strategies when they are committed and when they feel 
that there is support from headquarters (as indicated by 
the target set). This endorses the third hypothesis. 
T e s t s are run to examine w h e t h e r company and 
individual characteristics operate as moderators in the 
relationship between assessment and strategies. A mixed 
pattern is found. Further examination in the future into 
this issue will reveal a clearer picture. 
These findings have many implications for executives. 
Headquarters staff need to understand the decision maJcing 
process of subsidiary managers. This could affect the way-
subsidiaries are being managed -- what information should 
be provided to the subsidiary, what data should be 
expected from the subsidiary, how to set targets for the 




Prospect theory forms the base for the study. The 
empirical data indicates that the spirit of the prospect 
theory is applicable in examining the risk-taking behavior 
for business strategies. That is, risk-assessments 
significantly affect risk handling behavior. However, 
when certain assumptions in prospect theory are relaxed 




interaction between headquarters and subsidiary are 
included, certain adaptations are needed. 
One adaptation lies in risk-handling strategies. The 
strategies available to executives are numerous and not 
necmessarily mutually exclusive. One would expect that 
this does not run parallel to a betting situation whereby 
the choices are limited and mutually exclusive. In a 
business situation, the various strategies are dependent 
on one another. Hence, it is logical to find executives 
opting for both offensive and defensive strategies, after 
taking a more holistic view of the corporate situation. 
A further adaptation required is caused by the extent 
of u n c e r t a i n t y that is present in the political 
environment and business strategies. While perceived 
environmental uncertainty can be measured, the second type 
of uncertainty, impact uncertainty, cannot be ascertained. 
No one can claim with certainty that a specific 
probability of a result will occur. In the context of 
prospect theory, this can be tested by the throw of dice. 
But, in a political and business situation, possible 
developments are unknown. 
Conclusion 
This study covers both theoretical and practical 
grounds. It provides practitioners with a view of the 
perceived political risk in Hong Kong. This can be useful 
for formulating strategies and long-term plans. It is 
also valuable for headquarters to examine the issue from 
ix 
the subsidiary manager's point of view. 
The study also contributs to theory development. A 
relationship between risk assessment and risk handling 
strategies is examined and a pattern (between risk-
assessment and risk handling strategy) is identified. 
This is a step towards a better understanding of business 
strategy. For this research, prospect theory is used to 
examine the aforementioned pattern. Nonetheless, this 
study also serves to examine the prospect theory and its 
assumptions. In fact, it forms a foundation for further 
developments in these areas. 
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Amidst the dynamic business environment, business 
firms are becoming more alert and more responsive to 
change. One of the dynamic issues that is of increasing 
concern to companies involved in international business 
involves risk. As industries mature, as competition 
become increasingly keen, as profit margins narrow, the 
effects of risk on business performance appear to be more 
pronounced (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1984, 1985). Compa-
nies are faced with general environmental risks, industri-
al risks and firm-level risks (Miller, 1992). 
As more companies enter the international arena 
through trading and foreign direct investment activities, 
these companies are becoming vulnerable not only to polit-
ical issues within their own countries, but also to polit-
ical issues related to the host country (Leeraw and Morri-
son, 1991, Kennedy 1992). Political risk has evolved into 
an issue that executives cannot afford to ignore. 
The political upsurge in Eastern Europe in 1989 
realigned the structure of the economy in that area. The 
structure of many industries mutated to fit the new envi-
ronment. This created opportunities for some and limited 
development for others. Firms need to be swift in reas-
2 
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sessing the situation and in formulating corresponding 
strategies. By 199 0, there was mounting interest in the 
business opportunities offered by Eastern Europe. Manu-
facturing firms are seriously studying the feasibility of 
setting up plants on the new frontiers. Marketing poten-
tials are being explored. 
Russia went through political turmoil in mid-August, 
1991, when Gorbachev faced a coup, and a second tumult in 
December, 1991, when USSR was dissolved. The political 
power of the leaders underwent redistribution. Within the 
country, there is a general acknowledgement of the need to 
improve the economic conditions. In the international 
arena, new diplomatic links may be set up and there may be 
a new distribution of power amongst the countries of 
Eastern Europe in terms of armaments, financial resources 
and other related areas. Changes are expected. Though it 
may be difficult, if not impossible, to precisely predict 
firstly when and how these changes will take place and, 
secondly, the extent of the outcome of these changes, 
business executives need to be sensitive to the new oppor-
tunities and limitations brought about by political 
events. 
The past year has not witnessed much major political 
turmoil in Asia, with the exception of Thailand. The 
political issues that was most felt in Hong Kong are 
related to trading concerns over China. The rounds of 
negotiations relating to the •most favored nation• (MFN) 
clause, the dumping charges, the issues on copyright and 
3 
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the application of the Super 301 clause between China and 
US are ongoing processes that could directly affect busi-
ness activities in China. A number of US political lead-
ers are employing MFN as a key weapon to force changes in 
China's policy towards the Tiananmen dissidents. The 
respective negotiating power of the two countries and the 
level of willingness of China to alter its policies can 
have direct impacts on trade and foreign direct invest-
ments in China. Businessmen who are involved in China-
related activities are eager to minimize the risks and to 
optimize the possible gains. Based on each individual's 
assessment of the present and future situation, different 
sets of strategies are formulated. Some may prefer set-
ting up multi-site production in locations outside China 
in the fear of losing the MFN status ； others may actively 
lobby for MFN using all the available means; yet others 
may opt for alternative tactics. The success of each 
company is contingent upon the strategy chosen and the 
outcome of the political reality. 
Similarly, Hong Kong is undergoing a period of polit-
ical transition. The 1997 issue is a key factor in influ-
encing corporate decisions. 1997 denotes the time when 
the British Colony will be reverted to Chinese rule. The 
political risk related to this change is a primary concern 
for individuals and for firms. Executives see the urgency 
of assessing the risk and of developing corresponding 
strategies. This thesis is written with reference to the 
political changes in Hong Kong. 
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Historical Background 
Historians usually trace the development of Hong Kong 
to the Anglo-Chinese wars in the 1800's. In the early 
nineteenth century, the Ching Dynasty that ruled China 
deteriorated in power, while lords operating outside the 
jurisdiction of the Emperor grew in number as well as in 
power. On the other front, Westerners were knocking and 
demanding trading activities in China. 
Britain was in the lead in the area of trading. They 
encouraged trade in the Canton (Guangdong) region in order 
to promote the activities of the British East Asia Compa-
ny . The trade with Britain basically involved three 
parties -- China, Britain and India. Britain was a heavy 
importer of trade from India. China originally demanded 
raw cotton from India. These two factors resulted in 
prosperous trading activities for the British East Asia 
Company. It also initiated the proper environment for 
"hongs" (trading companies) in Hong Kong. However, in the 
search for more profits, India prompted the export of 
opium to China. The opium trade grew from 4,500 chests a 
year in 1800 to 40,000 chests in 1838 (Fairbank, Reischau-
er and Craig, 1965). It was estimated that by the 1830's, 
there were two to ten million smokers, many being govern-
ment officials who made no special effort to control this 
problem. 
In the late 1830s, on the political front, the Chi-
nese position on foreign relations was dictated by the 
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western states. British, American, Portuguese and Japa-
nese forces were partitioning the coastal areas. Economi-
cally , C h i n a was suffering from an outflow of silver 
reserves as a result of the importation of opium. Inter-
nally, distress and poverty was hitting the society as a 
whole. The Chinese government attempted to control the 
problem by trying to exterminate the opium trade. Hostil-
ities broke out between the British and the Chinese. This 
marked the beginning of the First Anglo-Chinese War (also 
commonly known as the Opium War) in 1839. In 1840, Brit-
ish forces seized an island south of Shanghai and negoti-
ated with the Chinese authorities. The military conflict 
was finally brought to an end in 1842 with the signing of 
the Treaty of Nanking in August of the same year. The 
Treaty included five terms, one of which was the cession 
of Hong Kong (comprised of the island of Hong Kong and the 
Kowloon peninsula, south of Boundary Street) to British 
rule and another was a payment of indemnity to the British 
Government for the damages related to the war. Despite 
the Treaty, hostilities resumed in the 1850,s. The Brit-
ish navy fought its way up to Canton. French forces 
invaded Peking. This period of unrest was known as the 
Second Anglo-Chinese War. Another treaty was signed to 
terminate the war. This Treaty increased the indemnities 
and officiated the lease of New Territories, north of 
Boundary Street in Kowloon Peninsula, to Britain for a 
period of 99-years, ending June 30, 1997. 
‘ 6 
e 
The Situation in Hong Kong 
The release of the draft agreement of the Joint 
Declaration in 1984 signifies a turn in the future of Hong 
Kong for the decade as well as generations to come. Hong 
Kong will revert to Chinese rule in 1997. This decision 
was reached after wide-ranging negotiations between the 
Chinese and British governments. The solution is consid-
ered original since nowhere in history has a similar 
agreement in the change of a government of a sovereign 
state been reached free from the use of arms. Nowhere in 
history has such a decision been made in advance to allow 
the handover of territorial rights almost fifteen years 
before the transition period. On July 1, 1997, the Colony 
of Hong Kong will revert to Chinese rule. The two govern-
ments have been attempting to shepherd a smooth transition 
in preparation for 1997. However, the general public is 
most concerned with the increasingly outspoken attitude of 
China in the running of Hong Kong (Mun, 1991)• The nego-
tiations on the construction of the new airport, the 
government structure before and after the transition and 
the role of the government officials are some of the 
issues that are being raised. These events all have 
implications on business in Hong Kong. 
In order to maintain the stability and prosperity of 
Hong Kong, a "One Country Two Systems" Policy was pro-
posed. This scheme allows for the sovereignty of China, 
while maintaining the capitalistic market structure for 
Hong Kong after 1997. Hong Kong will become a "Special 
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Administrative Region" with its own characteristics. The 
two supposedly conflicting structures of planned economy 
and market economy will have to find a compromise in order 
to coexist after 1997. It was agreed that the current 
social and economic systems would remain intact for 50 
years after 1997. This system implies that China will 
have the say in areas of national defense and diplomacy. 
Yet, Hong Kong will retain its economic and political 
structures. There will ultimately be changes in the 
economic and political systems in Hong Kong. British rule 
will be replaced by the Basic Law. Plans are being made 
so that the transition is gradual and minimal. 
The anticipated changes, though often advocated as 
minimal, are expected to affect individuals and corpora-
tions in Hong Kong. The many business enterprises in Hong 
Kong are concerned with the possible effects of communist 
rule. Kirpalani, Mun and Hui (1992) noted that Articles 
169 and 170 of the Basic Law, which gives China the power 
to interpret and amend the Basic Law, are most controver-
sial. Many are anxious that planned economy and communist 
ideology will slowly creep in. Production, marketing, 
personnel and financial management within a firm may need 
to adapt to the changing political environment. Relations 
with external institutes may alter according to the dynam-
ic environment. All of these factors could lead to a 
modified assessment of the opportunities in Hong Kong. It 
will influence how the multinational firms view Hong Kong 
and how they assess the risks in Hong Kong. Based on such 
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assessments, a new set of strategies might be set for the 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong. 
‘ 9 
Effects on Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has long been regarded as a window to 
China. It has been a favorite location for foreign direct 
investment (Hsueh and Woo, 1986)• US, European and Japa-
nese foreign investments have gathered in Hong Kong to 
capture the advantages provided by the Colony. The recent 
upsurge of political risk has caused turmoil in the busi-
ness environment. 
Financial Instability 
In 1981, it was clear that China was determined to 
regain its sovereignty in Hong Kong. During the negotia-
tions process, British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
attempted to refute the claim by maintaining the validity 
of the Treaties. But her attempts only managed to do more 
harm than good. The Hong Kong dollar fell from around 
7.50 to over 10.00 against the US dollar almost overnight. 
The stock market dropped to 44% of its value. The govern-
ment was forced to peg the Hong Kong dollar to the US 
dollar at 7.80 in an attempt to stabilize the economy in 
1984. This event was interpreted as a sign of financial 
instability in Hong Kong. 
There were a number of incidents in the financial 
industry that added onto the sense of instability. The 
closure of the Stock Exchange after "Black Monday" in 1987 
and the subsequent arrest of the Chairman of the Stock 
Exchange, runs on a number of international banks (includ-
ing the Bank of Credit and Commerce, Citibank and Standard 
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Chartered Bank) in 1991 exposed the inadequacy of govern-
ment control. It also reinforced the belief that the Hong 
Kong Government is becoming less interested in the long 
term prospects in Hong Kong. 
Brain Drain 
Individuals and families look for alternatives in 
minimizing the exposure to risk. Some choose to leave 
Hong Kong and to earn a foreign passport. Ng and Choy 
(1990) observed that before 1986, the average number of 
emigrants each year was around 20,000. The number rocket-
ed to 30,000 in 1987 and is expected to reach 65,000 by 
1992 (Table 1-1)• The typical emigrants are professionals 
and skilled labor, in their late twenties to early 
forties. They usually hold middle level management posi-
tions. 
The exodus trend is expected to bring about a series 
of limitations on the Hong Kong economy. First of all, 
due to the limited supply of human resources, the cost of 
human resources will surge. Moreover, companies will have 
to face the likely problem of placing employees at a level 
beyond their ability. In the hope to attract competent 
and well-qualified personnel, firms are impelled to raise 
the salary package. Since the competitive advantage of 
most Hong Kong-based firms derive their competitiveness 
from cost advantage (Lee, 1989), this could ultimately 
erode the global competitiveness of these companies. 
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Table 1-1 
Hong Kong Emigration: 
1980 - 1990 












Source: Ng, F.Y., H. Choy (1990), "The Outflow of People 
and Capital", Hong Kona Economic Journal, 
Vol. 154, 19-22 (in Chinese). 
Wong, Edward Y.T. (1992) "Brain Drain and Human 
Resources Development in Hong Kong", The Hong 
Kong Manager, March, 5-12. 
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Exodus of Firms 
Another obvious aftermath is the exodus of firms. 
Many companies have changed their domicile in recent years 
(Table 1-2). The trend has witnessed a significant in-
crease from one listed company shifting its domicile in 
1984 to a total of thirty-seven in 1989. Strategically, 
shifting the domicile can be a measure to avoid regula-
tions f to minimize tax and to maximize possible advan-
tages . However, most, if not all, of these companies 
shifted their domicile in anticipation of the possible 
adverse changes that will come with Chinese rule. Coimer-
cial companies all want to be avail themselves with much 
flexibility and autonomy as possible. In that way, if the 
economic structure changes, companies can decide on tac-
tics accordingly. 
Jardines was the first "hong" which moved its domi-
cile. The action caused disturbances in the stock market. 
The other devastating event was the announcement of the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation of the restructur-
ing of its operations in 1991. With this reorganization 
(South China Morning Post, 1990a) some 30 per cent of the 
bank‘s overall asset are being moved to a new holding 
company• 
The move has great implications, especially when 
viewed in the light of the role the Bank has played. 
Traditionally, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpora-
tion enjoyed many privileges in Hong Kong. It is the 




Change of Domicile: Hong Kong Listed Companies 
1984-1989 
No. of Listed Companies 






January - March 1 
April - June 2 
July - September 1 
October - December 3 
1989 37 
January - March 7 
April - June 12 
July - September 13 
October - December 5 
Source: Y.H. Lui (1989), "Change of Domicile: Effects of 
June 4th", Honcr Kona Economic Journal, 
Vol. 149, 28-31. 
Various newspaper articles in South China Morning 
Post and Ming Pao. 
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the Hong Kong Government. It takes up a leadership role 
on the local financial scene. It is, therefore, in access 
to much information regarding the economy, the market and 
the competitors. The Hong Kong Bank Group, which is 
comprised of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpora-
tion and the Hang Seng Bank, holds close to 50% of the 
consumer and commercial finance-related business. It 
holds an unchallengable position as the Government•s key 
banker. This move by the ‘de facto banking leader‘ is 
interpreted, in light of political clout, as a vote of 
distrust towards the situation after 1997. 
Editorials in two Chinese-backed newspapers criti-
cized the move as irresponsible. They stressed that this 
is not a mere economic decision. The Financial Secretary, 
unnecessarily and openly, supported the plan. The en-
dorsement seemed out of place had it been a decision 
related only to the company. Some commentators expected 
that many other Hong Kong based multinational firms would 
reconsider their exodus strategies. They expect many to 
follow suit (South China Morning Post, 1990b)• 
Relocation of 
Manufacturing Plants 
The devastating effect of business is not only caused 
by a change of domicile for finance and tax purposes but 
also by a corresponding shift of the manufacturing plants. 
Before the 1997 issue arose, many firms had investigated 
the possibilities of a move of the production sites due to 
the erosion of cost advantage (Ajami and Ricks, 1981) in 
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Hong Kong. Some had relocated to Special Economic Zones 
in China. Since the confidence crisis, companies have 
been actively examining the alternatives. This exodus is 
inevitable due to changes in the business environment. 
The process is speed up due to political realities. 
At the grassroots level, people are complaining that 
factories are being relocated to Special Economic Zones in 
China or elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This resulted in 
unemployment or a mismatch of skills and jobs available. 
Some economists predict a softer economy in view of the 
fall in the purchasing and earning power of the people of 
Hong Kong. 
Diplomatic Relations: 
China, Britain and Hong Kong 
On a more international or political level, there is 
an obvious tension between the British Government, the 
Chinese government and the Hong Kong Government. The 
British Government is keen to minimize the perceived risks 
of the company executives in order to ensure a smooth 
rundown of the years before 1997. They are eager to 
preserve order and prosperity in Hong Kong. The British 
Government is coining up with many schemes to attract 
foreign investments or to maintain existing ones. The 
infrastructure projects, including the construction of a 
new airport, a bridge connecting an outlying island, and 
the building of the light railroad are seen as confidence 
boosters. However, these projects caused much antagonism 
with the Chinese government during the decision process. 
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The Hong Kong Government, pressed by the massive 
exodus, came up with the "Right of Abode" in Britain for 
certain Hong Kong citizens. They also negotiated with 
other governments to ease the immigration rules. This 
again caused much friction on the relationship with China. 
Confidence in 
Local Government 
Another observable effect is a change in the confi-
dence level of the people. According to surveys performed 
by the local newspaper, South China Morning Post, 75% felt 
confident about Hong Kong‘s future in January 1989; this 
figure dropped to 60% in April and 25% after the June 4th 
incident. On the other hand, the percentage of those 
lacking in confidence jumped from 25% in January to 40% in 
April and 46% in June. This can also be confirmed by the 
long lines waiting to obtain applications for foreign 
citizenship outside the various embassies after June 1989. 
The view of the companies can be largely reflected by the 
perceptions of the individuals. As confidence falls, the 
anticipated risk level increases accordingly. Based on 
that, companies adjust their strategies and their expecta-
tions of the Hong Kong subsidiaries. 
Change in 
Government Policy 
The new relationship between the Hong Kong Govern-
ment, the British Government and the Chinese Government 
brought about new directions for the Hong Kong government. 
The local government appears to aim at maintaining an 
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image of commitment. However, its policies often demon-
strate a focus on short-term objectives with ininimuin 
commitment. 
Improvement of infrastructure is a long term commit-
ment. Plans for the new airport, the road system and the 
facilities for the port were proposed. However, when most 
of these construction contracts were granted to companies 
with British interest, there were concerns as to the 
ulterior motive of such government spending. There is 
also a conscious effort to expand the university system. 
The setting up of the third university, the opening of the 
Open Learning Institute, the review of the courses offered 
by tertiary institutions and the upgrading of some ter-
tiary institutions all aim in a similar direction. All 
these have implications for government expenditures. As a 
result, many governmental services are privatised. Gov-
ernment spending on social services, primary and secondary 
education will be minimized. 
Level of 
Overseas Investment 
Given the historical developments in Hong Kong and 
the relative strength of the nearby countries, the trend 
and the amount of foreign direct investment in Hong Kong 
was traditionally high in relation to the neighboring 
countries. However, in recent years, the level of foreign 
investments has been increasing at a slower speed. This 
is further evidenced by Moody's down-grading of Hong 
Kong-issued bonds from A2 to A3 when China's rating 
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dropped from A3 to BAAl after the Tiananman Incident. 
Such downgrading indicates that the risk is higher. 
Hence, the perspective of the business community is af-
fected. 
Business in Hong Kong is directed by two major 
forces. The primary driving force is from China. Many 
claim that the economic survival of Hong Kong depends 
heavily on the Beijing government and its policies. In 
fact, some have commented that Beijing is the lifestream 
of Hong Kong. Events within China as well as between 
China and its fellow countries keenly shape the prosperity 
of Hong Kong. These events may be macro or micro in 
nature, and they may affect Hong Kong directly or indi-
rectly. The other driving force is the conditions of 
nearby countries. Encarnation and Wells (1986) analyzed 
various host government policies and found that govern-
ments compete in the same market for foreign direct in-
vestments . The same holds true for countries in Southeast 
Asia. Many of them possess similar characteristics in 
terms of economic growth, technological advancement, 
factor endowment and market attributes. Most of them are 
competing keenly for foreign investments from the US, 
Europe and Japan. The government policies of neighboring 
countries and their economic conditions affect the per-
ceived advantage of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's connection 
with China remains a vital determinant resulting in dif-
ferential advantages. 
Due to political fallout in Hong Kong, overseas 
‘ 19 
investments in the manufacturing sector dwindled in 1988, 
after a peak in 1987 (Table 1-3) . As of 1988, there were 
605 overseas manufacturing investments, totaling HK$20 
billion. Out of these, 39 of them function as regional 




Overseas Direct Investment in Hong Kong 
Year US Japan UK China Others Total 
Before 1970 26 19 10 5 27 87 
1970-1974 21 22 10 0 29 82 
1975-1979 22 41 11 3 40 117 
1980-1984 44 33 20 12 71 180 
1985 12 5 2 4 23 46 
1986 15 17 3 5 16 56 
1987 12 25 3 14 21 77 
1988 4 8 3 6 14 35 
Total 158 170 62 49 241 680 
Source : Report on the Survey of Overseas Investment in 
Hong Kong‘s Manufacturing Industries, 1989, 
Hong Kong Government Industry Department. 
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Studies on Political Risk in Hona Kong 
Mun pioneered the studies on the political future in 
Hong Kong. In his 1982 study, he used the Delphi Method 
and found that political stability in Hong Kong in 1990 is 
expected to deteriorate from the 1980s level. It would 
decline in its economic contribution to China, in its 
relations with both China and Britain and in its role as a 
meeting ground in China's foreign relations. Mun and Ho 
(1985) examined the investment climate in Hong Kong and 
found it to be generally regarded as positive. Mun (1987) 
further examined the patterns of foreign investments in 
the various industries of Hong Kong. 
Cheng and Tam (1990) examined the perceived political 
risks in Hong Kong before and after 1997. The data was 
gathered after the June 4th Incident in 1989. A summary 
of statistics is shown in Table 1-4. Business executives 
generally expected a deterioration of conditions after 
1997. The study found that most of the companies they 
interviewed have contingency plans to deal with the risk. 
Many are actively pursuing the goal of minimizing the 
risk. Executives are most concerned with the possibility 
of restrictions on profit repatriation. Government struc-
ture and price stability are also areas of vexation. 
Faced with such an environment, the executives were also 
asked what process they would apply to reduce risk. The 
executives preferred to establish joint venture with 
foreign firms, to reduce fixed assets, to diversify inter-




Experts丨 Opinion on Political Risk in Hong Kong: 
Before and After 1997 
Before 1997 After 1997 
Economic stability 3.83 2.75 
Exchange Rate Stability 4.67 3.00 
Currency Convertibility 5.00 3 .17 
Price Stability 4.00 3.33 
Profit Repatriation 5.00 2.25 
Economic Recession 4.17 3.00 
Labor Productivity 4.00 3.17 
*Change of Political Leader 3.50 1.67 
Policy Stability 3.83 1.83 
*Brain Drain 1.83 3.33 
•Labor Shortage 1.83 3.67 
•Industrial Relations 2.83 3.00 
•Social Demonstration 2.50 3.50 
•Riots 3.33 3.83 
Government Structure 3.92 2.00 
Relations with China 3.08 3.50 
Relations with Foreign Countries 4.33 2.83 
1 = least favorable 
5 = most favorable 
* Reverse 
Source : Cheng, Tsz-yam Frederick, Wai Yun Christina Tarn 
(1990) "Political Risk Analysis for Business in 
Hong Kong: Before and After 1997", unpublished 
MBA research report, the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong 
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to take a more passive role and adapt to local government 
policy. Only a small percentage would choose to close 
down the business or to utilize local borrowing. 
A recent study attempted to look at the various 
attributes of political risk and to assess the relative 
importance of each. Young (1990) examined the relative 
utilities of four attributes that are regarded as vital to 
investments. Based on the conjoint analysis, it was found 
that in the case of Hong Kong, executives were most con-
cerned with the political and economic stability within 
the city (52%), followed by the city‘s relation with the 
Chinese government (24%), then comes regulation changes by 
the Chinese government (13%) and, finally, the interna-
tional relationship of China and the rest of the world 
(10%)• The situation between Hong Kong and China prompts 
us to consider this new factor. It shows that such an 
assumption of maintaining a friendly relationship does not 
necessarily hold. In certain cases, it may be a thermome-
ter for measuring the level of political risk. This 
attitude is confirmed in Mun et al (1990), a study which 
found that the executives and students in Hong Kong recog-
nize political risk as a crucial element in business 
education. The overall prosperity of Hong Kong depends 
largely on the unique agreement of the "One Country Two 
System". This is affected by the conditions in Hong Kong 
and China. 
In Kirpalani et al (1992) 's study, it was found that 
management expects Hong Kong to maintain a relatively good 
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trade-related environment after 1997. Their main concern 
lies in the general business environment -- the amount of 
red tape, the structure of the judicial system, the atti-
tude towards foreign ownership, the availability of local 
skill and the amount of supporting industry. This factor 
on general business environment obtained a below average 
rating. This reveals the concern over the uncertainty of 





The study of political risk mushroomed in the 1970s 
with the Arab oil boycott in 1973-74, and the sudden 
change in policy in Iran in the late 1970s (for example, 
Franko, 1986, Davidson, 1980, de la Torre, 1981). The 
discussions covered a wide range -- from theoretical 
analysis to forecasts of political risk, from how the 
risks are brought about to how such risks can be dealt 
with. These previous studies tend to treat political risk 
quite differently. The common ground is that political 
risk is regarded as the imposed constraints upon a firm 
(Daniel, Krug and Nigh, 1985), though some regard it as a 
cultural factor (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, Tse et al, 
1988). 
Various definitions and interpretations of political 
risk have been formulated (Table 2-1)• The range is so 
wide, that in fact, when Simon (1982) reviewed the past 
literature, he commented that there is no consensus as to 
what constitutes "political risk". One group of scholars 
considered political risk to be that which primarily 




Political Risks: Definitions 
Source Definition 
A. MACRO-PERSPECTIVE 
Bank of Amer. One aspect of country risk. Includes economic, 
financial, political, legal and social conditions. 
Institutional That which affects a country * s credit worthiness 
Country Credit Rating 
Merrill (1982) Ability of country in repaying external obliga-
tions. 
Dichtl and Refers to the credit worthiness of a country 
Koglmayr (1986) 
Micallef Unsystematic risk. Changes in the rules of the 
(1981) game in the legal and social environment 
Rice and Probability of one event or a class of events 
Mahmoud (1990) occurring 




Kobrin (1978) Loosely defined phenomena, referring to important 
factors in foreign investment decisions. 
Sethi and A catchall term for risk dimensions of politi-
Luther (1986) cal events which have an impact on business 
decisions. 
Root (1972) Threats to foreign investments that can arise from 
attitudes and behavior of host government and 
significant political social groups. 







Kobrin (1988) Unwanted consequences of political activities 
Yaprak & Uncertainty in political events that affect 
Sheldon (1984) business 
Torre and Probability distribution that an actual or 
Neckar (1988) opportunity loss will occur due to the exposure of 
foreign affiliates to a set of contingencies that 
range from total seizure of corporate assets 
w i t h o u t compensation to the unprovoked 
interference of external agents, with or without 
governmental action, affecting the normal 
operations of the affiliate 
Rummel & Objective measurement of probability estimate 
Heenan (1978) of risk in foreign investment 
Kennedy (1988) Risk of a strategic, financial or personnel loss 
for a firm because of macroeconomics and social 
policies or events related to political instabili-
ty 
Phillips- Political events that result in higher politi-
Patrick(1989) cal "transaction cost" for foreigners, affecting 
the range of options available and the value of 
assets 
Shapiro (1981) Risk of expropriation 
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Others (Brewer, 1982) stressed the effects on individual 
firms (micro-perspective)• Miller (1990) and others 
emphasized the financial aspects of such risks. 
Among the many definitions, Kobrin (1978), Overholt 
(1982) and Jodice (1980) claimed that the distinction 
between political and economic contingencies is not clear. 
They regard political risk in a more comprehensive manner, 
including the risk resulting from any environmental 
changes. Bradly (1977) went even further to say that 
political risk should be viewed as essentially due to 
non-political factors. 
Simon (1982, 1984) employed a four-criteria model in 
analyzing political risk. The criteria include the econo-
my of the country (open or closed), the initiators of the 
risk (internal of external), the effects on the country 
(country-wide or industry specific) and the effects on the 
firm (direct or indirect)• Another similar classification 
scheme is based on five approaches (Friedman and Kim, 
1988) • They are the selectivity of the effect (macro 
versus micro), the initiator (government versus social 
groups), the structural effects (transfer, operational or 
ownership risk), the relative power of bargaining and the 
type of host government structure. Kobrin (1988) classi-
fied risk according to three categories: operational risk, 
ownership risk and transfer risk. 
In this study, political risk is defined as any risk 
that is politically related, whether the initiator is the 
government, the general public, a foreign government or 
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any other party, as long as there is possibility of im-
posed changes, including negative and positive impacts, on 
the operations of a firm. This definition largely follows 
Sethi and Luther (1986) and Yaprak and Sheldon (1984) 
lines of thought. 
Characteristics of 
Political Risk 
Scholars have generally regarded political risks to 
possess three attributes -- unanticipated-ness, disconti-
nuity and uncertainty (Table 2-2)• Not all three charac-
teristics are necessarily present in every count of polit-
ical risk. Varying degrees of each characteristic may 
exist. 
Robock (1971), Van Agtmael (1976) and Sethi and 
Luther (1986) mentioned the characteristic of unanticipat-
ed-ness. Unanticipated events usually happen instantly, 
without much prior warning. They are often regarded as 
unlikely to occur. The Iranian experience is a costly 
lesson which showa that the unlikely can happen. In the 
more recent past, the June 4th event in China in 1989 took 
many politicians by surprise. Few expected that within a 
period of less than two months, the outcry made by the 
students would become a national outburst. Even fewer 
people anticipated the way it drew to an end in Tiananmen 
Square. These political events lead to corresponding 
changes in the governments丨 attitude and policy which can 
affect business operations. The fact that these events 




Attributes of Political Risk 
Attributes Author 
Uncertainty, Yaprak and Sheldon (1984) 
Change over time Poynter (1982) 
Kobrin (1988) 
Friedman and Kim (1988) 
Clarke (1988) 
Kennedy (1988) 
Discontinuity Robock (1973, 1976) 
Kobrin (1981b, 1988) 
Yaprak and Sheldon (1984) 
Micallef (1981) 
Green et al (1975) 
Schollhammer and Nigh (1984) 
Nigh (1986) 
Difficult to anticipate Robock (1971, 1973) 
Van Agtmael (1976) 








appear more severe. The executives are not given the time 
to analyze, evaluate, plan and calculate possible steps. 
Instead, they are forced to respond, almost instanteously. 
The lack of time and, possibly, the lack of updated, 
accurate information magnifies the risk. 
A second characteristic is that the events are dis-
continuous, or that they deviate from the normal path 
(Kobrin, 1981a, 1988, Robock, 1971). This is sometimes 
caused by a change to a leader with a different ideology. 
The change may be an improvement over the previous situa-
tion. But because it diverts from the trend, it becomes 
political risk. In Eastern Europe, as many rejoice in the 
democracy gained in the region, the executives already-
operating in those countries have to deal with discontinu-
ous and unanticipated changes. State-owned enterprises 
lost their special status. A market economy seeped in and 
changes sped up. In this way, business operations are 
faced with added political risk. Some of these changes 
may be guided by policy but not officiated by laws and 
regulations. Whether the changes are for better or for 
worse, the deviation from past trends implies that busi-
ness strategies need to be adjusted. 
A third characteristic mentioned is the degree of 
uncertainty (Milliken, 1987, Friedman and Kim, 1988, 
Miller, 1992, Yaprak and Sheldon, 1984). Kobrin (1988) 
draws a distinction between subjective and objective 
uncertainty. Subjective uncertainty refers to the 
likelihood of events based on perceptions and experiences. 
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Objective uncertainty can be approximated by situations as 
in the throwing of a die. The exact outcome is unknown. 
Yet all possible outcomes are known and information is 
available to calculate the exact risk. In the context of 
international business, subjective uncertainty is 
prevalent. 
The difficulty in subjective uncertainty lies in the 
inability of relying on past statistics. One challenge is 
how to interpret information towards the prediction of 
possible events. Besides, obstacles may be present that 
bar governments from the attainment of national goals. 
International pressure and international relationships may 
bring about such barriers. Another reason why firms face 
uncertainty is the lack of accurate information for pro-
jections of the future. A country that exercises control 
over the press and censors information released would 
breed a selected few who possess proprietary information. 
The proprietary nature of the information available in-
creases the power of these individuals. 
Interpretations of 
Political Risk 
The assessment of political risk is individualistic 
and subjective. Different executives may be exposed to 
different sets of information through their contacts and 
sources. Even with the same set of data, each individual 
may interpret it quite differently. The interpretation is 
often influenced by one's experience and expectations. 
Firstly, individuals usually have access to too much 
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information, sometimes even up to a level of information 
overload. Multinational companies are followers in the 
discipline of political risk assessment. Very often, 
their executives obtain the information second-hand —— 
from banks, from government officials, from insurance 
companies, from managers in subsidiaries and from news 
reports. The information has to be transformed to fit the 
needs of the individual firm. Sometimes, the information 
does not provide a perfect fit. The information regarding 
the specific characteristics of the industry, the struc-
tural traits of the firm and the strategies of its compet-
itors may be absent. Executives are forced to select what 
they consider relevant and draw their own conclusions. 
Secondly, people may be led to think in one direction 
thereby ignoring other important issues. Lastly, individ-
uals may be biased. Some executives are concerned with 
country risk (Bird, 1986, Merrill, 1982) . These are 
typical of executives with banking and financial back-
ground . Others are ethnocentric and tend to only focus on 
the interests of the headquarters (Mascarenhas and Sand, 
1985) • Others are concerned with the overall foreign 
investment in a host country and the risks that are faced 
(Basi, 1963). Hence, these executives tend to draw their 
conclusions based on past experiences. 
Political Risk 
Indicators 
The level of political risk of a host country is 
highly dependent on what indicators executives include in 
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the assessment of political risk (Haner, 1979)• Past 
studies suggest three major groups of indicators that are 
of concern. They are the political environment and the 
economical environment of the host country, plus the 
international relationship of the host country with other 
countries (Table 2-3)• Political environment of the host 
country can be reflected by the political structure, 
political instability, degree of centralization of govern-
ment, rules and regulations and the progress of moderniza-
tion. Macro-economic indicators such as gross domestic 
products, terms of trade, external debt, balance of trade, 
tax rate, foreign exchange rate, unemployment rate, com-
modity prices and monetary policy (Merrill, 1982, Pert-
lize, 1985, Kern, 1985) are often mentioned. Internation-
al relationship can be revealed by the level of interna-
tional cooperation and international conflict (Green and 
Korth, 1974, Sethi and Luther, 1986, Bennett and Green, 
1972, Green and Cunningham, 1975, Kobrin, 1976, Nigh 1986, 
Schollhammer and Nigh, 1984, Nigh and Schollhammer, 1987). 
These indicators usually comprised of quantitative data as 
well as subjective interpretation of events (Bunn et al' 
1978). 
Dichtl and Koglmayr (1986) advocate that subjective 
data and subjective interpretation be dispensed with. 
They recommend advanced forecasting techniques, relying 
solely on objective data. Many indicators on political 
risk are available (Bunn and Mustafaoglu, 1978)• The 
Business Environment Risk Index, Business International 
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Table 2-3 
Political Risk Indicators 
Indicators Authors 
Host Country Political Environment 
Progress of Modernization Mun (1982) 
Political structure Pennock (1966) 
Political instability Wu (1982), Rice and Mahmoud 
(1990) 
Centralization of government Austin and Yoffie (1984) 
Leadership change Wu (1982) 
Rules and regulations Jodice (1980), Stobaugh 
(1969), Robock (1971), Desta 
(1985), Kobrin (1988), 
Poynter (1982) 
Societal pressure Simon (1984), Robock (1971), 
Mun (1982) 
Host Country Economic Conditions 
Inflation Stobaugh (1969), Simon 
(1984), Mumpower et al 
(1987) 
Devaluation Simon (1984) 
Propensity to save Cosset and Roy (1991) 
External debt Alesina and Tabellini 
(1989) , Rimmel and Heenan 
(1978) 
Balance of trade Micallef (1981) 
Tax Simon (1984) 
Exchange rate differential Mumpower et al (1987) 
Unemployment Bird (1986) 
Gross national product Merrill (1982), Pertlitz 
(1985), Kern (1985) 
International relationship Mun (1982), Robock (1971), 
Simon (1984), Schollhamer 
and Nigh (1984), Nigh (1986) 
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Index (BI), Political System Stability Index (PSSI)• Frost 
and Sullivan's Political Report, World Political Risk 
Forecasts (WPRF) are such examples. other indices 
frequently used are the Banks and Textor Measure and the 
Feierabend and Feierabend Index. The Banks and Textor 
Measure classifies the countries into four categories of 
varying stability. The Feierabend and Feierabend index 
was constructed by analyzing thirty political activities 
and each of them on a weighted 7-point scale of political 
instability. These indice generally employ a quantitative 
approach (Table 2-4). Other methods based solely on hard 
data include multiple regression analysis and discriminant 
analysis. Another method is the decision tree approach. 
The reliability of these methods are also questionable 
(Mascarenhas and Atherton, 1983). 
Other executives assess the level of political risk 
based partly upon unquantifiable data. Friedman and Kim 
(1988) put stress on the events in the host country. 
Desta (1985) and Poytner (1982) pinpointed government 
policies as cues and argued that these policies are the 
major causes of political risk. Root (1968, 1972), Bodde-
wyn and Cracco (1972), Kobrin (1979) specifically examined 
the change of the host government‘s policy. Green (1974) 
studied how political structure and political process in 
the host country can affect political risk. Brewer (1983) 
and Pennock (1966) looked at governmental policy changes 
and its relation to instability. Others refer to the 





Methods for Assessment 
Method Author 
QUANTITATIVE 
Using scenarios Clarke (1988) 
Delphi Methods Mun (1982), Micallef (1981) 
Regression Burton and Inoue (1987) 
Time series analysis Brewer (1985) 
Discriminant model Jones (1984) 
Simulation Coplin and O‘Leary (1983) 
Econometrics Merrill (1982) 
Decision tree Desta (1985) 
Expert judgment with Mumpower et al (1987) 
given indicators 
QUALITATIVE 
Personal judgment Rice and Mahmoud (1990), 
Daniels et al (1985) 
Checklist Kobrin (1988), 
Coplin and O‘Leary (1983) 
Panel of experts Kobrin (1988) 
In-depth political forecast Ascher (1982) 
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as an indicator of political risk (Rice and Mahmoud, 
1990)• Some authors regard instability and risk as one 
and the same. 
Robock (1971) proposed to look beyond government 
policy and to examine government attitude. Others treat 
the attitude of the host government as the primary deter-
minant in analyzing political risk. They measure the 
attitude rather than the level of political stability. 
The change in attitude may be initiated by a turnaround in 
nationalistic attitude (Simon, 1984), environmental change 
(Van Agtmael, 1976), political development within the 
country (Sethi and Luther, 1986) or social unrest (Root, 
1968) . These causes are inclusive of many events --
political, economic and societal incidents• Events within 
and outside the host country, intra-national and interna-
tional happenings may have an influence. This thinking is 
in line with the research conducted by Schollhaininer and 
Nigh (1984) and Nigh (1985, 1986). 
Green (1974), Friedman and Kim (1988), Sethi and 
Luther (1986) and Nigh (1986) stress the importance of 
events beyond the scope and control of the host govern-
ment. They found that a stressful international relation-
ship, a global shift in political power, a new interna-
tional agreement, cooperation and so on all contribute to 
sources of political risk. 
Goldstein and Vanous (1983) cautioned that methods for 
assessing political risk and sources of risk in Western 
countries need modification and reinterpretation for other 
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countries. The same data may require a different 
interpretation and may result in different conclusions. 
Subramanian et al (1992) studied the relative impor-
tance of various political variables and found that polit-
ical stability ranks highest, followed by exchange con-
trol, attitudes towards foreign investors, governmental 
system, tax and labor policy. They also found that re-
gional staff ranks only second (after headquarters staff) 
as sources for political analysis. 
Rice and Mahmoud (1986) found that most companies 
assess political risk in a two stage process -- first, 
investigating the macro-environment, then, the micro-
environment . In both stages, a range of information is 
required. 
Empirical studies showed that executives actually 
prefer qualitative methods to quantitative analysis. 
Kobrin, Basek, Blank and la Palombara (1980) examined the 
various assessment methodologies used by American firms. 
An overwhelming proportion (46%) of respondents use quali-
tative methods which include multiple use of checklists, 
scenario developments and structured qualitative methods. 
Fewer respondents employ quantitative analysis. This 
shows that practitioners actually prefer qualitative 
analysis to quantitative data. Ideally, political risk 
analysis links risk analysis and expert judgment (Clarke, 
1988). 
Scenario developments, grand tours, a country check-
list, intuition of the chief executive officer or the 
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attitude of the subsidiary managers and news analysis by 
experts are the most popular methods in assessing politi-
cal risk (Simon, 1982, Robock, 1971, Ascher, 1982, and 
Ruirraiel and Heenan, 1978). 
Qualitative data is actually of vital importance. 
Expectations and perceptions of the executives come into 
play. Also, group dynamics and the power distribution 
among the various executives can affect the final verdict. 
Executives are involved in the decision-making process 
and in the formulation of strategies. Human behavior and 
organizational behavior play a significant role (Pugh et 
al, 1969) in the analysis of risk and in the policy deci-
sions . Events are interpreted by the executives before 
they can have an effect on management decisions. Human 
behavior is more difficult to predict since logic is not 
the only variable involved. Kobrin (1988) commented that 
since the risk involves subjective uncertainty, it is 
necessary to examine the events and the managerial evalua-
tion of each event. Opinions about future events are 
inherently subjective. 
The validity of political risk forecasting has not 
been firmly established. Rogers (1989) believed that such 
forecastings is not necessarily reliable. No empirical 
study have been performed on the power of predictive 
validity. Kobrin (1981b) found that the ratings by var-
ious indice demonstrate a low correlation. 
Milliken (1987) mentioned that uncertainty consists 
of three dimensions — state uncertainty (relating to the 
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changing enviornment), effect uncertainty (referring to 
the unknown impact), and response uncertainty (concerning 
unknown elements in the choice of response options). This 
phenomenoa implies that depending solely on an index 
probably simplifies the concept of risk. Managers, there-
fore, should opt for both quantiative and qualitative 
measures. 
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Effects of Political Risk 
The possible outcome of political risks is extensive, 
including direct and immediate effects as well as indirect 
and long term impact (Kassicieh and Nassar, 1986)• Nega-
tive indirect effects such as a sluggish economy, an 
insensitivity to growth, a non-aggressive business ap-
proach, an anti-foreign business sentiment in the host 
country and so on may cause a change in the composition of 
the environment. None of these factors impose their 
impact directly or immediately. However, when given time, 
the indirect effects may surface and their influence can 
be observed. Kobrin (1978) rejected the significance of 
indirect effects. He commented that "managers should be 
interested in political instability only to the extent 
that it is likely to constrain actual or potential opera-
tions" . He sees the effects of political risks as immedi-
ate, short-term and predictable. Still, indirect effects 
on the economy and the society as a whole or indirect 
effects on the company itself can also have far-reaching 
impact• In this study, we will concentrate on the direct 
effect on a firm. 
Profit 
The profit level of the firm is the primary interest 
of business executives. Robock (1971), Van Agtmael 
(1976), Friedman and Kim (1988), Desta (1985) and Kobrin 
(1981b, 1988) all dealt with this aspect. Van Agtmael and 
Desta are specially concerned with business loss whereas 
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Others emphasize the negative impact on profits. Torre 
and Neckar (1988) regarded the loss related to anticipated 
profits as the loss contingency. They labeled anything 
less than total loss as value contingency, which means the 
reduction in the expected value of future benefits. 
Weston and Sorge (1972) are concerned with the general 
financial situation. These scholars draw attention to the 
effect on the general level of profits, the future flow of 
profits and the fluctuation of the profits. Profit is the 
aggregate of operations risk, repatriation risk, revenue 
and cost. It is the bottom line figure incorporating 
sales and cost figures. Even though it is assumed to be a 
tell-all number, it may be presumptuous to look only at 
this figure. A segregation of the number into various 
components can provide more information to business 
executives so that future strategies can be developed. 
Operations 
of the Firm 
Root (1972) identified operational risk as one of the 
major effects of risks. Operational risk refers to any 
abrupt change in operations. Examples are difficulties in 
obtaining raw materials due to sourcing problems and 
transportation interruptions； production delays caused by 
hold-ups in shipment of raw materials and labor stoppages-
setbacks in export marketing due to new trading procedures 
and so on are caused by political events. Kim and Lyn 
(1987) pointed out that political risks could cause entry 
barriers into the host country and may ultimately affect 
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the investment portfolio of the multinational enterprise. 
It may also cause executives to re-examine whether to 
enter the new markets or not (Rugman, 1980)• 
The consequences of operational risks are the adverse 
changes in the primary value chain activities (Porter, 
1983) of the firm, both at the subsidiary level and at the 
global level. The results of such risks are probably more 
severe for foreign investments with manufacturing activi-
ties than those with only marketing activities. Manufac-
turing activities often serve as the backbone of a company 
as suppliers of the products sold. The effects are more 
serious for those companies with concentrated manufactur-
ing activities. If all the manufacturing is performed in 
one location, any operational risk will affect the sup-
plies of products in the global market (Porter, 1990). 
Extracting industry is one such example. Shell Co. de-
fines their risk as the "probability of not maintaining a 
contract for exploration, development and production of 
oil". This is a major concern for Shell since they follow 
a concentrated policy in exploration and production. 
For companies with only marketing activities in 
risk-prone regions, operational risks emerge when goods 
cannot reach the market in time. Dysfunction of the 
marketing infrastructure, problems in personnel management 
of the sales team may surface with the acceleration of 
political risk. These factors could decrease the sales of 
goods in the region. The effects cannot be ignored, but 
at least the consequences can be limited to a particular 
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marketing region. The effect is more pronounced in serv-
ice industries (Sabi, 1988, Terpstra and Yu, 1988). 
On a national basis, the relocation of operations may 
well affect the level of foreign investment, the general 
economy in the host city, host state and host country 
(Pomfret, 1989). 
Financial Status 
of the Firm 
Bankers are especially interested in the repayment 
ability of the country and of the firm if loans are grant-
ed. They often employ an index to measure the riskiness 
of the loans. The political risk index provided by Euro-
money and Institutional Investor basically measure the 
credit standing of a country in the international credit 
market. On a more micro-level, Cataquet (1988) regards 
any change in the contractual flow of financial payments 
as the major component of political risk. 
The financial status of a firm includes its profita-
bility, which is partly reflected by the operational risk 
and partly by the transferability of assets in a foreign 
land. Since operational risk has already been examined, 
transferability of financial assets, profitability, cost 
and revenue will be further discussed below. The ultimate 
loss of investments due to expropriation or confiscation 
will also be dealt with. 
Transferability 
of Assets 
A host government can erect barriers to limit a 
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firm's ability to repatriate earnings or assets. It may 
be brought about by enforcing new foreign exchange regula-
tions, fixing of foreign exchange rates, setting upper 
limits on foreign exchange transferred, devaluating the 
currency or setting up tedious procedures for repatriation 
(Root, 1972). 
Difficulties with transferability of assets are 
mainly twofold. Firstly, the total assets of the company 
may be deteriorated due to a new exchange rate. Whether 
the new rate is imposed by the host government or the 
result of market forces, it could have implications on the 
financial statements of the company. It would be revealed 
in the loss of profits and of total assets. Secondly, 
funds in a host country may be blocked by means of new 
repatriation regulations. This means that financial 
resources are not available for other subsidiaries. It 
decreases flexibility in the financial operations of the 
company. It also decreases the level of current assets 
for disposal in other regions and it limits the possibili-
ties of divestment. 
Revenue 
Sales can be affected by a strained international 
relationship (Kassicieh and Nassar, 1986)• Profitability 
is found to be a function of political instability (Green 
and Smith, 1972). The recent anti-dumping measures by US 
and European countries reduced the sales volume of many 
exports from the newly-industrializing countries (NICS) in 
Asia. The negotiations on the bilateral trade between US 
47 
and China, the copyright issue, the threats of 
retaliations on trade based on Article 301 intensified the 
relationship between the two countries. 
Expropriation and Confiscation 
of the Firm 
Many studies examine the likelihood of expropriation 
and confiscation. Bradley (1977), Kobrin (1980, 1984), 
Jodice (1980) and Encarnation and Vachani (1985) took ex 
propriation and confiscation as a main theme. It has been 
argued that expropriations and confiscations become less 
frequent as host governments become more experienced in 
dealing with multinationals. 
The loss with regard to expropriation and confisca-
tion is termed as ownership risk. It is probably the most 
severe loss that a corporation may be forced to face. 
This refers to the possible loss of assets and equity due 
to political risks. The capital investments, including 
all the fixed assets, may be taken over by the host gov-
ernment . 
Policy and Strategy 
of the Firm 
Kobrin (1981a) and Poynter (1982) are interested in 
how political risk affects the policy of a firm's foreign 
direct investment. Political risk can place limitations 
on the flexibility and the choice of strategy of a compa-
ny. It can also prohibit a company in setting policies 
and in designing its future tactics in certain ways. 
Pertlize (1985) illustrated how companies can formu-
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late their policy and strategies in the international 
market on the basis of political risks in different coun-
tries. Kennedy (1988) also developed a matrix using 
degree of political risk as one criterion and product 
portfolio type as the second dimension. He then suggested 
appropriate strategies for each mix. These studies demon-
strated the direct impact of political risks on the 
strategies of a company. 
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Dealing With Political Risk 
The ultimate purpose of assessing political risk is 
not only to accurately ascertain the origin and the like-
lihood of the risk; it is also especially useful for 
managers to devise strategies to reduce a firm's risk 
exposure (Haendel, 1979, Micallef, 1981). The literature 
provided a range of methods by which risks can be con-
trolled (Table 2-5)• The strategies can be categorized 
into -- optimization of short-term profits in the host 
country, minimization of capital commitment in risk-
conducive countries, increase of flexibility for the 
multinational firm on a global basis, change of the envi-
ronment by skillfully using the company‘s leverage, adap-
tation to the local request, transfer of the political 
risk, or slow divestment (Shapiro, 1981, Root, 1968, 
Yaprak and Sheldon, 1984). 
Maximization of 
Short-term Profits 
Shapiro (1981) examined the issue of political risk 
from the viewpoint of finance. In his opinion, a risk 
aversive country need not be avoided as long as the ele-
ment of risk is employed to make adjustments in strategic 
financial decisions. He argued that in risk aversive 
countries, a higher expected return on investment on such 
projects is a viable option. He also recognized the 
possibility of setting a shorter payback period in such 
countries (Weston and Sorge, 1972). Such adjustments are 




Methods for Handling Political Risk 
Method Author 
Evaluate time of entry Robock (1971) 
Joint venture arrangements Micallef (1981), Encarnation 
et al (1985) 
Structure the investment Shapiro (1981), Erol (1985) 
Develop multi-production sites Kobrin et al (1980) 
Develop multi-sourcing Robock (1971) 
Control intangible assets - Friedman and Kim (1988), 
marketing, technology Daniels et al (1985), Bradly 
(1977) 
Borrow locally Micallef (1981) 
Seek finance from local share- Bloch et al (1989) 
holders 
Maximize short-term profits Shapiro (1981) 
Set skimming price Friedman and Kim (1988) 
Repatriate, where possible Kobrin et al (1980) 
Formulate reinvestment policy Kobrin et al (1980) 
Lobby for support Robock (1971) 
Bargain and negotiate with govt Daniels et al (1985), 
Poynter (1982), Lecraw 
(1984) 
Adapt to local environment Bloch et al (1989), Encar-
nation and Vachani (1985) 
Buy insurance Robock (1971), Daniels et al 
(1985), Bloch et al (1989) 
Divest Shapiro (1981), Kobrin 
(1980) 
Seek information Shreave (1984), Mascarenhas 
and Atherton (1983) 
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investment. Shan (1991) found that the expected return 
and the payback period affects foreign direct investment 
decisions. Sethi (1987) advocated constantly examining 
the opportunities in a changing enviornment. 
Friedman and Kim (1988) recommended applying market-
ing strategies to deal with potential political risk. 
They suggest a skimming price policy in order to compen-
sate for the possible loss of future profit (March and 
Shapiro, 1987)• A wider profit margin in present business 
activity is able to offset possible alleviation of risk in 
the future. Similarly, Kassicieh and Nassar (1986) noted 
that most American involvement in the Gulf in the 1980s 
consisted of contracts and direct sales. These kinds of 
activities are more secure since the time span between the 
commencement and completion of the contract is much short-
er and payment or delivery can be completed in a shorter 
span of time. 
For distribution strategy, an alternative with less 
financial commitment is favored. Exporting or licensing 
to the host country is preferable to setting up wholly-
owned subsidiaries. As for product strategy, Friedman and 
Kim (1988) dealt more with the issues related to produc-
tion than the product itself, suggesting multi-production 
sites. On the matter of product range, it is suggested 
that firms sell products in risk-prone countries that are 
of less marginal commercial value to company as a whole 
(Weichmann and Pringle, 1983). Technological products that 
are turning obsolete, patented products that are running 
52 
f 
out of its period and excessive production capacity that 
are of little value to the company are ideal candidates. 
Minimization of 
Capital Commitment 
The potential ownership risk that a company is faced 
with is directly related to the amount of capital a multi-
national firm brings into the host country. To minimize 
this particular risk, a firm can find ways to alter the 
financial leverage. 
A popular method is to avoid wholly-owned subsidi-
aries (Calvet, 1981)• Anderson and Gatignon (1986) find 
evidence that foreign firms seek a smaller share of equity 
in entering a risky market. Forming joint ventures (wheth-
er with local firms or other foreign corporations) reduces 
the capital required from each partner； thus, minimizing 
the capital commitment. Other companies use licensing and 
franchising as Daniel, Krug and Nigh (1985) found in their 
study of China. In joining hands with another firm, the 
partner shares in the responsibilities of the investment 
(Micallef, 1981). 
Many multinational firms choose local firms as part-
ners. An advantage of maintaining a local partner (Bloch, 
Koeplinger and WoIfrum, 1988) is that it puts the host 
government in a more difficult position if confiscation is 
being considered. The local government, then, is not only 
dealing with the "monstrous" multinational corporations 
which come to "exploit the country". The government must 
also address the local owners and present them with some 
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rationale for confiscation or any anticipated loss due to 
political changes. In cases where confiscation is inevi-
table and compensation is given, the foreign companies can 
easily ask for equal treatment, based on the expectations 
of the local shareholders. This gives the multinational 
firms a higher stake to play, when dealing with the host 
government (Doz, 1986). 
In cases where local firms do not view the environ-
ment or the project favorably, or when they are limited by 
their financial resources, and their technological capa-
bility, the foreign company may revert to third-party 
participation in other forms. One such option is to devel-
op a joint-venture with another foreign firm. This mini-
mizes the capital committed in the host country. Hence, 
it lowers the total amount of exposure. Another alterna-
tive is to rely heavily on borrowing. Borrowing locally 
would directly involve the local banks in the project 
(Micallef, 1981). This carries the same basic effect as 
seeking a local partner. 
Another way is to borrow a significant amount from 
foreign banks (Yaprak and Sheldon, 1984)• This would 
affect the local government * s policy especially if the 
country is heavily in debt and if the country yearns to 
borrow extra money for government-sponsored project. Any 
possible default of a foreign debt may hurt the credit 
rating of the country and may influence the future borrow-
ing. Erol (1985) also noted the importance of the struc-
ture of the investment. 
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Some projects are well suited to borrowings from 
international organizations, such as the World Bank. In 
those cases, the international organization would act as a 
policing agent and exert direct or indirect controls on 




In order to be less dependent on a subsidiary in a 
particular host country, a multinational corporation may 
want to increase its flexibility. To achieve this flexi-
bility, the participation of headquarters is required so 
that strategies are drawn to enable diversification of 
sourcing, production or finance (Kogut, 1989)• If these 
activities are left to the discretion of the local manage-
ment, there may not be adequate motivation to consider the 
benefit of the entire corporation. Local management may 
be biased to local situations and local needs, instead of 
corporate concerns. 
Multi-site production can allow a company to create 
increased flexibility (Stopford and Wells, 1972). If the 
political risk in the host country should increase, for-
eign companies can quickly transfer the production sched-
ules to other subsidiaries where multi-sites are avail-
able. However, if the company has failed to develop 
multi-site production, if necessary machinery was not 
available elsewhere and if manpower was not trained in 
other places, the disturbance could cause a major headache 
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in operations. 
Multi-sourcing is yet another option available. 
Being dependent on raw materials outside the host country 
gives the multinational company additional power in nego-
tiating with the host government. Some companies follow 
the strategy of vertical integration and supply the raw 
materials from other subsidiaries. This allows the corpo-
ration to possess a powerful control device. The control 
exists if the host country relies on the subsidiary for 
employment, technology transfer or profits generated. 
Besides, diversification in sourcing gives a multinational 
firm more flexibility. 
Flexibility can also be achieved by withholding the sub-
sidiaries ‘access to new technology and to information 
crucial to their success. Some firms set up research 
centers outside the risk-prone area. They limit only 
obsolete technology to be made available to the risky 
countries. Updated technology is kept within the corpo-
rate headquarters. This gives the multinational corpora-
tion flexibility -- that is, if they were to lose the 
subsidiary, they can still keep the highly-valued current 
technology. Flexibility in the international distribution 
network is another source of strength. This gives the 
firm flexibility in global sourcing and global marketing. 
It also puts pressure on the local government to seek the 
assistance of the firm. 
Other companies retain financial resources. Instead 
of committing to capital investments for the subsidiary 
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(either in the form of a equity or intra-company loan or a 
guarantee on loans from financial institutions), a compa-
ny may choose to limit additional funding. That means 
additional finance is contingent upon the terms agreed 
upon. 
Being prepared for changes is another source of 
flexibility. Shreave (1984) suggested that close communi-
cation with the line and staff managers in the subsidi-
aries ensures that political risk assessment can be kept 
updated and relevant. This can shorten the time for 
strategy development. Mascarenhas and Atherton (1983) 
recommended a list of strategies in dealing with data and 
management problems in assessing political risk. This 
effort enables chief executives to be forewarned of future 
developments that could hinder a particular project. 
Adapt to 
Local Requests 
Host governments may persuade a foreign subsidiary to 
take up certain commitments or they may establish strin-
gent regulations. Many may simply adapt to local requests 
(Root, 1968)• This accommodating approach is character-
ized by being cooperative and unassertive. Such companies 




A more aggressive strategy is to attempt to change 
the environment. Many companies would ensure that they 
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leverage in their position before lobbying for support or 
negotiating with the local government (Poynter, 1986)• 
Once a minimal level of power is attained, the company may 
start soliciting for assistance. 
A company may lobby for support from other companies 
in the trade. A strong trade alliance may be able to 
exert pressure on the host government. This can be espe-
cially powerful in cases where foreign companies hold a 
sizable market share. If the trade alliance refuses to 
supply a much needed product, the local government may 
think twice before enforcing a regulation unfavorable to 
the foreign companies. 
Another target that companies could lobby for support 
is their home government. Home government is concerned 
with the balance of trade and the terms of trade with the 
host country. They often negotiate for reciprocal treat-
ment for foreign direct investment. Besides, home coun-
tries with a deficit balance of trade are specially sensi-
tive to companies‘ complaints of unfair treatment in host 
countries. The American government has been formulating 
ways to crack open the Japanese market in the past years. 
This was the result of the joint effort of the government 
as well as the companies involved. 
Other companies seek to negotiate directly with the 
local government. This type of strategy is derived from 
the bargaining power approach (Farge and Wells, 1982). 
The frequency is high in colonies of the home countries, 
with weak host governments (Shapiro, 1981) or with de-
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veloping countries (Kobrin, 1987)• This is also popular 
in countries where infrastructure is inadequate and where 
technology is lacking. In these situations, the host 
country has little to offer to the multinational firms, 
giving the foreign parties at an upper hand. 
Transferring 
the Risk 
Insurance is a well-accepted method to transfer risk. 
The limitations of obtaining an insurance policy is that 
it only covers certain specific risks (Brenner, 1981) --
for example, losses caused by war or from expropriation, 
as specified by the buyer. One may argue that if the 
insurance shopper can identify the risk in advance, he can 
tailor his strategies instead of being fully dependent on 
insurance. 
A second limitation is the amount and the time period 
insured. Normally, insurance companies establish a coun-
try limit for coverage. The riskier* the country is per-
ceived to be, the lower the limit and the higher the risk 
premium. This makes it expensive if not difficult for the 
companies to insure against risks in such countries. 
Divesting 
Another approach is to divest (Baker and Hashmi, 
1988)• Pulling out of a host country in a step-by-step 
manner is not without difficulties. Porter (1976) ac-
knowledges some of the difficulties in exiting a country 
--pressure from existing customers, the commitment to the 
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present staff, the value of assets, the image of the 
company and so on. These barriers sometimes make a smooth 
exit impossible, expensive and time-consuming. At times, 





Prospect theory was developed (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, 1984; and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) as an expla-
nation of behavior related to risk. This theory provides 
a framework for relating risk perception with risk han-
dling strategies. 
Prospect theory finds its foundation in expected 
utility theory. It complements the latter theory with 
empirical findings and explanations from other disci-
plines. It becomes an extension of the original theory, 
employing a much richer and more comprehensive framework 
in economics, decision science and psychology. 
Prospect theory proposes that decisions are not made 
spontaneously. Rather, it involves two stages —— an 
editing stage and an evaluation stage. In the editing 
stage, a person frames the problem in a simplified form. 
At this stage, a reference point is established. The 
different alternatives (also known as prospects) are 
compared to this reference point. The point serves as a 
neutral point, or a neutral zone on the scale. Outcomes 
better than the reference point are seen as gains and 
worse outcomes are considered losses. In the evaluation 
stage, a person evaluates each prospect and chooses the 
alternative that gives the highest satisfaction. Satis-
faction does not necessarily refer to monetary gain. 
Instead, it is often an optimization of gain, risk and 
personal preference. This reinforces Slavic (1987)»s 
premise that risk perceptions are individual and person-
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specific, with repeat to the reference point. 
The main differences between prospect theory and the 
expected utility theory are threefold. Firstly, prospect 
theory is based on the expected utility theory; yet, it is 
not normative in nature (Swalm, 1966)• The theory is 
derived from empirical studies of behavior. Secondly, 
prospect theory states that decisions are made with refer-
ence to a reference point, not to the final outcome as 
implied by the utility theory. Thirdly, prospect theory 
hypothesizes that behavior above and below the reference 
point is different. If the expected results are seen as 
possible gains above the expected reference point, risk 
averse behavior is expected. On the other hand, values 
below the reference point would lead to risk-taking behav-
ior. 
Prospect theory excels over the expected utility 
theory in its ability to deal with the assumptions of 
cancellation, transitivity, dominance and invariance 
(Tversky and Kahneitian, 1986) • These assumptions in the 
expected theory have been challenged by many -- cancella-
tion, being challenged the most and invariance, being 
rejected by only a few (Table 2-6). Further information 
is provided in Appendix 1. 
Kahneitian and Tversky (1984) realized that construct-
ing a theory that is acceptable both normatively and 
descriptively is beyond the state of the art of this type 
of research. Prospect theory, therefore, makes no norma-
tive claims. It bases its theory on empirical findings. 
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Table 2-6 
Expected Utility Theory: 
Violations of Assumptions 
Assumptions Empirical Study Explanatory Model 
Cancellation Certainty Effect All 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
Transitivity Preference Reorder Bivariate 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983) 
Dominance Tversky and Kahneman (1986) Prospect 
Theory 
Invariance Tversky and Kahneman (1986) Prospect 
Theory 
Source: Tversky and Kahneman (1986) 
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The theory frees itself from the assumptions mentioned. 
A contribution of prospect theory is its S-shaped value 
function. The S-shaped curve is also known as a Sigmond-
curve. The curve consists of two segments -一 a segment of 
concavity and a segment of convexity. In prospect theory, 
the outcome of prospects are considered as gains or losses 
from a neutral outcome or the reference point. The value 
function is commonly concave above the reference point and 
convex below it. This curve is divergent from the risk-
return analysis that assumes a linear function. 
This curve cautions us that the marginal value of 
money decreases as an individual accumulates more of that 
resource. This differs from the expected utility theory 
which presumes a linear risk-attitude. The shape of the 
curve leads us to discover the phenomena of certainty. A 
brief illustration of the concept of certainty is given in 
Appendix 2. 
A second implication of the marginal value can be 
seen from the shape of the curve. A marginal gain of $100 
to $200 is valued more than the marginal gain from $2,000 
to $2,100, given the discount of the stated probability. 
These features portray the psychological effect of risk on 
individuals and their behavior. 
The curve also showed that when losses are perceived 
people are typically risk-taking. This finding is a 
breakthrough from the historical belief that all 
decision-makers are risk averse (Fiegenbaium and Thomas, 
1988)• It also reveals that individuals exhibit a mixture 
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of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior. The major 
determinant for the risk handling method is the location 
of expected results in relation to the reference point. 
This again verifies the importance of framing and its role 
in decision-making. 
Previous Studies 
Many empirical studies have been performed to vali-
date the accuracy of prospect theory. When the theory was 
initially proposed, a number of studies emphasized its 
explanation, its relevancy and the assumptions of the 
expected theory (Kahaneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984; Kahne-
man, Solvic and Tversky; 1982, Tversky, 1969; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981, 1986; Hershey and Shoemaker, 1980, Budes-
cus and Weiss 1987, Levin, John and Davis, 1987; Fiegen-
baim and Thomas, 1988; Karen and Raaijamker, 1988; Loke 
1989) • Most studies involve individual choice between two 
alternatives of certainty (Bell, 1982)• Typically, the 
attributes provided in making the choice only involve risk 
and return. Many of these studies attempt to identify 
risk-averse and risk-taking behavior. 
Some studies examined the appropriateness of prospect 
theory in situations that reflect features close to real 
life. In order to assimilate reality, other attributes 
are added. The theory turns from a mere choice in hypo-
thetical situations to decisions that are more reflective 
of the real world situation. Currim and Sarin (1983) 
suggested that the prospect theory can be applied in 
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business, especially for modeling consumer preference. 
This is, perhaps, the beginning of such studies in the 
business context. 
Diamond (1988) examined individual consumer choice in 
automobiles given the probability of breakdown and the 
cost of repairs. Peterson and Lawson (1989) studied risk 
aversion attitude and the individual‘s involvement in 
politics. On an organizational level, many studies looked 
at the role of decision-makers, especially organization 
buyers. Puto et al (1985) looked at framing and effects 
of loyalty on decision-making. Puto (1987) applied the 
theory in the context of industrial buyers, further broad-
ening the theoretical framework. In Quails and Puto‘s 
thesis (1989), they examined how organizational attributes 
would offset or provide incentives for choice. Other 
studies looked at prospect theory in particular situa-
tions. Whyte (1986) and Loewenstein (1988) tried to use 
prospect theory to explain follow-up behaviors in errone-
ous decisions. It is prudent to note that these studies 
conclude that prospect theory can be applied in a range of 
business contexts. 
Previous Business-Related Studies on 
Prospect Theory 
The relevance of prospect theory in marketing has 
been widely discussed by scholars (Table 2-7)• Empirical 
studies on prospect theory and its isomorphic relationship 
to business situations was initiated by Puto. Puto mainly 
dealt with the issue in industrial buying situations. His 
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Table 2-7 
Studies Related to 
Applications of Prospect Theory 
in Business 
Author(s) Year Topic Examined 
Put<p, Patton and 1985 Loyalty, framing and behavior 
King for organizational buyers 
Whyte 1986 Prospect theory and escalating 
coimitinent for general deci-
sion-makers in organizations 
Puto 1987 工 a n d final reference 
points for organizational 
buyers 
Loewenstein 1988 Framing and delay strategy for 
general decision-makers in 
organizations 
Diamond 1988 Probability and cost for 
consumer choice 
Bondt, Werner and 1988 Prospect theory and escalating 
Makhija commitment 
Quails and Puto 1989 Organizational attributes, 
framing and choice for organi-
zational buyers 
Peterson and 1989 Risk aversion and political 
Lawson involvement for individuals 
Burton and Babin 1989 Marketing implications of 
prospect theory 
D‘Aveni 1989 Financial choice of execut-
ives in companies with high 
probability of bankruptcy, 
based on prospect and agency 
theory 
Hogarth and Einhorn 1990 Prospect theory with levels of 
payoffs and probabilities 
Mowen and Mowen 1991 Time and outcome evaluation --




research is reported in three major articles. 
In Puto et al (1985), a modified rebuy industrial 
decision was formulated. He examined how perceived risk 
and risk handling strategies are associated to loyalty to 
existing suppliers, the buying situation (dominance of 
price, quality, service or a combination of the three) and 
the perceived procurement problem (framing)• Utilizing an 
experimental design in his research, he found that the 
effects of all three conditions are statistically signifi-
cant. Choice of the vendor (whether existing or new, and 
whether a guarantee exists) which denotes that risk-han-
dling tactics were affected by all three variables. It 
was concluded that risk-handling strategies in industrial 
buying were related to how the buyers perceive (frame) the 
problem. 
Research on the framing process was lacking until 
Puto (1987) tested a model of buying decision framing 
process. In this article, the issue of the framing proc-
ess was briefly examined. In his study, Puto proposed a 
model of a two-stage framing process. An initial refer-
ence point is premised to be a function of the buyers• 
expectations and their specific buying objective. This 
initial reference point forms a basis for the final refer-
ence point. However, this point is not the only factor 
influencing the ultimate reference point. The final 
reference point is posited to be influenced by the sales 
message of the potential sellers, the reward the individu-
al anticipates in making various decisions as well as the 
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initial reference point. Finally, it is hypothesized that 
the final reference point affects the choice. Again, an 
experimental design is used to validate the proposed 
model. This model is put in the context of an industrial 
buying situation. It was found that the data is generally 
consistent with the model, implying that a two-stage 
decision-making process is being followed. 
Quails and Puto (1989) examined the ability of pros-
pect theory to explain industrial buying decisions, and 
explored how organizational climate affects this process. 
Organizational climate is conceptualized as two main 
constructs ——work environment and reward system. pros-
pect theory is found to be supported by the empirical 
data. It was further found that a significantly higher 
proportion of respondents with positive frames chose the 
option resulting in certainty. On the contrary, people 
with negative frames tend to favor the risk-taking or 
uncertainty option. This again supports the prospect 
theory. 
Diamond (1988) subscribed to a different perspective. 
He looked at consumer choice, using prospect theory as a 
basis. His research differs from Puto‘s studies in the 
sense that his subjects are consumers, not industrial 
buyers. Hence, organizational attributes need not be 
considered. In this study, two types of purchase situa-
tions are examined -- the first one is a high probability, 
low consequence situation, the second one is a low proba-
bility, high consequence situation. It was found that 
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some respondents appeared to ignore probability elements 
altogether; other respondents indicate that in the infor-
mation process, consequences are combined with probability 
to reach a judgment. It was also found that enduringly 
involved individuals rely less on traditional indicators 
of quality and are more prone to risky decisions. There 
were also correlations in the relationships between 
product-class involvement and risk-handling management 
methods (Venkatraman, 1989)• It was concluded that the 
interaction between probability and consequence range is 
significant. This confirms the hypothetical weighting 
function that probability is more important in high proba-
bility, low consequence situations and consequence is more 
important in low probability, high consequence situations. 
Overweighting of small probabilities was found and evalu-
ated. The authors also claim that factors other than 
probability, such as purchase price of the product, may 
affect the weighting of the probability. 
Application of 
Prospect Theory in Business 
Many business disciplines recognize the frequent 
encounter with risk. Financial analysis often evaluates 
the risk of various contingencies (D丨Aveni, 1989)• In 
capital investment, the most commonly used analysis in-
cludes return on investment, pay back periods as well as 
the possibilities of being unable to achieve the target. 
Management makes tradeoff decisions between risk and 
return. Any deviation from the expected result is taken 
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as risk. In marketing, decisions relating to new product 
developments estimate the cost and the potential revenue 
of the new product and compare it to the possibility of 
failure. Most of these assessments are based on the 




The previous discussions on the prospect theory and 
the studies on risk analysis form a foundation for the 
theoretical basis. In this chapter, attempts will be made 
to incorporate the various theories and to come up with a 
framework. Few attempts have been made to review the 
relationship between political risk and the company 
strategies. In this research, we attempt to examine the 
relation between perceived political risk and preferred 
strategy from the perspective of an executive. This 
association forms the focus of the study. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to test the conceptual 
model that will be presented below. Specifically, by-
testing the model, a number of objectives can be attained. 
Firstly, it will enable us to study the relationship 
between risk assessment and strategy. Many scholars 
emphasize the relevance of assessment. They also advocate 
that strategies should be contingent upon assessment. 
Porter (1980) provided us with a basic outline for assess-
ment. Porter's further writings on strategic management 
(1980, 1983, 1986, 1990) rely heavily on this assessment 
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framework and further developed the framework from the 
local environment to the global level. In these writings, 
he cautioned managers to seek data before building up 
strategies based on information. Day and Wensley (1988) 
and Ohmae (1989) both reiterated the importance of the 
external and internal environment as well as the signifi-
cance of assessment of the environment. Based on such 
assessments, strategies can follow. These writings pro-
vided us with a paradigm of strategic management. They 
repeatedly discuss the importance of relating strategy to 
assessment. 
However, empirical studies on the process of develop-
ing strategies are lacking, except for case analyses, such 
as Kotler et al (1985) and Porter (1983, 1990). These and 
many other cases are interesting and worth examining. 
However, their emphasis is on the success (or failure) of 
the strategy. The process of strategy development and the 
relationship between risk and strategy has not been probed 
empirically nor with much depth. A comprehensive under-
standing of the ways in which companies deal with politi-
cal risk cannot be ascertained. This study hopes to offer 
an empirical understanding of the relationship between 
assessment and strategies. Armed with knowledge of the 
relationship, executives can become more precise in map-
ping their strategies. It can also provide academicians 
with a better understanding of the decision-making proc-
ess. 
Secondly, the element of risk is becoming an increas-
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ingly dominant component of business nowadays. Risk can 
be examined from many perspectives. To name a few, there 
is social risk, political risk, technological risk and 
business risk (Short, 1987, Ayres and Sandilya, 1986, 
Zimmerman, 1986, Morrow, 1987). This study attempts to 
demonstrate how political risk is assessed and dealt with. 
Many executives foresee an increasingly vital role for 
political risk in their foreign direct investment deci-
sions. Given that trend, a major concern for companies is 
to optimize risk and return. An understanding and an 
accurate assessment of risk plays a dominant role. An 
understanding of the relationship between perceived risk 
and risk handling strategies can provide further insights. 
This study should impart a deeper understanding of 
political risk. The previous studies on political risk 
look at risk analysis and risk handling as two separate 
entities (Kobrin, 1988). The emphasis of these studies 
has been on state uncertainty -- how to gain a more accu-
rate prediction and a higher reliability for the predic-
tion. There has been few systematic approach attempting 
to relate political risk and political risk handling 
strategy. This study would allow us to study how strate-
gies, with reference to perceived political risk, are 
developed. It also examines state uncertainty, effect 
uncertainty and response uncertainty (Milliken, 1987)• 
Based on this.approach, recommendations can be made so 
that management can direct their strategies to optimally 
serve the company. This is very meaningful to management. 
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Thirdly, the testing of the model can enable further 
understanding of the prospect theory. The theory has been 
claimed to be a powerful tool in explaining behavior when 
an individual is faced with risk and uncertainty. Placing 
the theory in a business context expands the frontier of 
the theory from a decision-making theory to a strategy-
development application. It also tests the validity of 
the theory based on an objective uncertainty in the result 
(for example, that of throwing a dice) to a subjective 
event (for example, the possibility of an event) in gaug-
ing the end result. The differences between subjective 
uncertainty and objective uncertainty and the differences 
between a choice of one alternative (in betting) and the 
choice of a portfolio of strategies (in business) would 
further test the applicability of the theory with these 
adjustments. This would be a contribution to the existing 
theory. 
Lastly, few studies have looked at strategic develop-
ment from the perspective of a subsidiary. The viewpoint 
of headquarters dominate previous studies. Investigating 
the issue from a subsidiary manager's viewpoint may lead 
to further insights and better understanding of the opera-
tions of multinational corporations. The relationship of 
executives• behavior and corporate behavior is confirmed 
by Allison's (1971) research which states that a company‘s 
decision-making process is similar to an individual‘s 
decision-making process. This is supported by Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas (1988)• Hence, a better understanding of an 
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Scope of Study 
The topic to be studied is the relationship between 
perceived political risk in host countries and risk han-
dling strategies. Specifically, we will be examining the 
level of perceived political risk facing business execu-
tives (at the subsidiary level) in Hong Kong in light of 
perceived changes in 1997. The personal preferences of 
executives towards various risk handling strategies spe-
cific to the situation will be investigated. 
The study concentrates on exploring the attitude and 
the behavior of executives working in companies or subsid-
iaries with foreign direct investments in Hong Kong. For 
the purpose of this study, foreign direct investment is 
restricted to subsidiaries with foreign origins that are 
operating in Hong Kong. It includes foreign investments 
in manufacturing as well as non-manufacturing industries. 
In order to reduce the complexity of the study, foreign 
direct investment from three different home countries are 
examined. The countries specified are the US, Japan and 
France. These three home countries were chosen based on 
their relatively higher involvement in investment in Hong 
Kong. The consideration and evaluation of the political 
risk in Hong Kong may be significantly affected by the 
changing role of their home countries in the near future. 
This study concentrates on studying political risk in host 
countries and ignores the issues of home country political 
risks (Well, 1988, Tallman, 1988) as well as risks faced 
by third world or NIC multinationals (Wells, 1983). 
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For each company, one individual was contacted: the 
individual identified as the chief executive officer of 
the subsidiary, typically the subsidiary manager. The 
study peruses the personal attitude and preference of the 
executive. 
Since this study focuses on mapping the risk percep-
tion and risk handling strategies of individuals, the 
complexity of the components of a decision-making unit 
(Morris, Stanton and Calantone, 1985; Morris, Paul and 
Rahtz, 1987; Samli, Grewal and Mathur, 1988) is not ad-
dressed. The interaction of the players within the unit, 
the various motives of the individuals, their leadership 
ability will not be examined. The complexity of the role 
of the headquarters and subsidiaries (Doz, 1986) will also 
not be studied. 
Attempts were made to contact the various counsels in 
Hong Kong with the goal of obtaining updated information 
on foreign direct investments from the respective coun-
tries . List of companies were obtained. The details of 
the list will be further discussed in the section under 
Survey Design. 
It should be noted that this study attempts to draw 
the relationship between risk assessment and risk handling 
strategy at a point in time. Organizations• decision 
making has been found to be multi-phased (Smith and Tay-
lor, 1985; Brown and Brucker, 1990) . Many studies ac-
knowledge that a person goes through different stages of 
awareness of a problem, of setting a target, of evaluating 
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the options and of determining the choice. This study 
assumes that all the individuals interviewed have gone 
through the initial steps and are at the stage of choosing 
among the alternatives. Dynamics in group decision-making 




The model presented in Figure 3-1 incorporates a 
simplified conceptual framework of the study. The struc-
ture portrays a relationship between political analysis 
and risk handling strategies, with the existence of a 
reference point. Personal and company characteristics are 
regarded as the mediating variables. 
The construction of the model is based upon Puto 
(1987), Puto et al (1985), Quails and Puto (1989). In 
these studies, Puto applied the prospects theory in exam-
ining how organizational buying behavior is affected by 
perceived risk. He also used individual characteristics 
as moderating variables. It is assumed that a parallel 
exists between the variables examined by Puto and the 
variables in this study. 
General Introduction 
The framework is comprised of four major components. 
Specifically, they are risk assessment, risk handling 
methods, reference point and characteristics (personal and 
company). Limiting the decision making process to these 
four components reduces the burden on the respondents and 
thereby improve the accuracy of their feedback (Silk and 
Kalwani, 1982). 
Empirical studies incorporating all four constructs 
in one holistic model cannot be identified. Past research 
provided little insights on how executives choose among 
the strategy alternatives, given a certain perceived level 
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these major components is, therefore, deemed important and 
necessary. 
Prospect theory states that the evaluation of a 
particular situation enables a person to frame the prob-
lem. At the end of the first stage of evaluation (risk 
assessment), a reference point is established. Then, 
different prospects (or alternatives) are compared to a 
reference point. The choice of the prospect (risk han-
dling strategy) is dependent on the gains and losses 
relative to the reference point. This theory identified 
three major elements of concern ——evaluation of the 
situation, the reference point itself and the choice of 
prospects. Their counterparts in the context of political 
risk are identified as political risk assessment, target 
and strategy choice. Besides these three major elements, 
a fourth moderating construct is added onto the framework. 
This fourth component is personal and company characteris-
tics . Since the study involves personal perceptions or 
opinions of company strategies, personal and company 
characteristics are expected to play a role in influencing 
the process. The conceptual model ignores the timing in 
the different stages and only depicts the relationship of 
these four components at a point in time for the execu-
tives. 
Differences between the assumptions in prospective 
theory and the situation of risk assessment and risk 
handling strategies need to be addressed. The first dif-
ference lies in subjective uncertainty verses objective 
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uncertainty. The inability to rely solely on past data 
and past behavior makes political risk assessment more 
complicated. The second difference can be found in the 
difficulty of identifying risk-taking verses risk-averse 
strategies in business• Tactics are often neutral in 
nature and are regarded as risk-takers or otherwise based 
on the situation of the firm, its resources, its coitimit-
ment and its evaluation of the host country. The same 
strategy may be seen differently by different executives 
and different firms. This implies that the prospect 
theory has to be adapted for use for the business environ-
ment. The third major difference is that the prospect 
theory assumes two alternatives (which was extended to 
more alternatives in later studies) that are distinct and 
mutually exclusive. In business strategies, especially 
those involving corporate decisions, a number of tactics 
often complement and support each other. The tactics are, 
therefore, not mutually exclusive. Besides, a risk-taking 
tactic in one functional area may go in harmony with a 
risk-averse strategy in another functional area. For 
example, a company may limit the inflow of intra-company 
funds in an effort to minimize anticipated financal expo-
sure. This may force the same company to seek financing 
from local sources. These risk-avoidance financial 
strategy may go hand in hand with risk-taking strategies 
in other areas like importation of advanced technology in 
order to reach a balance of leverage with the local gov-
ernment in future negotiations. A fourth difference is 
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that in prospects theory the decision is made over a 
period of time, whereas in business strategies the associ-
ation can only be made at one point in time. The ever-
changing business environment, the dynamic nature of 
information made available every minute means that in the 
development of business strategy, there is no perfect 
information, nor is there totally accurate information. 
Perception of 
Political Risk 
In order to assess the political risk of a country, 
many different aspects have to be explored. Various 
indicators have been utilized to measure the levels of 
political risk. Some of these are based on past data, 
such as, the number of expropriations or the number of 
coups in the last year; others are forecasts of future 
situations, such as the possibility of an opposing party 
winning an election or the expected number of riots in the 
coining year. A major uncertainty lies in the predictive 
validity of these indicators. The unknown lies in firstly 
whether the event will take place and secondly the direc-
tion and impact of its effects on business. No matter 
which types of indicators are used, the assessment is 
largely a personal interpretation and evaluation. 
Executives personally select indicators that they 
deem important. They may include index measuring the 
environment in the host country or outside the country. 
They may derive from a general impression of the country. 
The range of events and indicators cited as important are 
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illustrated in Table 3-1. 
In the case of Hong Kong, with the advent of 1997 the 
risk elements usually involve four parties -- the local 
Hong Kong government, the Chinese government, the British 
government and the home country from which the investment 
originates. The role of the first three parties is evolv-
ing with the approach of 1997• Their respective power in 
the management of Hong Kong is altering with the passage 
of time. The fourth party, the home country of the for-
eign investor, differs for each country. 
Even though the British, Chinese and Hong Kong Gov-
eminent all affect the politics of Hong Kong, each of them 
looks at the city from a different perspective. The role 
of the British Government in Hong Kong is dwindling as it 
paves the way for Chinese sovereignty by 1997. In fact, 
some political pundits have commented that the British 
Government is growing increasingly willing to comprise 
with the PRC Government. Some even criticized the British 
government's policies in Hong Kong, which they say aim at 
economic and financial gains for industries and the people 
in Britain with little concern for local, ongoing economic 
development (Lee, 19 9 2; Tang, 1992). The British have 
been accused in using the Hong Kong government as its 
mouthpiece in voicing opinions and in directing economic 
policies. The Hong Kong Government and British Government 
often share similar policies and follow the same lines of 
argument. On the other side is the Chinese Government 




of Political Risk Perception 
I. Political and Legal 
A. Hong Kong 
* Change in Government‘s economic policy 
* Change in administrative structure 
* Change in foreign exchange operations 
* Change in tax rate 
* Economic policy of local government 
B. China 
* Change in government structure 
* Change in economic objectives and policies 
* Change in foreign exchange operations 
* Government丨s control of Renminbi 
* Control of profit and capital repatriation 
* Tax rate and tax policy 
* Power of opposing political parties 
* Stability and value of Renminbi 
II. Social and Economical 
Hong Kong 
* Cost of labor 
* Industrial disputes 
* Price level change 
* Stability of Hong Kong dollar 
* Availability of labor 
* Productivity of labor 
* Convertibility of Hong Kong dollar 
* Efficiency of labor 
III. International Relationship 
* Image of Hong Kong 
* Hong Kong‘s diplomatic relationship with other countries 
* Image of China 
* China‘s diplomatic relationship with other countries 
IV. Relationship Between Hong Kong and China 
* Hong Kong representation in Chinese government 
* Willingness to follow of China‘s policy 
* Autonomy of Hong Kong 
* People‘s attitude towards Chinese government 
* people's behavior toward Chinese government 
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Hong Kong through a more dominating hold. In this study, 
we will concentrate on two parties -- the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment (which indirectly represents the British Govern-
ment) and the Chinese Government. 
The home government includes a range of countries 
that place foreign direct investments in Hong Kong. The 
characteristics of each home country are different and 
need to be examined at length. In order to concentrate on 
the political risk in the host country, instead of the 
home country, this area will not be examined in this 
study. Three different home countries will be selected 
for the purpose of comparison. 
Reference Point 
In Puto, Patton and King (1985), a range of decision 
frames are acknowledged. They include a variety of ways 
of coining up with a reference point. THe use of past 
performance, risk analysis, worst scenario, expected value 
and the like are common yardsticks. In Puto (1987), the 
reference point corresponds to the different price levels 
in a purchase. In Quails and Puto (1989), price levels 
were used to delineate the reference point. In the case 
of a business unit, the reference point can be measured in 
terms of the business target of the unit ——the level of 
its expected result and the perception of the target. 
Since prospect theory has not been tested in the context 
of strategies, the proposition in this study relating to 





Prospect theory states that the framing of the prob-
lem influences the choice of risk averse or risk taking 
strategies. In business decisions, strategy choices 
comprise of a range of risk-handling strategies. 
Puto et al (1985) defined risk averse as a preference 
for an alternative whose outcome is known with certainty 
over one having an equal or more favorable expected value 
but whose outcome is probabilistic. According to this 
definition, risk-handling strategies cannot be categori-
cally identified as risk-averse or risk-taking. Certainty 
under political changes is almost a misnomer. Despite 
this fact, relative offensive and defensive strategies can 
be identified. Offensive strategies are those that the 
company takes an active role in. They are those that 
involve more effort, more planning and more initiative. 
They also aim at changing the environment. This, though 
different from risk-taking strategies, is similar in 
nature. Defensive strategies are more reactive and are 
more often a response to the environment. They assume 
that the environment is given so they try to work within 
the limitations set. In this study, we will try to draw 
an association between the different types of strategies 
based on the perceived political risk, the reference point 
and the company and personal characteristics. The rela-
tions between these factor will be further examined under 
the section on Hypothesis. 
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Company and Personal 
Characteristics 
Prospect theory examines the three major variables 
that have already been discussed in the previous sections. 
We feel that since business strategies are confined within 
a company, there are often personal preferences towards 
the different strategies. Company and personal character-
istics affect the value that the executive place on assess 
to political risk, and the perception of the reference 
point which, in turn, affects their choice of the risk 





the Major Constructs 
Assessment of 
Political Risk 
Given the summary of the previous studies on politi-
cal risk indicators, a general outline for understanding 
political risk has been formulated. This includes two 
major parts -- indicators referring to incidents in the 
host country (internal) and indicators that involve the 
host country with other countries (external)• Host coun-
try indicators can be further categorized into political, 
social and economic related indicators. The external 
indicators refer to the international relationship with 
other countries and the intranational relationship between 
the city and the central government. 
Based on the information from previous research of 
the literature, discussions were held on a small group 
basis with middle-level executives who were enrolled in a 
Diploma course offered by the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. Fifty-five statements were gathered after the 
exercise. A second round of indepth discussions was also 
held with senior executives responsible for subsidiary 
operations in Hong Kong. This was performed on an indi-
vidual basis through interviews. In general, these execu-
tives showed more concern for the situation outside of 
Hong Kong. They also took into account the economic 
conditions in the Special Economic Zones, which they 
believe manifest the policy of the Chinese government. 
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The input from Hong Kong executives allow us to 
operationalize the construct for the local environment. 
The opinions that both the Diploma participants and the 
executives mentioned were collected. Duplicate statements 
were reduced. Statements that did not demonstrate at 
least one characteristic of political risk (unanticipated-
ness, discontinuity and uncertainty) were dropped unless 
it was mentioned by two or more executives. These state-
ments were included in a pilot test. They were reduced to 
twenty-nine statements after two tests. And, in order to 
measure the overall political risk of Hong Kong, a global 
statement was also included. All these statement are 
evaluated on a 6-point Likert scale. 
The statements that are finalized involve four 
perspectives -一 the political and legal environment (Hong 
Kong and China), social and economic environment (Hong 
Kong)• the international relationship and intranational 
relationship (Table 3-1)• By examining these sub-indices 
and the global statement, we are not only studying Hong 
Kong as a city-state, but also as a city under way to 
fulfilling the "One Country Two Systems" proposal. 
Political Risk Handling 
Methods 
The dependent variable in this study is the risk 
handling strategy. This refers to the likelihood that an 
individual would choose a specific risk handling method. 
The literature review indicates a wide range of options 
available. They cover choices ranging from inward looking 
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to outward looking tactics. They comprise aggressive as 
well as defensive strategies. 
The suggested alternatives incorporate various objec-
tives. They can be categorized into maximization of 
short-term profits, minimization of capital commitment in 
Hong Kong, increase of global flexibilities, increased 
adaptation to local requests, negotiations with local 
governments in an attempt to make changes, ways to trans-
fer the risk and divesting. The same group of Diploma 
course participants and the senior executives separately 
commented, analyzed and came up with the various strate-
gies under each of the objectives mentioned. Twenty-five 
different statements (to be evaluated on a 6-point Likert 
scale) representing the construct were derived after pilot 
tests. The strategies are presented in Table 3-2. 
Reference Point 
Many studies have addressed the antecedent of the 
reference point• However, few investigations has been 
performed on how the reference point interacts with dif-
ferent assessments of the political climate in the forma-
tion of risk handling strategies. To investigate whether 
political risk handling strategies vary across contingen-
cies of different perceived levels of risk, and to examine 
the role of reference point, it is essential that this 
construct be examined. 
The reference point is of special importance to 
business. Puto (1987) treated it as analogous to a target 
that an individual sets. It denotes a point that reflects 
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Table 3-2 
List of Political Risk Handling Strategies 
A. To maximize short-term profits 
* Set a higher profit margin 
* Set a higher long term target 
* Favor contracts with shorter time span 
B. To minimize future investment 
* Favor trading, etc to foreign investment 
* Minimize additional investment 
* Seek additional funds from local banks 
* Seek additional funds from foreign banks 
C. To minimize possible loss 
* Market obsolete technology to subsidiary 
* Withhold assess to new technology 
* Buy political insurance 
* Maintain operations at minimal level 
* Act as good citizen, follow host government guideline 
* Create better corporate image 
* Set up holding company in other countries 
D. To increase global flexibilities 
* Develop multi-site production 
* Develop multi-souring of materials, etc 
* Limit inflow of intra-company finance 
* Develop information systems 
E. To negotiate 
* Lobby competitors to negotiate with local government 
* Lobby home government to negotiate with local government 
* Lobby competitors to negotiate with central government 
* Lobby home government to negotiate with central 
government 
F. To divest 
* Sell subsidiary ownership to local firm 
* Sell subsidiary ownership to multinational firm 
* Pull out 
Note : A, D and E constitute agressive (offensive) behavior 
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how the executive reacts and interprets the expectations 
of the headquarters or the regional office. It also 
demonstrates how the executive views the profit level in 
relation to the political risk in the host country. It is 
a self-imposed performance guideline. This target may 
reflect the directives of the headquarters. Or, it may 
simply be based on the guidelines from headquarters. 
Alternatively, the subsidiary may derive a target level. 
The executive may accept the target or may revise the 
standard according to his own perception. Regardless of 
the number that is arrived at and regardless of what 
indicators are used, the executive is affected by the 
reference point. According to prospect theory, alterna-
tives are compared to the reference point and frames are 
set. If the target is set at a level that executives feel 
is easy to achieve, little effort is placed on exploring 
potential profits. However, if the target is set at a 
level that executives feel is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to attain, the executives may have a tendency to opt 
for projects that bring a higher return (hence higher 
risk). 
Four indicators for the reference point are incorpo-
rated in this study. The first indicator is the target of 
the unit in relationship to its competitors. The second 
• indicator is the target in relationship to other subsidi-
aries. The third indicator is the perceived difficulty in 
attaining the target. The final indicator is the level of 
personal commitment to the target. These indicators 
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indicate how an executive views the goal. It measures the 
perceived aggressiveness and commitment of the subsidiary 
manager to compete in an industry in Hong Kong. It also 
provides insights into the perceived importance and power 
of the Hong Kong subsidiary with respect to the multina-
tional corporation as a whole. It measures the perceived 
expected performance of the subsidiary as compared to 
others, using the competitors and other subsidiaries as 
yardsticks. The executives are asked to respond to the 
four indicators based on a 6 point Likert-type scale. 
Moderators: 
Company and Individual 
Characteristics 
Demographics relating to company and individuals are 
collected. These include size of the Hong Kong subsidi-
ary, the experience of the subsidiary in Hong Kong and the 
relative importance of the subsidiary. It also includes 
the activities that are performed in Hong Kong as well as 
the yardsticks used for measuring the performance of the 
subsidiary. Individual demographics include sex, age, 
working experience. These characteristics reveal, in this 
preliminary study, whether company and personal demograph-
ics (Arnold, 1982) affect risk perception, reference point 





As depicted in Figure 3-1, the risk handling strate-
gies are posited as a function of two factors: (i) politi-
cal risk perception, and (2) reference point. These two 
constructs combine to determine the preferred strategy. 
HI: Risk handling strategies are determined in 
part by the executive's assessment of 
the political risk and in part by the 
reference point. 
It is surmised that the evaluation of political risk 
alone does not determine the strategy. Normatively, risk 
assessment must be carried out before strategies are 
settled. Target (reference point) also affects the choice 
of strategy. The reference point (a variety of perform-
ance targets) provides a gauge for performance expected, 
or rather, the self-imposed performance level. These are 
the two main variables that affect political risk handling 
strategies. This hypothesis is stated in HI. 
A major characteristic of prospect theory is the 
surmise that different types of behavior are divergent, in 
relation to various levels of perceived risk. A situation 
that is seen as relatively positive (or a gain situation) 
is more likely to lead to a risk-averse behavior, whereas 
a negative scenario (or a loss situation) is more likely 
to result in a risk-taking action. This surmise is tested 
in the following hypothesis: 
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Hla: Managers who regard the political future 
of Hong Kong as less risky are more 
likely to prefer defensive (risk-
averse) tactics than those who view the 
situation as more risky. These same 
managers who regard the future as less 
risky are less likely to prefer offen-
sive (risk-taking) tactics than their 
counterparts. 
Prospect theory states that the reference point is a 
factor that mediates the risk assessments and the strate-
gy. That is, a process exists -- firstly, risk is as-
sessed; then, the reference point is set based on the 
assessment; and finally, strategies are chosen based on 
the reference point. In the context of business strate-
gies in subsidiaries, it is deemed necessary to make some 
adaptations. Due to the different sets of strategies 
(offensive and defensive) available and the imposition of 
the target from headquarters, the reference point may not 
act as a mediating variable; though, it is still one of 
the variables that affects the preference towards a 
strategy. Most targets are set by the headquarters 
(Bartlett, 1985). From the subsidiary manager‘s view-
point, the target may not be perceived to be based on risk 
assessment, reference point determination, nor strategy 
choice. The target is a given fact that executives have 
to respond to. Hence, it is a factor influencing the 
strategy, but not a mediating factor. This association is 
stated in Hlb. 
The hypothesis (Hlb) will be tested by means of 
comparing two regression analyses. The purpose of using 
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two nested regressions is to test the incremental effect 
of the reference point on the preference towards a strate-
gy, independent of the political risk assessment. The 
first regression examines political risk assessments as 
predictors of the strategy and the second regression 
retains these predictors plus the four dimensions of the 
reference point. If the effects of the political risk 
assessments are mediated entirely by the reference point, 
then they should have significant regression in the first 
regression and act as a nonsignificant coefficient in the 
second one. This would demonstrate that the reference 
point is a mediating factor. This method has been previ-
ously employed by Puto (1987)• 
However, if the coefficients shown in the first and 
second regression do not conform to the pattern discussed 
above, then the reference point is a significant factor 
(depending on the beta coefficient) but not a mediating 
factor. This assumption refines the prospect theory and 
presumes that the reference point is not a mediating 
factor. This is stated in Hlb. 
Hlb: The reference point affects the risk-
handling strategies as an influencing 
factor, but the effects of political 
risk assessment are not mediated by the 
reference point. 
According to the prospect theory, people with a 
reference point that is considered relatively easy to 
attain would behave differently from those whose reference 
point is seen to be difficult to attain. Under the cir-
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cumstance of relatively high political risk, the executive 
probably finds it difficult to achieve the given target. 
They would be more motivated to take up an offensive 
(risk-averse) strategy. An offensive (risk-taking) 
strategy generally assumes more monitoring, more control 
and more effort, not to mention a higher level of risk. A 
defensive strategy avoids risks and expects minimal 
changes in the environment. This difference for the two 
types of strategies is stated in hypothesis Ic. A more 
detailed list of sub-hypotheses stating how each independ-
ent variable affects the two different strategies is 
illustrated in Table 3-3. 
A major supposition in Hlc is that offensive and 
defensive strategies are affected by different variables. 
As shown in Table 3-3, it is expected that offensive 
strategies are mainly affected by the reference point. 
The first line in Table 3-3 indicates the expected effects 
of the independent variables (political risk assessments 
and reference point measurements) on offensive strategies. 
The conditions in Hong Kong and the conditions in China 
are surmised to have little effect. This is because 
offensive strategies are usually outward looking. The 
mere evaluation of local conditions in Hong Kong and in 
China would have limited effect. The effects of intrana-
tional and international relations are more pronounced. 
The more unstable the relationship between Hong Kong and 
China, and the more unstable the relationship with the 
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the greater likelihood of choosing offensive strategies. 
This is in line with the main thesis of prospect theory 
(that a negative frame would lead to more risk-taking 
behavior)• As for the various measurements of reference 
point, it is expected that if a manager regards the target 
as difficult to attain, or as much higher than either the 
competitors or the subsidiaries, or if the manager feels 
that the target ignores his personal input, the reference 
point is viewed in a negative sense. Again, according to 
prospect theory, this would most likely lead to offensive 
strategies. 
The second line in Table 3-3 illustrates the sub-
hypothesis which states the effects of the eight variables 
on defensive strategies. Only the conditions in Hong Kong 
and the conditions in China are expected to carry a sig-
nificant effect on the choice of defensive strategy. All 
the other variables are elements that are concerned with 
the environment outside of Hong Kong or are situation in 
other locations in comparison to those in Hong Kong. 
Since defensive strategies are generally inward-looking, 
the factors that are indicative of the conditions outside 
Tablof the city are expected to carry little effect. 
It is found that managers would generally prefer the 
status quo in Hong Kong. Most businessmen rate Hong Kong 
positively in light of investment climate. Minimal 
changes are preferred. On the other hand, changes in the 
conditions in China are often interpreted as a trend 
towards economic freedom. That, too, is viewed positive-
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ly. According to prospect theory, when the conditions are 
favorable, managers would opt for defensive strategies. 
This is the rationale behind the second line in 4. 
The third line in the figure compares the effect of 
each attribute on offensive and defensive strategies. 
Conditions in Hong Kong and conditions in China are ex-
pected to have stronger impact on defensive strategies 
whereas the others are likely to exert greater effects on 
offensive strategies. 
Hlc: The effects of political risk assessment 
and reference point are different for 
offensive and defensive strategies 
(refer to Table 3-3). 
Role of the 
Moderators 
Little investigation has been done on how perceived 
risk interacts with company and individual characteris-
tics. Similarly, little research has examined the effec-
tiveness of risk assessment across variations in situa-
tional characteristics. 
To investigate whether the importance of the explana-
tory variables (political risk assessment) varies across 
contingencies, eight activities (sourcing, production, 
scheduling, local marketing, overseas marketing, service, 
technology development and coordination) each with two 
levels (have and have not), five target criteria (sales, 
expense, return on assets, market share and profit) each 
with two levels (have and have not) , five company charac-
teristics (number of employees, years of operation in Hong 
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Kong, planning frame, contribution of Hong Kong subsidiary 
and company nationality) and four individual characteris-
tics (age, working experience, years of working in subsid-
iary and sex) are incorporated as moderating variables. 
This part of the study is exploratory in nature. The 
attempt is to gain more understanding of the topic. 
The expected effects of the moderators (demographic 
and company characteristics) on the strategies is summa-
rized in H2. 
H2: Risk handling strategy is influenced by 
risk assessment and reference point. 
Company and individual characteristics 
and reference point are contingent 
variables influencing the choice of the 
strategy. 
These two major hypothesis form the basis of the 
study. In order to test these hypothesis, a survey was 
performed and statistical tests are carried out. The 




The first phase in developing the questionnaire lies 
in the operationalization of the four constructs. The 
questionnaire was developed in three stages. As mentioned 
earlier, the first stage involved discussions on the 
measurements of the constructs. The second stage included 
in-depth interviews on the measurements• The third stage 
consisted of pilot testing the initial questionnaire that 
was derived from the first two stages. 
In the first stage, based on theoretical guidelines 
and past research, discussions were held with middle-level 
executives. These executives are participants enrolled in 
a Diploma course offered by the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. The majority of these executives have worked for 
five to ten years in business and hold responsible posi-
tions in companies. They come from firms of various 
nationalities. 
In the discussion sessions, the executives were asked 
to form groups of five or six people. They were given the 
task of brainstorming on the various aspects of the three 
major constructs and to come up with statements that can 
be used to assess the constructs. A sub-index, based on 
past studies, for each construct is available as a refer-
ence. Fifty-two executives attended the sessions. The 
executives were encouraged to be creative and to put down 
as many statements as possible. Explanation or justifica-
tion for the statements was not required. After each 
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session, time was spent to discuss the appropriateness of 
each Of these statements. Irrelevant statements were 
discarded. In the end, 55 statements for assessing polit-
ical risk situation in Hong Kong and 41 statements relat-
ing to risk handling strategies were collected, respec-
tively. As for the reference point, meaningful insights 
were gained from the discussions. 
During the second stage, senior executives were 
contacted. A total of twelve managers working in foreign 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong were interviewed. Each of these 
managers is solely in charge of the Hong Kong operations. 
They either report to a regional office or to the head-
quarters. In-depth interviews were carried out with each 
of the executives. During the interviews, the executives 
were asked to depict the indicators that they themselves, 
their subsidiaries, other units in their company or their 
competitors may consider when assessing political risks in 
Hong Kong. They were also asked what type of strategies 
they would consider applying to handle political risk in 
Hong Kong. Through such dialogue, we want to tap informa-
tion from a senior management perspective. Executive were 
also asked to comment on the conceptual framework. 
Generally, the senior executives show a greater 
concern for regional and global events. They tend to 
consider the environment outside Hong Kong. The informa-
tion that they gave was then transformed into statements. 
Overall, they come up with fewer statements. Neverthe-
less, the information obtained from these senior execu-
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tives is very insightful guidelines. These statements 
were compared to those formulated by the middle-level 
managers. Duplicates were eliminated and new ones are 
included. In total, 60 statements and 49 statements for 
political risk assessment and risk dealing strategies were 
obtained. 
In the third stage, we attempted to finalize the 
questionnaire. A pilot test was conducted. A total of 42 
people responded to a questionnaire that incorporated the 
statements derived in the first two stages. Respondents 
were asked to answer the questions as well as to point out 
any clarification that is required. Questions that are 
considered ambiguous were noted. Alpha coefficient is 
calculated for the sub-index within each variable. State-
ments that do not show a high correlation to the sub-index 
were dropped. After this exercise, the statements were 
reduced to 42 and 34 respectively. The reference point 
indicator was revised. Personal and company characteris-
tics were specified. 
The revised questionnaire went through another round 
of tests. This time, 56 people responded. Some state-
ments were dropped after factor analysis was performed. 
Twenty-nine and 2 5 statements make up the questionnaire. 
A sample of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3. 
.107 
Survey Design 
In order to study the executives working in the 
various foreign investments in Hong Kong, a list of updat-
ed US, Japanese and French firms was obtained from the 
respective Consulates. Regional headquarters were elimi-
nated. Joint ventures and licensing arrangements were 
removed from consideration. Only wholly owned subsidi-
aries are included. The elimination of regional headquar-
ters and joint ventures is to ensure that companies se-
lected are truly foreign investment and that they are 
affected by the temperaments in the home country. 
At the end of the exercise, names of 252 American, 
246 Japanese and 187 French companies were identified. 
The selection of the three home countries is due to the 
overall size and impact of their foreign direct investment 
in Hong Kong. We also wanted to incorporate a spectrum of 
home countries that covers different continents, which may 
represent different cultures, corporate styles and work 
ethics. Even though the effect of such differences is not 
the focus of the study, the inclusion, nevertheless, 
provide insights and breadth in the study. The names of 
the chief executive were also obtained. They serve as the 
sampling frame for our research. 
A letter was sent to all these chief executives informing 
them of the purpose of the research, outlining the study 
and soliciting their help in the study. The letter was 
followed up by a telephone call within three weeks of the 
letter in order to further explain any general questions 
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regarding the survey and to make appointments for inter-
views. In cases where the chief executives were out of 
town for a week or longer, the interviewer asked for the 
name of the manager who is second in line in an attempt to 
make an appointment. Failing to contact the number two 
man, recommendations for an appropriate replacement were 
sought. The process continues for further recommendations 
of two other managers. If that still failed or if there 
was a strong negative reaction, the company was excluded. 
The interview is based on the questionnaire de-
veloped. Before the interview, the questionnaire was sent 
to the executive. The purpose was to inform the executive 
of the type of issues that would be addressed and of the 
specific areas that will be discussed. It also gave the 
managers a chance to collect relevant information if they 
so wished. During the interview, the interviewer again 
stated the objective of the study. As a warm-up exercise, 
the interviewer then went into a general discussion on the 
issue of political risk. This unstructured discussion 
provides us with further information and insights on the 
issue. The replies were noted down. The interviewer then 
went through each question. He would also attend to any 
clarifications or queries that the executive may have. 
The executives were reminded that their personal opinions 
are sought and that their responses would be kept confi-
dential. 
The use of one single informants per company for 
studying strategies places limitations on the study re-
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suits. One limitation relates to the extent to which 
executives perceive and interpret political risks in a 
consistently different way than do others members who may 
also have an influence on the strategy. Second, to the 
extent that these variables are measured from one of the 
members, the measures obtained can only serve as approxi-
mations of the groups I decision. 
The single-informant design is not without advantage. 
It enables informants to remain anonymous and do not 
necessitate their responses to be checked against their 
colleagues. Thus it is likely to encourage the informants 
to provide candid responses, given the politically sensi-
tive information they are asked to reveal (Huber and 
Power, 1985)• There is also evidence that perception risk 





A total of 685 companies were selected from lists 
provided by the American, Japanese and French consulates. 
Out of these, half (342 firms) were randomly selected to 
form the sampling frame. The chief executives or their 
designated representatives were interviewed based on the 
questionnaire (Appendix 3). They were also asked to 
generally comment on their assessment of political risk in 
Hong Kong. Altogether 134 completed and successful ques-
tiomiaires were collected, representing a 39% response 
rate. This rate, though slightly lower than expected, may 
be partly due to the sensitivity of the topic, and partly 
due to the extensive travelling schedule of the respond-
ents . The data was collected during the summer period, 
which is a favorable time for annual vacation. Consider-
ing all that, the response is reasonable. 
It should be noted that the data collection is per-
formed in the summer months of 1991. This is months 
before Deng visited the cities in the southern part of 
China when he reinforced the need to open up the economy. 
The executives may have different perceptions of the 
future of Hong Kong in view of these developments. This 
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study is only able to portray the situation as of the 
summer of 1991. 
Company and Individual 
Characteristics 
A profile of the respondents is given in Table 4-1. 
It should be noted that although we targeted the question-
naire at chief executive officers, some of the respondents 
may not be holding senior positions. This is implicit 
from their age, their working experience and their salary. 
One would seldom expect senior managers to be below 29 
years of age (6% of respondents), or have less than nine 
years of working experience (16.4%). However, since such 
respondents do not form a significant proportion and 
because their names are referred by the chief executive, 
no correction is made. This phenomena is present because 
for the senior executives who were contacted and refused 
to be interviewed, the interviewers were instructed to ask 
for the name of another senior manager who is second in 
command. The senior manager could have referred us to 
other executives who were not as senior. However, there 
is a lack of concluding evidence to allege that they are 
not senior executives. 
A profile of the companies that the respondents 
represented is shown in Table 4-2. Many of these overseas 
firms in Hong Kong are small in size in terms of number of 
employees (around 50% have less than 50 people on the 
payroll)• They are also relatively insignificant in terms 








Male 119 (88.8) 
Female 15 (11.2) 
Age 
Below 29 8 (6.0) 
30 - 39 61 (45.6) 
40 - 49 42 (31.3) 
Above 50 22 (16.4) 
No response 1 ( 0.7) 
Working Experience 
Less than 9 years 22 (16.4) 
10 - 19 55 (41.0) 
20 - 29 43 (32.1) 
Above 30 years 14 (10.5) 
Years in Company 
Less than 2 years 19 (14.2) 
3 - 7 38 (28.4) 
8 - 1 2 22 (16.4) 
13 - 17 17 (12.6) 
1 8 - 2 2 8 ( 6.0) 
More than 23 years 30 (22.4) 
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Table 4-2 
Profile of Companies 
Total (%) 
134 (100) 
No. of Employees in Hong Kong 
Less than 19 41 (30.6) 
20 - 49 27 (20.1) 
50 - 149 24 (17.9) 
150 - 299 15 (11.1) 
Above 300 26 (19.4) 
No Response 1 ( o . 7 ) 
Years of Operations in Hong Kong 
Less than 9 years 47 (35.1) 
10 - 14 17 (12.7) 
15 - 19 18 (13.4) 
20 - 24 21 (15.7) 
25 - 29 11 ( 8.2) 
Over 30 years 19 (14.2) 
No Response 1 ( 0.7) 
Functions Performed in Hong Kong (multiple answers) 
Sourcing of Materials 90 (67.2) 
Production 101 (75.4) 
Scheduling 81 (60.4) 
Marketing (local) 40 (29.9) 
Marketing (overseas) 61 (45.5) 
Service 65 (48.5) 
Technology 115 (85.8) 
Coordination 84 (62.7) 
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Target Indicators (multiple answers) 
Sales 30 (22.4) 
Expenses 7 9 (59,0) 
Profits 81 (60!4) 
Market Share 89 (66.4) 
Return on Assets 9 9 ( 7 3 . 9 ) 
Profit Margin 47 (35.1) 
Planning Period 
Monthly 9 ( 6 . 7 ) 
Quarterly 20 (14.9) 
Semi-annually 38 (28.4) 
Annually 63 (47.0) 
Others 4 ( 3 . 0 ) 
Profit Contributions to Headquarters 
Less than 4% 45 (33.6) 
5 - 9 % 30 (22.4) 
10 - 19% 17 (12.6) 
20 - 49% 20 (14.9) 
Above 50% 10 ( 7.5) 
No Response 12 ( 9.0) 
Nationality 
US 45 (33.6) 
Japan 60 (44.8) 
France 29 (21.6) 
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less than 10% of the group ‘ s profit. Despite the low 
contribution, various functions are being performed. A 
total of 115 out of 134 firms indicated that some sort of 
technology development (the most commonly cited activity) 
is performed in Hong Kong. Many executives commented that 
the subsidiaries act as technology transfer agents in 
bringing technology to China and countries in Southeast 
Asia. They regard their technology development function 
mainly in the adaptation of western technology in the Asia 
region. This includes production related technology as 
well as management technology. The second most commonly 
performed function is production, followed by sourcing of 
materials and scheduling of shipments. This reflects that 
many of the subsidiaries are highly dependent on neighbor-
ing subsidiaries and rely on business units outside the 
territory for materials, sourcing and end markets. 
Most of the subsidiaries prepare an annual plan. A 
high percentage of the respondents indicate that the 
subsidiaries adopt a flexible planning horizon -- shorter 
term arrangements are made upon request or upon demand. 
Most of the subsidiaries use return on assets as a yard-
stick, followed by market share, profits and expenses. 
Assessment of 
Political Risk 
Generally, the executives regard the investment 
climate in Hong Kong as favorable when compared to the 
other alternatives. A global question that comprises the 
overall perception of the situation in Hong Kong gives a 
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mean of 3.602 (with a scale of 1 to 8, i being extremely 
favorable and 8 being extremely unfavorable)• This shows 
that even though the executives in Hong Kong may have 
certain apprehensions (as shown in the response to some of 
the statements in Table 4-3) about some elements, the 
prevailing conclusion is that Hong Kong is still a rela-
tively preferred (the degree being very light) place for 
investment. Due to the lack of previous studies as an 
anchor for comparison, it is not possible to conclude 
whether the investment climate in Hong Kong has improved 
or deteriorated when compared to the past years. However, 
we can generally conclude that as of 1991, when compared 
to other investment opportunities, Hong Kong is viewed on 
the favorable side. 
The qualities that portray a negative inclination are 
those relating to the cost and efficiency of operations in 
Hong Kong, the possible restraints imposed on Hong Kong by 
the Chinese Government (such as the tax rate or economic 
policy) and the effects of such controls. Besides these 
factors, most other attributes are regarded favorably by 
the executives. It appears that the future of Hong Kong 
is highly dependent on the expected economic changes in 
the city as well as the political change that may be 
brought about by Chinese sovereignty in the future. 
In analyzing the political risk of Hong Kong accord-
ing to the four sub-indices, it is found that most re-
spondents are susceptible to the conditions in China (with 
mean of 4.1818 based on a 8-point scale, with 1 being 
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The reference point influences the strategies as one of 
the factors, but the effects of political risk assessment 
are not mediated by the reference point". 
In the following section, we will first examine Table 
4-10 and Table 4-11 independently. Then, we will compare 
the two types of strategies. 
Reference Point Not 
Functioning As a 
Mediating Factcrr 
Hypothesis lb is tested with two regression lines as 
given under section A and B in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-
11. The purpose of using two nested regressions is to 
test the incremental effect of the reference point on the 
strategies independent of the effects of the moderators 
(personal and company demographics)• The first regression 
equation examines political risk assessment as predictors 
of strategies and the second regression equation retains 
these same predictors plus the reference point constructs. 
If the effects of the assessments are mediated entirely by 
the reference point, then they should have significant 
coefficients in the first case and nonsignificant coeffi-
cients in the second. 
In the main effects model for offensive strategies 
(Table 4-lOa), none of the risk assessment variables are 
significant. All the coefficients, however, are in the 
expected direction. For defensive strategies (Table 4-
11a)• the changes in conditions in Hong Kong and China are 
significant. Changes in China acts in an opposite direc-
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Stronqly Agree Agree stronalv Disagree 
B. Conditions in China 
•The Renminbi will *The economic policy and Nil 
depreciate. objectives of the Chi-
(3.343) nese government will 
remain unchanged. 
•Taxation policy in China (4.112) 
will become more 
attractive to foreign *The government structure 
partners. in China will remain un-
(3.567) changed. 
(4.346) 
•Control on profit and 
capital repatriation in *The foreign exchange 
China will be main- system in China will 
tained. remain unchanged. 
(3.632) (4.799) 
*Power of the opposing 
political parties in 
China will increase. 
(3.858) 
•The Chinese government‘s 
control of Renminbi is 
unlikely to change. 
(3.866) 
• 
C. Intranational Relations 
•Hong Kong will *Hong Kong's autonomy will Nil ‘ 
increasingly follow the be maintained. 
guidelines of China. (4.246) 丨 
( 3 . 1 7 9 ) ； 
•The people of Hong Kong , 
•Hong Kong will increase are supportive of the 
its representation in Chinese government. 




Strongly Agree Agree Stronalv Dis^mrpA 
D. International Relations 
•The diplomatic Nil *The people of Hong Kong 
relationship between are positive towards 
Hong Kong and the rest the Chinese governmen 
of the world will be (attitude) 
friendly and (5.090) 
cooperative. 
( 3 . 1 0 4 ) 
•The international image of 
Hong Kong will remain 
strong and positive. 
( 3 . 5 9 7 ) 
/ 
*The diplomatic 丨 
relationship between ‘ 
China and the rest of j 




( 3 . 6 7 9 ) 》 
！3 
•The international image of •‘ 
China will be strong and i 
positive. , 
( 3 . 8 9 5 ) —> 
Overall ‘ 
i: 
•Overall, you regard the 
investment climate in KEY / 
Hong Kong, compared to 
other neighboring coun- Mean scores are 
tries, to be extremely shown in brack-
favorable. et, on a 8-point 
(3.602) scale --
1 being totally 
agree, 
8 being totally 
disagree. 
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extremely little change envisaged), followed by the condi-
tions in Hong Kong (mean of 3.9656), intranational rela-
tionship (mean of 3.8245) and finally international rela-
tionship (mean of 3.7408). The suspicion towards develop-
ments in China has been well documented in many other 
reports (Newsweek, 1991, Cheng and Tain, 1990) . The other 
sub-index, though highly regarded marginally, is contin-
gent upon the political structure and developments in 
China. China appears to being holding the strings that 
direct the business environment in Hong Kong. 
Political Risk Handling , 
Strategies jj 
A range of risk-handling strategies are given in the { 
questionnaire. The preference of the executives for each 
strategy is presented in Table 4-4. The most preferred 丨少 
strategies include strategies such as creating a better ‘ 
corporate image in Hong Kong, developing a more accurate 
丨, 
information system relating to Hong Kong and acting as a j 
good citizen in Hong Kong. These allude to a continued , 
existence in Hong Kong and assume a long-term commitment. f. 
Others favor tactics such as developing multi-site produc-
tion sites in other locations and examining multi-sourcing 
for raw materials. The least preferred strategies involve 
pulling out of Hong Kong, keeping Hong Kong operations at 
a minimal level and selling the ownership in Hong Kong to 
either a local firm or another multinational corporation. 
From the preferences shown, one can observe that the 





Strongly Aqree Agree Strongly Digaaree 
•Create a better corporate ^Minimize additional in- *Pull out from Hong Konc 
image in Hong Kong. vestment in Hong Kong. (6.097) 
(2.812) (4.007) 
•Develop an information *Limit intra-company loan 
system that provides the and intra-company trans-
headquarters with updat- fer to Hong Kong, 
ed and accurate informa- (4.067) 
tion from Hong Kong. 
(2.821) *Lobby for support from the 
home government to seek / 
•Act as a good citizen and support from the Chinese 
follow the guidelines government. 丨I 
set by the Hong Kong (4.136) i 
government. ^^  
(2.843) *Determine a higher profit ^ 
margin for the present “ 
•Develop multi-site produc- market. ！^  
tions outside Hong Kong. (4.201) d 
(2.918) 
•Lobby for support from “ 
•Develop multi-sourcing of competitors in the same 丨, 
raw materials and parts. business to seek support J^  
(3.157) from the Chinese f 
government. 
*Favor trading and licens- (4.221) , 
ing to foreign direct 
investment. *Seek additional funds for 
(3.433) investment by borrowing 
from banks outside of 
•Lobby for support from the Hong Kong. / 
home government to seek (4.293) 
support from the Hong 
Kong government. *Set up holding company in 
(3.612) other countries. 
(4.338) 
•Withhold Hong Kong's 




Strongly Agree Acrree Stronalv Disagree 
•Buy political insurance. *Market obsolete technology 
(3.639) to Hong Kong. 
(4.737) 
* Favor contracts and *Sell ownership in the Hong 
commitments with a Kong subsidiary to 
shorter time span. another multinational 
(3.654) firm. 
(4.851) 
•Lobby for support from 
competitors in the same *Sell ownership in the Hong 
business to seek support Kong subsidiary to a 
from the Hong Kong local firm, 
government• (4.896) 
(3.654) 
*Keep the Hong Kong opera-
*Set a higher long term tions at a minimal 
target for operations in level. 
Hong Kong. (4.903) \ 
(3.858) KEY 
•Seek additional funds by Mean scores are 
borrowing from banks in shown in brack-
Hong Kong. et, on a 8-point 
(3.940) scale --
1 being totally 
agree, 






potential business area. Few are taking steps toward 
divestment. This coimitment propels executives to examine 
alternative ways of minimizing cost, minimizing risk and 
optimizing the global profit. It is also evident that 
most executives adopt highly flexible strategies. The 
decision on the strategy choice seems to involve more than 
a singular analysis of the profitability in Hong Kong. It 
comprises concern for functional factionalization (David-
son and McFetridge, 1984) which involves not only a deci-
sion on the investment portfolio in Hong Kong, but also 
the functional activities that are most suited to Hong 
Kong and their integration with functional activities 
performed elsewhere. It reveals not only cogitation, but 
also a long-term perception on the role of the subsidiary 
in Hong Kong and its related business. With such a situa-
tion, it is possible for the Hong Kong subsidiary to be 
maintained, but with certain operations relocated to other 
locations. This is a step toward globalization of multi-
national firms in their activities (Porter, 1986) • Be-
sides f many executives view Hong Kong as the window to 
China (Lee, 1982, Mun and China 1986) . In order to im-
prove their global competitive mix (Sethi, 1987, Kogut 
1985), the subsidiary's existence in Hong Kong is highly 
reflective of the potential of the Chinese market. Many 
firms intend to use Hong Kong as the stepping stone and 
the inroad into the Chinese market. 
It is also found that the group of executives show a 




sive strategies. (The average for offensive strategies is 
4.6023 on a 8-point scale, and the mean for defensive 
strategies is 2.5297 with T-value at 8.3200, significant 
at 0.00%.) This may be caused by the respondents‘ role as 
subsidiary managers and their keen concern for business in 
Hong Kong. The psychological and social ties to the city 
may have drawn them to prefer defensive strategies. 
Because of their commitment to the city, they would favor 
negotiating for changes using the company as an agent of 
influence and would opt for minimal changes in the busi-
ness strategies. They may also be more concerned for 
their own position and power in the subsidiary than for 
the whole corporation. In that case, they may forfeit 
benefits for the multinational corporation, and for sub-
sidiary or even personal benefits. This speculation is 
based on comments received during the interviews. 
There is another possibility. Defensive strategies 
are more inward-looking whereas offensive strategies tend 
to be more outward-looking. This may well reflect the 
orientation of the executives. Most managers would look 
at factors and strategies that are easily controllable 
before they attempt those strategies that are contingent 
upon other variables beyond their command. This is espe-
cially true in Hong Kong. Traditionally, Hong Kong is 
heavily dependent upon international trade. The environ-
ment in international business is often affected by fac-
tors that are both numerous and unpredictable. Their 
experiences with negotiations on US-China trade issues 
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made the executives more aware of the limitations they 
face. Such an orientation may have influenced the execu-
tives ‘preferences. 
Reference Point 
The measurement of the reference point is reflected 
in four different dimensions. They include the level of 
the target compared to competitors, the level of the 
target compared to other subsidiaries, the ease to achieve 
the target and the level of input from the subsidiary. 
Most executives believe that their opinions are being 
taken into consideration when the target is being deter-
mined. They view the target set for the Hong Kong subsid-
iary as slightly higher than both their competitors and 
other subsidiaries. It is expected that a fair effort is 




The two major areas of interest in this study are 
political risk assessment and political risk handling 
strategies. Sub-indices are developed for both risk 
assessment and risk handling strategies (Subramanian et 
al, 1992, Au, 1992) . Under each sub-index, a number of 
statements are derived to measure the different con-
structs . 
It is necessary to ensure the reliability of each 
sub-index under the constructs. Churchill (1979) suggest-
ed ways to purify the measurements. He proposed that 
rounds of factor analysis and calculation of the Cornbach 
alpha be carried out and that statements which demonstrate 
a low reliability be eliminated. After a few rounds of 
varimax rotation factor analysis and elimination of meas-
ures, Cornbach alpha values (Heeler and Ray, 1972) range 
from 0.6200 to 0.7654 were obtained for the various con-
structs for risk assessment and risk handling strategies. 
Thirteen statements on risk assessment and eight state-
ments on risk handling strategies were dropped after 
rounds of factor analysis and calculation of Cornbach 
alpha, leaving 17 statements for each of the two respec-
tive variables. Procedures for arriving at these state-
ments are summarized in Table 4-5. In the discussions 
that follow, the sub-indices are calculated as a sum of 
the statements shown under each respective sub-index in 
Table 4-6 and 4-7. The value of the alpha coefficient 
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Table 4-10 
Summary of Steps 
Arriving at the Statements 
for the Constructs 
Step Participants Risk Risk 
Taken Involved Assessment Handling 
Literature author 
research 
Discussion based 55 middle-level 55 state- 41 state-
on literature executives merits ments 
research 
Indepth interview 12 senior 22 24 
executives 
After Elimination author 60 49 
of duplications 
After pilot test -
first round 42 executives 42 34 








Reliability of Construct: 
Political Risk Assessment 
I. Changes in Hong Kong Environment 
Alpha = 0.7086 
* The Hong Kong dollar will be easily convertible to 
foreign currency. 
* The Hong Kong dollar will remain stable. 
* There will be minimum price level change in Hong Kong. 
* There is unlikely to be any restriction on repatriation 
of profit or capital in Hong Kong. 
* There will be little change in the economic policy set 
* The administrative structure of the Hong Kong government 
will reinain unchanged. 
II. Changes in China Environment 
Alpha = 0.7391 
* The foreign exchange system in China will reinain 
unchanged. 
* The Chinese government»s control of Renminbi is unlikely 
to change. 
* Control of profit and capital repatriation in China will 
maintain. 
* The government structure in China will reinain unchanged. 
III. International Aspect 
Alpha = 0.6200 
* The international image of Hong Kong will reinain strong 
and positive. 
* The international image of China will be strong and 
positive. 
* The diplomatic relationship between Hong Kong and the 
rest of the world will be friendly and cooperative. 
* The diplomatic relationship between China and the 
rest of the world will be friendly and cooperative. 
IV. Intranational Aspect 
Alpha = 0.7207 
* Hong Kong Is autonomy will be maintained. 
* The people in Hong Kong will be positive towards the 
Chinese government (attitude)• 
* The people in Hong Kong will be positive towards the 
Chinese government (in action)• 
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Table 4-10 
Reliability of Construct: 
Risk Handling Strategies 
I. Offensive Strategies 
Alpha = 0.7654 
* Develop multi-site production outside Hong Kong 
* Develop multi-sourcing of raw materials and parts 
* Develop an information system that provides the head-
quarters with updated and accurate information from 
Hong Kong 
* Lobby for support from competitors in the business to 
seek support from the Hong Kong government 
* Lobby for support from the home government to seek 
support from the Hong Kong government 
* Lobby for support from competitors in the business to 
seek support from the Chinese government 
* Lobby for support from the home government to seek 
support from the Chinese government 
II.Defensive Strategies 
Alpha = 0.7604 
* Sell ownership in the Hong Kong subsidiary to a local 
firm 
* Sell ownership in the Hong Kong subsidiary to another 
multinational firm 
* Favor contracts and commitments with shorter time spans 
* Minimize additional investment in Hong Kong 
* Market obsolete technology to Hong Kong 
* Limit intra-company loans and intra-company transfer 
to Hong Kong 
* Withhold Hong Kong‘s access to new technology 
* Keep the Hong Kong operations at a minimal level 
* Pull out from Hong Kong 
* Set up holding company in other countries 
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lies within the ideal range for ensuring the reliability 
of the data (Churchill and Peter, 1984) . The factor 
analysis also ensured the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the various constructs. 
This process enables the data to be purified. It 
also ensures that each sub-index is a meaningful construct 
for further analysis and discussion. 
Method of Analysis 
Multiple regression is the primary analysis tool used 
in this research. Independent variables can be identified 
and a dependent variable can be specified for each hypoth-
esis to be tested against. The independent variables 
include the risk assessment perception, and the reference 
point measurement. The dependent variable is either 
offensive strategies or the defensive strategies. These 
are applied for hypothesis HI, Hlb, Hlc and H2. T-tests 
are used for hypothesis Hla. In testing H2, moderating 
variables such as personal and company demographics are 
used to form sub-samples. For each of the sub-samples, 
multiple regression is performed and the beta coefficient 
for each group is compared to ascertain whether a signifi-
cant difference exists. 
In order to employ multiple regression analysis, it 
is vital that the basic assumptions of regression are not 
violated. This includes the assumptions of normality of 
variance, normality of residuals, absence of collinearity 
(Norusis, 1990)• Each of these is inspected based on the 
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suggestions of Norusis (1990) and Kleinbaum et al (1988). 
The results of the tests, as discussed below, show no 
violation for the assumptions stated above. 
For each of the independent variables, the Studen-
tized residual is plotted against the predicted value of 
the dependent variables. No outliers are identified. The 
spread of the residuals do not increase with the magnitude 
of the predicted values, suggesting that the variance is 
constant and normal; in addition, the residuals approxi-
mately follow a normal distribution. These allow us to 
conclude that the variance and the residuals are normal. 
The tolerance of variables is a common measurement 
used to verify the assumption of collinearity• The vari-
ance inflation factor is the statistic employed. The 
value of the variance inflation factor for the sets of 
independent variables is presented in Table 4-8. It is 
found that the variance inflation factors are all within 
the acceptable range (less than ten) as recommended by 
Kleinbaum, Kupper and Muller (1988). Based on that and 
with the factor analysis results, we can conclude that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to exist. 
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Table 4-10 
Measures of Collinearity: 
Tolerance and VIF 
A. Four independent Variables 
Tolerance VIF* 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition 0.659971 1.515281 
Changes in China Condition 0.980195 1.020252 
Intranational Relations 0.736630 1.357534 
International Relations 0.659971 1.515281 
B. Eight independent Variables 
Tolerance VIF* 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition 0.581412 1.719951 
Changes in China Condition 0.917761 1.089608 
Intranational Relations 0.725791 1.377807 
International Relations 0.769105 1.300212 
Target - ease to attain 0.890592 1.122849 
Target - compare to 
competitors 0.879025 1.137624 
Target - compare to 
subsidiarie 0.938137 1.065942 
Target - level of personal 
coimtiitment 0.900234 1.110822 
*VIF = Variance inflation factor. 
Acceptable if VIF less than 10 (Kleinbaum et al, 1988) 
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Findings 
Political Risk Assessment 
Regressing the global statement on the overall evalu-
ation of the investment climate in Hong Kong with the four 
political risk assessment sub-indices, it is found that 
three out of four of the sub-indices are significantly 
associated (Table 4-9). Changes in Hong Kong conditions 
and the state of international relationships are signifi-
cant at a 1% level, whereas changes in China conditions 
are significant at a 5% level. Altogether, the four sub-
indices manage to explain around 26% (R-square) of the 
variations. 
The investment climate in Hong Kong is considered 
favorable when there is little change in the business 
condition in Hong Kong, when changes are anticipated in 
China and when the international relationship of both 
China and Hong Kong with the rest of the world is favora-
ble. This implies that executives are eager to keep the 
status quo for the business environment in Hong Kong. 
However, the reverse is true for China. Executives prefer 
major changes. They even expect changes in China to 
benefit the business climate in Hong Kong. There has been 
a number of reports on complaints of the business and 
political structure in China lack flexibility and an 
understanding of the market economy. This concern is 
shared by executives based in Hong Kong who have apprehen-






and Political Risk Assessments 
(Hong Kong) 
Independent Variables Beta 
(standard deviation) 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition 0.048611 c 
(0.017511) 
Changes in China Condition -0.044337 b 
(0.017180) 
Intranational Relations -0.012682 
(0.028642) 
International Relations 0.090175 c 
(0.028419) 
Dependent variable = global statement on the 
perceived investment climate 
in Hong Kong, compared to 
other neighboring countries 
R square = 0.2628 c 
a = significant at 10% 
b = significant at 5% 
c = significant at 1% 
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Many executives believe that if changes take place in 
China, there will be more opportunities and the possibili-
ty of more inroads for negotiations with the Chinese 
government. It also implies that the gap between the 
market economy in Hong Kong and the central planned econo-
my in China may be narrowed. The international relation-
ship is the third factor that is deemed significantly 
associated. Many Hong Kong business fear adverse effects 
in cases of a tenuous relationship with other countries. 
Though intranational relationship does not show a signifi-
cant influence, its effects are possibly inferred in the 
perceived changes in Hong Kong and China. 
Prospect Theory 
In order to test the validity of the prospect theory, 
it is necessary to classify the respondents into two 
groups. One group contains those executives who view the 
overall situation in Hong Kong positively (above the mean 
for the global statement) and the other group consists of 
executives who suggested that the condition is poorer than 
the other countries (below the mean). 
According to prospect theory, those who view the 
condition with pessimism would prefer offensive strategies 
when compared with their counterparts who view Hong Kong 
optimistically. Alternatively, those who view the condi-
tion with optimism would prefer defensive strategies more 
than the other group. For offensive strategies, the 
difference between the two groups is significant at 0.07. 
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For defensive strategies, the difference is significant at 
0.03. The directional difference is as hypothesized. 
This shows that the principle of prospect theory is ap-
plicable in the business context. Hla is accepted. 
Political Risk Assessment 
and 
Reference Point 
Effect of Reference Point 
on the Choice of Strategy 
Two sets of multiple regressions are performed for 
this analysis. One set uses the offensive strategy as the 
dependent variable, the other set employs the defensive 
strategy as the dependent variable. In each of the two 
sets, in order to test how the reference point influences 
the strategy, four multiple regression lines are obtained• 
The first two are the backbone of the analysis -- one 
includes the reference point as well as the various con-
structs of risk assessments (named as the extended model), 
the other consists only of the risk assessment constructs 
(named as the main effect model)• The other two regres-
sion lines incorporate the global statement as an inde-
pendent variable. They are shown for comparative pur-
poses . A comparison of the first two models gives insight 
on the effects of the reference point. The data are 
presented in Table 4-10 (for offensive strategies) and 
Table 4-11 (for defensive strategies)• The analysis 
examines Hypothesis la which states that "Risk handling 
strategies are determined by the executive‘s assessment of 
political risk and the perception on the reference point. 
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The reference point influences the strategies as one of 
the factors, but the effects of political risk assessment 
are not mediated by the reference point". 
In the following section, we will first examine Table 
4-10 and Table 4-11 independently. Then, we will compare 
the two types of strategies. 
Reference Point Not 
Functioning As a 
Mediating Factor 
Hypothesis lb is tested with two regression lines as 
given under section A and B in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-
11. The purpose of using two nested regressions is to 
test the incremental effect of the reference point on the 
strategies independent of the effects of the moderators 
(personal and company demographics)• The first regression 
equation examines political risk assessment as predictors 
of strategies and the second regression equation retains 
these same predictors plus the reference point constructs. ‘ 
If the effects of the assessments are mediated entirely by 丨 
the reference point, then they should have significant 
coefficients in the first case and nonsignificant coeffi-
,ij 
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cients in the second. 
In the main effects model for offensive strategies 
(Table 4一10a), none of the risk assessment variables are 
significant. All the coefficients, however, are in the 
expected direction. For defensive strategies (Table 4-
11a), the changes in conditions in Hong Kong and China are 





A. Multiple regression using political risk assessments as 
predictors of offensive strategies 
Variable Beta Coefficient 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition -0.020128 
Changes in China Condition -0.032131 
Intranational Relations 0.226914 
International Relations 0.260587 
R square = 0.0341 
B. Multiple regression using political risk assessments 
and reference point as predictors of offensive strategies 
Variable Beta Coefficient 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition -0.068932 
Changes in China Condition -0.087445 
Intranational Relations 0.346821 
International Relations 0.322923 
Reference point - ease to attain 0.557791 
Reference point - compare to 
competitors -1.517801 
Reference point - compare to 
subsidiaries 0.948805 
Reference point - level of personal 
commitment 1.710275 b 
R square = 0.1126 
Dependent variable = sum of preference for offensive 
strategies 
a = significant at 0.10 
b = significant at 0.05 






A. Multiple regression using political risk assessments as 
predictors of defensive strategies 
Variable Beta Coefficient 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition -0.350101 a 
Changes in China Condition 0.391234 b 
Intranational Relations 0.322762 
International Relations -0.295812 
R square = 0.0879 b 
B. Multiple regression using political risk assessments 
and reference point as predictors of defensive strategies 
Variable Beta Coefficient 
Changes in Hong Kong Condition -0.330417 a 
Changes in China Condition 0.527463 b 
Intranational Relations 0.394977 
International Relations -0.289621 
Reference point - ease to attain 0.940629 
Reference point - compare to 
competitors 0.084003 
Reference point - compare to 
subsidiaries -1.104500 
Reference point - level of personal 
commitment -1.499636 
R square = 0.1235 b 
Dependent variable = sum of preference for defensive 
strategies 
a = significant at 0.10 
b = significant at 0.05 
c = significant at 0.01 
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tion than expected. 
In the extended models (Table 4-lOb, Table 4_llb), 
the effects of the reference point are high for an offen-
sive strategy but low for a defensive strategy. The 
regression results do not confirm the reference point as a 
mediating factor. Thus, hypothesis lb is accepted. 
Relating Strategies 
and 
Political Risk Assessment 
Offensive Strategies 
Executives who show a preference for offensive 
strategies generally perceive the presence of a high level 
of change in Hong Kong as well as in China, but they also 
expect the intranational and international scenes to 
maintain their present status. This can be observed in 
both regression lines in the main effects and the extended 
model. The magnitude of the four political risk sub-
indices shift as the variables for reference point are 
included. The direction of the influence remains, with 
the reference point. It should be noted that out of the 
12 independent variables (four in the main effect model 
and eight in the extended model)• only the level of per-
ceived personal coimitment in relation to the reference 
point shows a significance association. 
The insignificant association between the perceived 
risk assessment and offensive strategies partly supports 
Hypothesis lb (elaborated in Table 3-3) . In both the main 
effects model and the extended model, the conditions in 
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Hong Kong and China bear, as hypothesized, little effect. 
The intranational and international conditions, contrary 
to the surmise, reveal weak associations. This demon-
strates that preference for offensive strategies is most 
likely dependent on factors beyond political developments 
influence by other countries. Offensive strategies, which 
are often proactive in nature, tend to diagnose global 
opportunities. This would include factors beyond intrana-
tional and international relations. 
In the extended model, personal commitment is the 
only variable that shows a significant relationship with 
the choice of offensive strategy. When the executives 
feel that their personal opinions are listened to and feel 
a strong commitment to the target, they tend to favor 
offensive strategies. This process possibly reveals a 
self-perceived role in the formulation of strategies for 
the committed staff. This indicates that in cases of 
conflict between the subsidiary management and the head-
quarters in fixing the target or when the headquarters 
dictate the decision, the subsidiary managers would ignore 
offensive strategies as a tactic for the local scene. 
This is not uncommon in organizations where the conunitment 
at the subsidiary level is low and where control from the 
supervising unit is lax (as in a number of multinational 
corporations which treat their subsidiaries as independent 
entities due to the headquarters‘ lack of understanding of 
the local environment, Bartlett, 1986)• When personal and 
company objectives divert, it is not uncommon to ignore 
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company objectives and to pursue personal benefits. One 
cannot judge categorically whether the deployment of 
offensive strategy is desirable. Even in cases of appar-
ent commitment to the firm, the executive could be pursu-
ing personal gains. An interesting example is cited by 
one respondent who remarked that one of his business 
friends used lobbying activities to upgrade the company‘s 
public image and obtain better publicity for the company. 
This, the respondent noted, enabled his business friend to 
land himself another job that was better secured. The 
respondent implied that his friend may be performing such 
a task in the name of the subsidiary, but mainly for his 
personal benefit. This incident revealed that personal 
interests may come before corporate stakes. On the other 
hand, when a subsidiary manager is highly committed, he 
would be more prepared to opt for an alternative that 
involves higher risk. 
The inclusion of the reference point as an independ-
ent variable significantly improves the explanation on the 
offensive strategies• The inclusion does not affect the 
direction of any of the risk assessment constructs, though 
the magnitude is revised. The R square increases from 
0.0341 to 0.1126, indicating that a small to medium effect 
of the risk assessment constructs is increased to a medium 
to large effect (Brown and Melamed, 1990) when the refer-
ence point is incorporated. This demonstrates the rele-
vance of the reference point (though statistically insig-
nificant) in explaining the preference for offensive 
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strategies. Since the reference point is often a personal 
evaluation of the target, it appears that offensive 
strategies are more affected by personal perception of the 
environment. 
Defensive Strategies 
Defensive strategies refer to those tactics that 
manifest an inclination to accept the environment and 
respond only when compelled to. They are often more 
reactive in nature. A list of such strategies is given in 
Table 4-7(11). 
The study shows that executives who tend to favor 
defensive strategies perceive Hong Kong to be more stable 
and the relationship between other countries and Hong 
Kong/China as more stable; however, they predict the 
situation in China will follow a less stable path, they 
also predict a less stable Hong Kong-China relationship. 
Out of these four independent variables, two demonstrate a 
significant association (Table 4-11). They are the con-
structs regarding the changes in Hong Kong conditions and 
China conditions. This illustrates the importance of the 
local environment when executives evaluate the political 
risk handling strategies in Hong Kong. 
For those executives who regard Hong Kong as more 
stable, they feel more inclined to use defensive strate-
gies in protecting their investments in Hong Kong. Their 
primary concern lies in protecting against risks caused by-
factors other than political. This includes economic and 
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financial factors like interest rates, cost of operations 
and so on. Defensive strategies, such as moving out of 
Hong Kong, can minimize such risks. In times of political 
instability, many executives feel that they do not possess 
the adequate power to persuade, to negotiate nor to direct 
changes which are heavily influenced by events and tem-
peraments outside of the city. Businessmen often feel 
trapped between the political scuffles among the Hong 
Kong, British and Chinese governinents. Comments reveal 
that past experiences, such as the aftereffect of the 
Tiananmen Incident on the Hong Kong economy or the impact 
of the trade disagreement among the three governments on 
the exports of Hong Kong, are issues that are dominated by 
political considerations. In such cases, executives 
indicate that defensive strategies may not be effective in 
reducing the risks. Justifiably, they do not opt for 
defensive strategies. 
Executives who perceive China to be politically 
unstable are more likely to have a preference on defensive 
strategies. Instability in China is often interpreted 
as a willingness, on the part of the government, to accel-
erate economic changes. Instability in China is often 
seen as an inclination to overcome the inertia towards 
change, to accept new ideas, to introduce innovations, to 
initiate a market economy and to instill a higher level of 
democracy. Under such conditions, executives are more 
prone to accelerate their business commitment in Hong 
Kong, expecting the possibility of a wider opportunity in 
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China if and when the Chinese government changes its 
policy. 
The international relationship also affects the 
preference for defensive strategies. However, intrana-
tional relationships and the reference point do not sig-
nificantly affect the choice of defensive strategies. 
Besides, the inclusion of reference point as an independ-
ent variables does not significantly improve the predic-
tion of the likelihood of defensive strategies, nor does 
it affect the direction of the relationship between the 
political risk assessment and the dependent variable. 
When comparing the extended model with the main effects 
model, R square is increased marginally from 0.0879 to 
0.1235. None of the reference point measurements attained 
any significance in the beta coefficient. 
ComparincT Offensive 
and Defensive Strategies 
In prospect theory, a major proposition is that the 
risk handling strategies are exhaustive and consist merely 
of two mutually exclusive alternatives -- risk-averse and 
risk-taking strategies. They appear to be bipolar in 
nature. We are interested in validating whether such a 
proposition holds true for business strategies. If the 
premise holds true, the beta correlations for the two 
regression lines, offensive and defensive strategies, 
would be opposite in nature. When comparing the beta 
coefficients presented in Table 4-12 (a summary of Table 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































independent variables affect the likelihood of the choice 
of the strategies in the same direction, others demon-
strate an opposite directional relationship; secondly, the 
variables that significantly influence the strategies are 
different. 
With reference to the hypothesis (Hlb) as stated in 
Table 3-3, the results in Table 4-11 reveal that the 
hypothesis is accepted to some extent. The direction of 
the effects are as surmised. The impact of the influence 
for certain variables does not reveal a significant effect 
on offensive strategy as suggested. The variables that do 
not show a significance level of influence include intra-
national relations, international relations and level of 
ease of reaching the target. 
These results throw further light on the topic. It 
demonstrates that political risk assessments exert a 
stronger impact on defensive strategies than offensive 
strategies. This substantiates the notion that defensive 
strategies are inward looking. In considering defensive 
strategies, the primary factors are related to conditions 
in the host countries. On the contrary, offensive strate-
gies are more outward looking. The parameters that are 
taken into consideration are global in nature. Offensive 
strategies primarily address the issues of configuration 
and coordination (Porter, 1986)• Such decisions are often 
made at headquarters with a global perspective. 
Previously, Hong Kong has been rated favorably as a 
production center. In recent years, Hong Kong has become 
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a coordination center, concentrating on sourcing of mate-
rials and scheduling of finished products (Table 4-2)• 
When making a business policy relating to the Hong Kong 
subsidiary, two dimensions must be taken into account - a 
decision on the activities to be performed here and a 
decision on the specific strategy in carrying out the 
activities. Because of the complexity of the policy 
decision, it is possible that an executive would choose an 
offensive strategy for one individual function and a 
defensive strategy for another function. For example, a 
company may want to set up an information center (offen-
sive strategy) in Hong Kong while marketing obsolete 
technology to other countries via Hong Kong (defensive 
strategy)• Such a strategy choice combine offensive and 
defensive strategies. When managers consider a decision 
that involves a high level of complexity and a number of 
probabilities, the alternatives available cannot be simply 
categorized into two groups. 
One would also notice that the independent variables 
that significantly affect the strategies differ in the two 
situations. The offensive strategy is significantly 
affected by the executive's personal commitment. However, 
with defensive strategies, it is the perception of the 
political conditions that are significant. These findings 
(summarized in Table 4-12) confirmed the hypothesis Hlb. 
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Effects of Moderating Variables 
on Strategies 
The earlier investigation focuses on factors that 
affect strategies. It examines the overall pattern for 
all the respondents. This picture can be refined to 
reveal group differences in the pattern. A range of 
moderating variables including the activities performed in 
Hong Kong (yes and no), targets used (yes and no), company 
characteristics (classifying each characteristic into two 
levels) and personal demographics (classifying each char-
acteristics into two levels) are used for the analysis. 
To investigate the moderating effects of the contin-
gency variables, a sub-group analysis was performed 
(Arnold, 1982, Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie, 1981, Kohli, 
1989b). Moderators were used for classifying the respond-
ents into sub-groups. Chow test (1960) is performed to 
test the statistical significance of the difference in the 
size of the regression coefficients across the pairs 
(Draper and Smith, 198 0)• The results for offensive 
strategies are reported in Table 4-13 and for defensive 
strategies in Table 4-14. 
Effects of Moderating Variables 
(Activities in Hona Kona) 
on Strategies 
In answering the questionnaire, executives were asked 
to indicate the activities of the Hong Kong subsidiary. 
For each activity (sourcing, production, scheduling, local 
marketing, overseas marketing, service, technology and 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary of the Effects of 






Local Marketing 0.01 0.05 
Overseas Marketing 0.10 0.01 




Sales Volume 0.10 0.05 
Expenses 0-05 O.Ol 
Return on Assets — 0 * 0 1 
Market Share 0.10 
Profits —— — 
Company Demographics 
Planning Period " ” 
No. of Employees 0.05 二！• 
Years in Hong Kong 一 二 二 
Hong Kong Contribution 0.01 "” 
Nationality 0.10 O-Ol 
Personal Demographics n in Age u � u 
Experience 
Years in Company --: 「二 1 
Sex ' 
Kev • Onlv significant effects are illustrated 
y • Suibers^in table denote the significance level 
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This forms the subgroups for the analysis. The analysis 
are shown in Tanle 4-13 and Table 4-14. A summary is 
illustrated in Table 4-15. 
Sourcing 
In the sample, the perception of conditions in China 
is important for defensive strategies for executives 
working in companies both with and without sourcing activ-
ities. In contrast, perceptions of intranational rela-
tionships and personal commitment manifest an influence on 
offensive strategies only for those with sourcing activi-
ties ；international relationships are important for defen-
sive strategies only for those without sourcing activi-
ties . Overall, when an executive chooses defensive 
strategies, there is a significant difference for the 
effect of the independent variables in the two subgroups. 
Though few Hong Kong companies obtain their parts and 
sourcing from China, often times these parts are shipped 
into China for assembly work or manufacturing. Therefore, 
perceived China condition carries a significant influence 
for both subgroups. Expectations of fluctuations in the 
political and economic conditions in China will likely 
prompt executives to use a more defensive strategy for 
both sub-groups. 
Production 
The two subgroups do not show any significant differ-
ence in their preference for either offensive or defensive 
strategies (see Chow test results in Table 4-13 and Table 
4 - 1 4 ) • Hong Kong conditions, China conditions and intra-
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national relations significantly influence the choice of 
defensive strategy in cases where no production function 
is performed in Hong Kong. These findings lend support to 
the argument that the establishment of production facili-
ties is a capital investment. The decision for such a 
decision is made with a long term frame of reference. 
Political risk that are seen as short term fluctuations 
affect the decisions minimally. Long term trends may have 
a stronger influence. 
Once production facilities are set up, divestment is 
often regarded as costly (Porter, 1983). One has to 
consider the financial arrangements, the element of time 
lag between the decision and the actual divestment. It is 
possible that by the time divestment is arranged, the 
political environment will have changed. Therefore, even 
when political risks are perceived, there may not be much 
significant difference in the choice of strategies. 
Scheduling 
Again, there is no evidence of significant difference 
in the preference of strategies for the subgroups. Never-
theless, perceptions of Hong Kong conditions manifest an 
influence on both offensive and defensive strategies where 
scheduling activities are present; perceptions of China 
conditions affect defensive strategies whether or not 
scheduling is performed. The effects of other variables 
can be observed in Table 4-13 and Table 4-14. 
Scheduling of the finished products allows possibili-
ties for both offensive and defensive strategies. The 
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location of the endmarket and the location of the produc-
tion site affects the relative impact of the different 
variables. 
In a way similar to the pattern shown in other func-
tions (sourcing, production, local marketing, overseas 
marketing, technology and coordination), the level of 
personal commitment to the target set exerts a significant 
impact on offensive strategies. 
Marketing 
Executives in companies with and without local mar-
keting tend to show a difference in their strategies, both 
offensive and defensive. As expected, those performing 
local marketing are affected by their perception of the 
local environment, and by those factors tied to the local 
environment, such as the perceived conditions in China and 
intranational relations. Executives in firms with and 
without overseas marketing also show a significant differ-
ence in their strategies, both offensive and defensive. 
Executives working in companies that perforin overseas 
marketing are affected by global conditions such as inter-
national relations and China conditions. This finding 
reveals that marketing activities in locations outside 
Hong Kong are affected mostly by international factors. 
These two moderating variables (local marketing and 
overseas marketing) portray a difference in both the 
offensive and defensive strategies for the subgroups. 
This implies the effects of each sub-index of political 
risk may greatly differ. 
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Service 
The preference for various defensive strategies seems 
to show a difference for the two sub-groups. Hong Kong 
conditions, intranational relations and the level of 
difficulty (or ease) to achieve the target are important 
for those with a servicing function but not for those 
without such functions. China conditions and internation-
al relations have a strong influence on those services for 
offensive strategy. 
Technology 
Again, the preference for defensive strategy shows a 
difference for the two regression equations, especially 
where defensive strategy is the dependent variable. The 
impact of the various variables is shown in the Tables. 
Coordination 
Though there is no apparent difference between the 
two sub-groups for either offensive or defensive strategy, 
it can be seen that Hong Kong conditions and the intrana-
tional relationship have an impact on offensive strategies 
for executives in companies performing a coordinating func-
tion; in addition, China conditions manifest a stronger 
influence on defensive strategies for those with coordi-
nating activities. 
Overall 
The most powerful moderating variable within this 
group are local marketing and overseas marketing functions 
which exert significant differences for both offensive and 
defensive strategies. Certain functions are more effec-
166 
t 
tive in their roles as moderating variables for defensive 
strategies. Among these functions are supporting activi-
ties such as service, technology development and sourcing, 
which have a stronger impact than the primary activities 
such as production and sourcing. Supporting activities 
often form the basis for other activities in the Hong Kong 
subsidiary as well as in subsidiaries elsewhere. It is a 
cornerstone for other subsidiaries to build on. Any 
drastic change in the support activities could have 
large-scale and long-term ramifications. Hence, they are 
significant moderators. The moderating effects cannot be 
ignored. 
Due to the possible impact of the changes on second-
ary or supporting activities, executives would tend to 
express a difference in their perception when choosing the 
related defensive strategies. Other activities like 
production and scheduling do not show a significant dif-
ference . This is probably due to the fact that such 
functions are capital-investment related activities. A 
long lead time may be required for any change. Besides, 
decisions regarding these long-term strategies are often 
made at the headquarters‘ level. The presence or absence 
of such activities may not explicitly affect the subsidi-
ary manager's assessment of and preference towards the 
strategies. Instead, the subsidiary managers may treat 
the political environment as given factors or limiting 
factors that are channeled down from headquarters. 
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Effects of Moderating Variables 
(Measurement of Performance) 
on Strategies 
Five commonly used yardsticks for measuring the 
achievement of a subsidiary or a strategic business unit 
have been identified. The selection of one or more of 
these benchmarks is left to the discretion of the manager. 
Each of these measurements of control presumes the role of 
a moderating variable in the following analysis. 
Sales Volume 
Conditions in China are an important factor influencing 
the preference for defensive strategies where sales volume 
is taken on as a target; the same variable does not show 
an impact on offensive strategies, nor in conditions where 
sales volume is not employed as a measuring stick. The 
perception of international relations has an influence on 
offensive strategies where sales volume is used and on 
defensive strategies where sales volume is not used. 
Personal coimitment exerts opposite directional predomi-
nance on both offensive and defensive strategies where 
sale volume is used as a control device. Overall, one 
observes a difference in the impact of the different 
independent variables on the dependent variables, for both 
offensive and defensive strategies. 
Sales volume is basically a measurement of the suc-
cess of marketing, whether local or overseas. Using it as 
a control implies an emphasis on marketing activities. 
The impact of sales volume as a moderating variable is 
consistent with findings in the last section where the 
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moderating effects of marketing are examined. 
Expenses 
The two subgroups (one which uses expenses as a 
control and the other which does not) demonstrate a sig-
nificant difference in their preferences for both offen-
sive and defensive strategies. The eight independent 
variables have impacts on the different conditions and at 
different levels. Where expenses are used as measuring 
yardstick, perceptions on Hong Kong conditions and China 
conditions are eminent for defensive strategies; the same 
variables are not important for offensive strategies. 
Where expenses do not act as a target, the perceived 
international relationship and the personal evaluation of 
the level of difficulty in achieving the target exert 
substantial impact for defensive strategies, again not for 
offensive strategies. The personal view of intranational 
relationship and the level of the target as compared to 
competitors shows an influence on offensive strategies. 
Companies that are cost-centers tend to use expenses 
as a control device. Cost centers usually evolve around 
production and other cost-related functions. For compa-
nies that stress minimizing cost or cost reduction, the 
conditions in Hong Kong and China greatly affect the cost 
of activities in Hong Kong. Traditionally, Hong Kong has 
been successful in attracting cost-based functions due to 
its past economic conditions. Changes in the political 
and economic environment may have direct effects on the 
expenses incurred here. This would be a major concern. 
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Profits 
Profit is an amalgamation of revenue and expenses. 
It is a measuremnt of the bottom line. Around 60% of the 
respondents indicate that their companies use this measur-
ing device, as shown in Table 4-2. For executives in 
these firms, their perception of the events in China is 
important for defensive strategies; personal commitment is 
vital for offensive strategies. Evaluations of conditions 
in China are vital for those using both sales and expenses 
as targets. It is, therefore, logical that these inde-
pendent variables show up again in the regression coeffi-
cient since profit is a summary of revenue and expenses. 
Return on Assets 
Another method of measuring performance is to employ 
return on assets as a yardstick. This moderating variable 
results in pronounced effects on the preference for a 
defensive strategy, but does not demonstrate such signifi-
cance for an offensive strategy. Perceived Hong Kong 
conditions, China conditions and the level of personal 
commitinent to the target are more important when return on 
assets is used as a control device, but not so in its 
absence. The state of international relations of the 
different countries is a dominant factor when return on 
assets is not used as a control. 
The difference between using profits and return on 
assets as a control device is that for return on assets 
the emphasis is not only on profit maximization but also 
on assets optimization. Under such conditions, executives 
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must pay attention to both offensive and defensive strate-
gies and to events happening in both Hong Kong and China. 
Market Share 
Companies using market share as a standard of meas-
urement tend to follow aggressive strategies. It indi-
cates that they aim to increase sales volume as well as 
expand their market share. These companies hope to flour-
ish with a growing market. 
This moderating variable is expected to exert more 
impact on offensive strategies. Empirical findings sup-
port this logic. There is a significant difference in the 
beta coefficient of the two regression equations for 
offensive strategy but not for defensive strategies. 
Perceived China conditions and intranational relations 
between Hong Kong and China have a greater effect for 
those executives working in firms using market share as a 
target than for those who do not use it. This reflects 
the possibility that China is an existing or potential 
market for these companies. They are, therefore, watchful 
towards the changes in China. Another possibility is that 
the relationship between China and Hong Kong may greatly 
affect the competitiveness of the products in the end 
markets. This is apparent since the intranational rela-




Effects of Moderating Variables 
(Company and Personal Characteristics) 
on Strategies 
Planning Period 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether their 
companies expect annual, quarterly or monthly plans for 
the unit. The planning period proves to be an insignifi-
cant moderating variable. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the two sub-groups for 
either offensive or defensive strategies. This phenomena 
is understandable since companies may use a mixture of 
planning periods to suit the characteristics of the 
strategic business units as well as the functions per-
formed. Due to the variety of planning periods available 
within any one company, it is not expected that this 
variable would be regarded as a strong nor consistent 
characteristic of the subsidiary. Hence, its effects are 
not prominent. 
Years in Hong Kong 
Executives working in companies that have operated 
for a shorter period (less than 14 years) in Hong Kong do 
not show much difference as compared to those which have 
operated for a longer period. This reveals that the 
experience a subsidiary learned from the past does not 
necessarily function as a moderating variable. It is 
possible that most of the subsidiaries have been gaining 
experience from past working experience with other compa-
nies (see Table 4-1 for their profile) through the employ-
ment of experienced staff, and that they depend more on 
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personal experiences. It also indicates that the knowl 
edge of business units is not easily maintained or passed 
on to the executive. This study stressed the relationship 
of risk assessment and risk handling strategies on a 
personal basis. Company-based experiences apparently have 
little impact. 
Number of Employees 
A comparison of executives who work for subsidiaries 
with 50 or less employees with those in subsidiaries with 
more than 50 employees indicates a difference for both 
offensive and defensive strategies. For smaller compa-
nies, the perceived international relations have a greater 
impact； for larger companies, the target as compared to 
competitors and the level of personal commitment has 
greater impacts. This findings provide insights as to the 
moderating effect of the size of the subsidiary. Smaller 
subsidiaries are more concerned with risk assessment 
showing that they are highly vulnerable to the environ-
ment. Larger subsidiaries are more concerned with refer-
ence point measurements showing that they are more aware 
of the effect of the competitors. Also, it is reasonable 
to expect that larger subsidiaries would be required to 
maintain a profit level. The marginal effort required to 
bring out additional performance and marginal revenue is 
higher than what is economically viable. That may be why 
these executives are more concerned with the variables 




The beta coefficient of the two regression equations 
shows that executives in companies with a lower contribu-
tion (less than 9% of the profit of the parent company) is 
affected more by the perceived conditions in China, the 
expected international relationship, the level of the 
target as compared to other subsidiaries and the level of 
personal commitment. This is probably due to the fact 
that subsidiaries with smaller levels of contribution tend 
to be performing a smaller number of functions in Hong 
Kong. Their existence in Hong Kong is unlikely to be 
driven by technological advancements or special skills. 
Their presence may be seen as replaceable. Therefore, 
when they are considering defensive strategies, more 
conditions have to be considered. 
Company Nationality 
The executives interviewed work for American, Japa-
nese and French companies. The three sub-groups demon-
strate a difference in the intensity of the effect of the 
independent variables on risk-handling strategies. Howev-
er, whether such differences are due primarily to company 
nationality or due to other indigenous factors must be 
further studied before conclusions can be drawn. This 
finding, nevertheless, offers some possibilities for 
follow-up studies. 
Personal Demographics 
Executives who are younger tend to be more affected 
by whether they personally feel committed to the set 
target. People who are older (over 40) are more affected 
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by their evaluation of the developments in China. A 
similar pattern is observed for other moderating variables 
such as working experience. This is expected since there 
is a high correlation between age and number of years of 
working experience. However, the length of employment 
with the present subsidiary does not show any statistical-
ly significant difference between the two sub-groups. 
This again reveals that executives depend more on past 
personal experiences than on knowledge gained by the 
business unit. 
Overall 
Based on the results of the analysis, it can be 
generally said that personal demographics and company 
characteristics are moderating factors in different situa-
tions. This goes in line with hypothesis H2. However, the 
extent and the direction of their effects cannot be fully 
ascertained from this study. The moderating variables 
that affect offensive and defensive strategies (as appar-
ent in Table 4-15) make the issue more interesting and 
more worthy of exploring. Further studies and research 
are needed to fine tune this relationship. This study can 






It is clear that prospect theory provides us with a 
foundation that may be adapted to the business environment 
in order to relate risk assessment, reference point and 
risk-handling strategies. The principle provides a mean-
ingful theoretical background. Certain adaptations in the 
theory can make it even more powerful. 
First, the reference point should not be regarded as 
a mediating variable that affects the preference for 
risk-handling strategies. This deviates from the prospect 
theory. The prospect theory expects a step-by-step proc-
ess in developing the reference point and in framing the 
choices against the reference point. Results of the study 
illustrate that subsidiary managers tend to regard the 
target (reference point) as something that is handed down 
from the headquarters. It is, therefore, not a mediating 
factor in terms of its association with the personal 
preference for the strategies. Unlike the assumption of 
the prospect theory, it does not go through a process that 
involves formulation of a perception and then the estab-
lishment of a reference point. Rather, both political 
risk assessment and reference point are assumed to be 
factors beyond the control of the subsidiary manager. It 
is possible that such phenomena are only present in policy 
and strategy issues that involve senior management. This 
study on the particular situation in Hong Kong relaxes 
some of these assumptions. These changes enable theorists 
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to examine the validity of the theory under a wider range 
of conditions. 
Secondly, it is apparent that in determining business 
strategies, executives would take into account both offen-
sive and defensive strategies. It has been discussed 
earlier that the two groups of strategies, offensive and 
defensive, are complement each other. They are not 
stand-alone strategies. It can be confirmed from this 
survey that business strategies are a summation of various 
tactics, some of which involve specific functional areas. 
These tactics often range from risk-averse to risk-taking 
strategies. They are, unlike a dice-throwing situation, 
mutually dependent and supportive of each other. A higher 
preference for offensive strategies does not necessarily 
imply a lower preference for defensive strategies. Never-
theless, the respondents in the study generally indicate a 
higher preference for offensive strategies. Given the 
situation in Hong Kong, executives are willing to induce 
changes and incur risk on behalf of the company. This 
study indicates that personal commitment to the target 
significantly affects the choice of offensive strategies. 
Based on this study and other studies on risk handling 
behavior, we cannot, at this point in time, confidently 
conclude whether personal risk-taking preferences, demo-
graphics or situation specific factors act as moderating 
factors• 
Another observation is that defensive strategies are 
highly reliant on the political environment. This is 
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logical since in times of higher* perceived, risks, compa-
nies are especially sensitive to the added danger and are 
keen to handle such risks. Executives realize the time 
lag in formulating a strategy and in realizing the re-
sults. Therefore, they are alert to formulating defensive 
strategies well in advance, and this action is highly 
dependent on the political risks. 
Offensive strategies, on the other hand, are not only 
aggressive in nature (for example, examining the possibil-
ities for new production and sourcing internationally), 
they also involve intra-industry strategies (like liaising 
with competitors and the government in negotiating for 
changes in the investment climate)• The choice of these 
strategies imply that competitors are not necessarily 
treated as opponents. An intra-industry strategy is 
preferred when most companies within the industry, or 
within the area, are confronted with a similar situation. 
Companies are, therefore, willing to cooperate. This 
again demonstrates the macro-nature of the potential 
political risk in Hong Kong. Foreign companies tend to 
share the same view regarding the macro-nature of the risk 
and are willing to join forces to deal with it. 
Thirdly, prospect theory assumes that an individual 
is his own boss and that gains or losses are personal 
gains. In business, many executives view themselves as 
agents for the subsidiary. Their personal interests often 
lie beyond the performance of the business units. In 
cases where there are conflicting interests between per-
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sonal pursuits and company interests, the executives may 
be forced to make a choice. The study has not examined 
this aspect. By incorporating agency theory and conflict 
theory in the prospect theory in future studies, one could 
extend the theory and build a clearer and more comprehen-
sive picture. This study has shown that certain company 
and personal characteristics act as moderators in the 
choice of the two types of strategies• This suggests that 
executives play a double role as an agency for the company 
and as an agency for the subsidiary and for himself. This 
may cause conflicts between headquarters and the subsidi-
ary. The issue will become more dominant as the power in 
subsidiaries increases. Further examination of this issue 
will prove valuable to practitioners. 
Originally, prospect theory does not study how other 
variables (such as demographics) may act as moderating 
variables. This is an extension that Kohli and Zaltman 
(1988) and Kohli (1989a) added. In this study, some 
company and personal characteristics demonstrate an impact 
as moderating variables. This preliminary study can only 
shed some light on the relationship, further studies can 
further fine tune the effects of these variables. By 
taking more environmental factors into account, the pros-
pect theory will draw closer to mirroring real life situa-
tions. 
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Political Risk Studies 
It is interesting to note that some studies on polit-
ical risk depend heavily on quantitative data (Green and 
Korth, 1974, Sethi and Luther, 1986, Nigh, 1986) and rely 
on political indices such as the Business International 
Index, World Political Risk Forecasts and so on. In this 
studyf it is found that individual executives seldom rely 
solely on such statistics. Their perception is an aggre-
gate of quantitative data, their personal interpretation 
and their personal views. This coincides with the find-
ings of the empirical studies by Kobrin, Basek, Blank and 
la Palombara (1980) which concludes that executives pre-
dominantly employ qualitative methods. It shows that the 
practice has not changed through time, nor has does it 
differ in across countries. 
The findings in no way refute the fact that informa-
tion functions as a useful tool in assessing political 
risk. However, an executive often forms his own opinion 
on the level of risk of a country after collecting infor-
mation and comments from a range of sources. Quantitative 
data and accurate information is a necessary but not 
totally sufficient requirement to form a perception of 
political risk. Executives tend to collect extensive 
information from all sources available about the macro-
economic environment as well as industry-specific details. 
They also take into account company-specific issues. 
However, such information only forms a pool for analysis. 
The data undergoes an evaluation process before a personal 
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opinion is established. 
This observation implies that the whole issue related 
to the study of political risk and political risk handling 
strategies is more complex. Country-based analyses pri-
marily using economic indicators can be useful, but a 
footnote commenting on the limitations is crucial. These 
analysis are not fully predictive of future developments. 
It means that executives who are reliant on such indices, 
must be cautious in using this data. A country-specific 
index may be unable to reveal the realities of a particu-
lar industry or for a particular country. Hence, both 
risk analysis and expert judgment are required (Clarke, 
1988) • Besides, an index only reflects environmental 
uncertainty. The effect uncertainty and response uncer-
tainty are not addressed. 
Because political risk assessment relies on personal 
interpretations, bias may exist. This explains possible 
differences in opinion among executives, even when they 
are given the same information. The differences are more 
intense when a range of sources giving conflicting infor-
mation is used. When headquarters staff compare their 
sources of information with the subsidiary executives, 
they are bound to find their information less in-depth, 
outdated and limited in scope. Subsidiary managers are 
open to continuous information inflow from officials of 
the host government, local bankers, competitors, local 
consumers and the like. Due to these differences, one 
would expect that in a group discussion process on the 
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issue, conflict resolution mechanisms need to be intro-
duced to resolve the differences and to compromise on a 
commonly agreed option. 
Despite differences in the perception of the risk 
level, the subsidiary executives in Hong Kong are keenly 
aware of the possible effects of political risks on the 
firms. The issues that they are concerned with can be 
illustrated by the breadth of strategies that were men-
tioned during the discussions. It is interesting to note, 
however, that during the interviews and in the survey 
conducted, few of the executives gave serious considera-
tion to strategies to minimize the risks of expropriation 
or confiscation. There is also a low preference for 
divestment. This may be a reflection of the situation --
that the perceived probability of such events is low. 
This perception possibly reveals a positive attitude 
towards the business environment in Hong Kong. However, 
if the executives are ignoring the expropriation risk 
without a factual or strategic basis, this is not an 
advisable move. It is recommended that companies investi-
gate their specific situation and ensure that such a risk 
is assessed and well protected against. 
This study demonstrates an obvious linkage between 
external analysis of the environment, internal analysis of 
the company and business strategies. Strategies are 
contingent upon political risk analysis (whether accurate 
or not) as well as upon the characteristics of a firm. 
This confirms the normative behavior that is advocated by 
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many scholars in business strategies (Porter, 1985)--
that is, making business strategy decisions based on 
external and internal analysis, is being practiced. 
Executives carry with them personal evaluations of the 
political risk in Hong Kong, China, and the international 
arena, as well as a personal opinion on the target set. 
Their choice of strategy is dependent upon these varia-
bles • Though the intensity and the magnitude of each 
variable varies according to the moderating variables, it 
is worth noting that risk assessments have stronger ef-
fects on defensive strategies whereas personal commitment 
to the goal carries more impact on offensive strategies. 
This finding implies that the host country and the head-
quarters can exert influence on the perception of risk and 
the attitude towards the target which would influence the 
choice of strategies. 
Another finding is the effect of the moderating 
variables on the political risk assessments and the refer-
ence point on the strategies. This empirical finding can 
provide theorists of business strategies with much insight 
--that personal characteristics and personal feelings do 
come into play. Strategy development process is not 
simply a model that is fed with inputs of data. It is 
based on how the numbers are interpreted. The end result 





Based on the study, there are a number of issues that 
management in headquarters may want to note. Knowing the 
relationship between risk perception, reference point and 
strategy, headquarters can work to sway the executives ‘ 
perceptions and choice. 
Regarding the perceived political risk, headquarters 
can subscribe to studies and provide information on polit-
ical risks for the subsidiaries. This would add to the 
information that the subsidiary managers already received. 
The additional information, whether in consensus with or 
in disagreement with other information already obtained, 
cannot be guaranteed. But it ensures that subsidiary 
managers would not become lost in their very updated and 
detailed information from local source. It balances the 
micro-aspects with the macro-aspect analysis of trends and 
major events. By providing some information and by guid-
ing how the information can be interpreted, there is an 
indirect impact on the executives‘ evaluation of the 
political risk. Also, if there are disagreements on the | 
level of political risk in the host country, the staff in 
the headquarters can use the common information that both 
parties possess as a basis for discussion. This can, 
firstly, ensure a common footing for information. Second-
ly, headquarter can select information for dissemination 
to the subsidiaries. It can also construe the information 
collected. The flavor of the information provided can 
somehow channel the subsidiary managers‘ perception of the 
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political risk in the host country. By doing so, head-
quarters is indirectly steering the managers, interpreta-
tions and perceptions. Thirdly, when there is a common 
basis for discussion, there can be more meaningful coitimu-
nication. Besides, the fact that headquarter staff are 
armed with extensive information on the political environ-
ment in its international subsidiaries demonstrates to the 
subsidiary managers that headquarters is concerned, aware 
of and willing to discuss the political future of the host 
country. This would bring about an atmosphere for commu-
nication and dialogue. 
Another thing that headquarters may want to take part 
in is setting up training courses on political awareness 
for the staff in both headquarters and the subsidiaries. 
Managers are often faced with information overload. The 
difficulty lies in sifting through the information, iden-
tifying the important ones and in interpreting its impli-
cations for the future. This requires skills that are 
probably beyond that of the business executives. It is 
especially hard for the staff in the headquarters to 
decipher information about a place that they may not have 
been to. However, interpretation directly affects the 
strategy choice. Hence, it is vital that the interpreta-
tions be accurate. This requires executives to be sensi-
tive to and altert to changes the political environment, 
as well as skillful in the assessment of possible effects 
on the industry and the company. Training can improve 
such skills. Such skills also improve with experience. 
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Headquarters needs to nurture a group of staff who have 
political sensitivity and good business discernment. Such 
directions require top management support, initiation and 
motivation. In doing so, the executives' choice of defen-
sive strategies will be sharpened as risks are identified 
and are interpreted earlier than their competitors. A 
multinational company can develop its advantage in this 
area and then vigorously compete with its competitors. 
Headquarters may find that subsidiary managers could 
hold significantly different perceptions of political risk 
and could have significantly different ways of handling 
the risk. It is expected that headquarters staff and 
subsidiary managers hold different opinions on the issue 
as they view the matter from different perspectives. In 
those cases, there is a need to narrow the gap. A number 
of alternatives are possible. One is to centralize all 
major decisions at the headquarter丨s level. This method 
generally exerts greater control on the subsidiaries. 
Another way is to increase communication between headquar-
ters and subsidiaries when setting the target, when dis-
cussing the risk in the host country and when developing 
strategies to deal with the anticipated risks. Communica-
tions open ways for an exchange of opinions and leave room 
for compromise and negotiations. It also clarifies any 
difference in opinion. Another way is to impose already 
decided goals on the subsidiaries. On the other hand, 
headquarters may feel that the subsidiaries do not con-
tribute significantly to the profits of the group. Then, 
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it may allow the subsidiaries the freedom to choose its 
own strategies. 
Another point that is worth noting is that higher 
levels of commitment to the target are associated with 
higher preference for offensive strategies. Headquarters 
may want to influence the likelihood of choosing offensive 
strategies by formulating more control over the coininitted 
staff. Besides that, this also reflects that subsidiary 
managers may have a tendency to over-emphasize their 
performance within the territory instead of assessing the 
outcome for the multinational firm as a whole. This 
explains their willingness to employ offensive strategies 
and shows the relationship of personal commitment with 
offensive strategies. This sentiment is apparently bene-
ficial for the unit, but may not be so for the foreign 
firm as a whole. In that case, it is vital that companies 
prompt their senior subsidiary managers to consider com-
mitment to the company, not just to the subsidiary. This 
has to be accompanied by appropriate controls on the 
subsidiaries, appropriate incentives for the managers and 
appropriate career developments for the managers. This 





The focus of this study lies in examing the applica-
tion of prospect theory in risk-handling business strate-
gies, with reference to political risk assessment. It is 
hoped that the study can provide empirical support in 
understanding how executives make strategy choices. 
Throughout this study, the relevancy of prospect theory in 
a business context is tested. The study hopes to contrib-
ute to a better understanding of business strategies as 
well as to the development of prospect theory. The par-
ticular political situation in Hong Kong is used as the 
background for the study. 
Prospect Theory 
The primary contribution of prospect theory is mani-
fested in its ability to relate risk assessment to strate-
gy choice. This has been validated in many situations as 
reported in the literature research of the preceding 
chapters. Based on past studies, it is believed that the 
same phenomena described in the prospect theory holds in 
situations related to the choice of business strategies, 
under concerns for political risks. 
Another strength of the prospect theory lies in its 
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power to explain the choice between risk-taking verses 
risk-averse behavior, in relation to reference point. The 
theory states that individuals who are more optimistic 
(with regard to the reference point) would tend to choose 
a risk-averse alternative whereas those who view the 
situation (with regard to the reference point) more pessi-
mistically are more likely to opt for a risk-taking alter-
native. Similarly, we believe that the reference point is 
an important factor in affecting the choice of strategies. 
We argue, in the case of strategy choice, that the refer-
ence point is not a mediating factor, as proposed in the 
prospect theory. Subsidiary managers are often provided 
with a frame of reference (equivalent to targets in the 
business setting) for measuring their performance. Since 
these targets are often handed down from headquarters, it 
differs from a personal decision where the frame is large-
ly a personal preference. Under such a headquarter-sub-
sidiary relationship, we hypothesize that the reference 
point affects the risk-handling handling directly, and not 
as a mediating factor. Other factors that are surmised to 
be important in affecting the strategy choice are personal 
perceptions related to risk assessment in Hong Kong. 
These factors form the group of independent variables. 
The dependent variables are the choice of strategies which 
are classified into two groups according to their nature. 
They are offensive strategies (which are more pro-active 
in nature, and generally more risk-taking) and defensive 




Applying Prospect Theory in 
Business Strategies 
The data collected includes responses from 134 execu-
tives from various foreign companies. The data showed 
that managers are generally risk-aversive in nature. 
However, those managers who perceive the political future 
of Hong Kong with less optimism have a higher tendency to 
favor offensive strategies than those managers who are 
more optimistic. This confirms with the spirit of the 
prospect theory. 
The choice of offensive strategies is significantly 
related to reference point, particularly to the level of 
commitment to the target. The various factors related to 
perceived political risk in Hong Kong do not bear any 
significant effect on the preference for a particular 
offensive strategy. However, it is found that defensive 
strategies, unlike offensive strategies, are significantly 
affected by the perceived changes that may take place in 
Hong Kong and China. For defensive strategies, reference 
point does not demonstrate a significant impact. The 
differences in the impact of the independent variables 
(such as political risk assessments and reference point 
perceptions) on the preferences for offensive and defen-
sive strategies show that the various strategies probably 
have a number of dimensions. Classifying these strategies 
into two types, that is, risk-taking and risk-averse, only 
addresses one of the many dimensions. The assumptions of 
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prospect theory, such as mutually exclusive choices, 
limited number of choices, certainty of environment and 
certainty of results, do not always hold. Due to the 
multiple dimensional nature of business strategies, the 
preference for each strategy is affected by different 
factors. Different strategies are often seen to be com-
plementary to each other, supporting each other in view of 
a common goal. Hence, executives would be well advised to 
explore all possible strategies and to see how they may 
fit into an overall plan. 
These findings demonstrate that, in international 
business, decisions are affected not only by the environ-
ment in a particular city. Decisions are also affected by 
the executives‘ commitment toward the target. The data 
also revealed that preferences for strategies are also 
influenced by moderating variables which include company 
and personal characteristics. This implies that the 
relationship between risk assessment and risk handling 
strategies are subject to variation within each company 
and with each executive. 
Value to Theorists 
This study demonstrates that a relationship exists 
between risk assessment and the choice of risk-handling 
strategies. Prospect theory is a useful tool in explain-
ing such a pattern. However, in cases of business strate-
gies, because of the wider scope for which uncertainty 
exists, the comparability and relativity in evaluating 
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country risks, and the wide range of strategy options 
available, prospect theory needs to be adapted before it 
can fully explain risk-handling behavior in business. The 
relevancy of reference point is one such example where 
prospect theory provides a basis for explanation, but 
where adaptations are needed for analyzing the conditions 
in the business context. The empirical data supported the 
hypothesis that the reference point acts as an independent 
variable, but not as a mediating variable, in the strategy-
choice. This signifies the importance of examining the 
theory and making adaptations for different contexts. 
From this, one can be assured that this research is a 
valuable cornerstone for future theoretical developments 
in both business strategy and decisions under uncertainty. 
The contribution of this study is to lay the first stone 
for such research and suggest the role of the reference 
point, as well as propose possible variables (such as 
personal and company characteristics that are found to 
have a bearing on the relationship) that can be incorpo-
rated into future research. The study also reveals the 
many assumptions and limitations of prospect theory that 
have not been fully dealt with before. Besides, it ad-
dresses the relationship between assessment and strategy. 
The empirical findings allow academicians to have an 
understanding of how executives make decisions. The same 
pattern may exist for assessment and strategy choice under 
conditions other than political risk. Research in other 
areas can provide more insight on this issue. 
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Value to Management 
The study is also meaningful to management. It is 
one of the few studies that uses subsidiary managers as 
the sampling frame. Headquarters personnel would be 
interested to know the mindset of the subsidiary managers 
in order to cultivate a better understanding and formulate 
better communication and control at the subsidiary level. 
It is interesting to note that most managers are risk-
averse in nature. Those executives who are more prone to 
favor risk-taking strategies are those who regard the 
future as less bright. It should also be noted that 
managers who have a stronger commitment to the target have 
a higher tendency to opt for offensive strategies. Know-
ing that, headquarters managers can map the preferences of 
subsidiary managers for different strategies. This can 
allow them to a better control and coordination of the 
subsidiaries. The pattern also indicates that personal 
interest and the personal experience of any individual 
manager may affect his strategy choice and that personal 
preferences may come before company interests. In cases 
where headquarter managers want to direct the strategy 
choice, they may have to work around the variables that 
would affect the choice of strategies. They need to be 
aware how the subsidiary managers rate their commitment 
towards the target. They also need to have a better 
understanding of the personal characteristics of the 
subsidiary executives. In cases where conflicts between 
personal and company interest exist, management would need 
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to formulate tactics to handle such situations and to 
ensure that strategies made in the subsidiary level are in 
line with the company‘s overall direction. 
The study provides much insight on strategy decision. 
It relates preferences of strategies with risk assessment 
on a personal level. The limitation is in whether we can 
confidently assume that personal preference is reflective 
of organizational decisions. The study is unable to deal 
with this area. It is proposed that future studies need 
to examine this issue. 
On a more practical side, this study portrays a 
picture of how executives evaluate the political risks in 
Hong Kong and how they view the suitability of various 
strategies. This data can be a valuable piece of informa-
tion for comparison with other countries as well as for 
longitudinal studies of Hong Kong. It can also be used 
for executives in headquarters, to obtain a better under-
standing of the subsidiary staff. 
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Expected Utility Theory: 
Violations of Assumptions 
Expected utility theory is a mathematically-based 
theory that looks at alternatives in uncertainty. It 
calculates the expected value of each alternative and 
recommends the option with the highest expected outcome. 
This theory is normative in nature. It assumes that all 
decision-makers are rational and that all information is 
available. 
A weakness of the expected utility theory lies in its 
inability to deal with the assumptions of cancellation, 
transitivity, dominance and invariance (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986) • This range of assumptions has been 
challenged by many -- ranging from cancellation, being 
challenged by most, to invariance, which was rejected by 
only a few. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) further state 
that invariance and dominance are normatively essential 
but descriptively invalid. A summary of these assumptions 
and their violations is given in Table 2-6. 
Cancellation 
The notion of cancellation postulates that 
alternatives can be collapsed into fewer choices. Options 
resulting in the same outcome are assessed as if they were 
the same. This implies that choices may be eliminated 
according to the final outcome. It also implies that 
decision-makers are only concerned with the expected 
outcome. The process of reaching the result and the range 
of possible outcomes appear to be of little relevance. 
According to the notion of cancellation, if A is pre-
ferred to B, it can be expected that the ultimate result 
of A differs from B and that it carries an expected 
outcome better than B. The argument for this assumption 
is that only one state will be actualized. 
However, in real life situations, if A carries a 
higher expected outcome but consists of one possible event 
that is highly unfavorable, the decision-maker may choose 
B even while being fully aware of its inferior expected 
value. For instance, three investment choices may be 
aiven. The first one runs a 12% risk of bankruptcy, but a 
l8% chance of obtaining a 10% return. The second runs a 
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36% risk of bankruptcy, but a 44% chance of receiving a 
20% return. The third alternative is to put the portfolio 
in the bank, thus ensuring an 8% return. Expected utility 
theory would favor the first two alternatives. In fact, 
because both of these alternatives bring an 8.8% return, 
they will be collapsed and considered as one and the same 
choice. However, individuals may indicate a different 
preference. Many may prefer the certainty of an 8% return 
——thus choosing the third alternative. Some may be 
willing to take a certain amount of risk of a 12% bank-
ruptcy, whereas the more risk-taking individuals will be 
willing to take a 36% risk of bankruptcy. This type of 
behavior violates the assumption of cancellation. 
Trans itivity 
Transitivity describes the phenomena whereupon if a 
person prefers A over B and B over C, it can be implied 
that the same person, when given a choice between A and C, 
would take the former option. Transitivity is satisfied 
if it is possible to assign a value to each alternative, 
and if each alternative can be evaluated independently. 
According to Tversky (1969), a person»s choice is 
considered intransitive if, in the majority of the adja-
cent pairs, he prefers the one with the higher outcome but 
prefers another one when comparing to an extreme pair. 
Many empirical studies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 
Budescu and Weiss, 1987) cast doubts on this assumption. 
Dominance 
Dominance is perhaps the most seemingly rational 
principle. This assumption states that if one option is 
better than another in at least one state and equivalent 
in all other states, the dominant option would be pre-
ferred. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) provide two scenarios 
of a sure gain of $250 (expected value of $250) verses a 
25% chance to obtain $1,000 (expected value of $250). 
Since the two choices result in the same outcome, one 
would expect half of the respondents to prefer the first 
alternative and the other half to choose the second op-
tion. In the empirical study, 84 percent chose the former 
and 16% the latter. This intriguing behavior can be 
compared to another set of scenarios of a sure gain of 
$240 versus $250. In this second situation, all the re 
spondents would normally choose the former choice. The 
difference in the two sets of scenarios brings about some 
interesting observations and hypotheses. 
It can be speculated that choices are framed in a 
complex manner, combining a number of conditions. The 
expected value may be only one of the conditions consid-
ered Also, direct comparisons between each independent 
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state may be difficult if not impossible. Individuals are 
often at a loss to integrate and evaluate these complex 
choices. The violation of dominance denotes the inadequa-
cy of the expected utility theory. 
Invariance 
Invariance is a condition where different 
representations of the same choice yield the same 
preference. Invariance exists when changes in the 
description of an outcome do not alter the preferential 
order. The failure of invariance is probably attributable 
to the nonlinearity of decision weights and the framing of 
probabilities. A case of violation of invariance as 
suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) is to consider 
commercial events in terms of state of wealth (total 
assets), rather than gains and losses (profits). 
Cancellations would assume that a sure gain of $500 
and a 50% gain of $1,000 as the same option since they 
possess identical expected values. Since these two 
choices are the same, according to invariance, one would 
expect the same preference. However, when individuals are 
asked to choose between a sure gain of $500 and a sure 
gain of $600 as well as to choose between a 50% gain of 
$1,000 and a sure gain of $600, the two do not produce the 
same pattern. Again, individuals may have different 
responses to certainty and to risk-aversion. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1984), on observing cases of failure in 
invariance, concluded that "invariance is normatively 
essential, intuitively compelling and psychologically 
unfeasible". Variance is only possible if final outcomes 
are looked upon as gains and losses instead of state of 
wealth, or if evaluations are made in terms of their 
appeal to human lives. 
The certainty effect (to be discussed in detail 
later) can be labeled as "a reduction of the probability 
of an outcome by a constant factor with more impact when 
the outcome was certain than when it was only probable" 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)• This psychological princi-
ple holds that a given decrease in the probability of an 
event will have the greater effect when the event is 
considered inevitable, rather than merely possible. It 
implies that a risky event gives way to certainty. The 
tolerance level and the tradeoff between risk (and cer-
tainty) in respect to return has yet to be examined before 
a model is developed. In cases of certainty versus high 
return, risk aversion behavior is observed. 
A second explanation of the marginal value can be 
seen from the shape of the curve. A marginal gain of $100 
to $200 is valued more than a marginal gain of $2,000 to 
$2 100, given the discount of the stated probability. 
These features portray the psychological effect of risk on 
individuals and their behavior. 
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The curve also showed that when losses are perceived 
people are typically risk-taking or prefer the highest 
possible gain even though it coincides with a lower 
monetary expectation. This finding is a breakthrough from 
the historical belief that all decision-makers are risk 
averse (Fiegenbaium and Thomas, 1988)• It also reveals 
that individuals exhibit a mixture of risk-seeking and 
risk-averse behavior. The major determinant for the risk 
handling method is the location of the reference point. 






The narrow definition of the term certainty refers to 
a preference for certainty in the events of similar 
outcome. A more comprehensive understanding of certainty 
can be observed by closely examining Appendix 2-1. 
The major characteristic of the function is the over-
weight of probability involving certainty and the 
underweight of probability that is regarded as impossible. 
Besides, the difference between the expected utility curve 
and the proposed curve is greater at the two ends of the 
curve (from 95% to 100% and from 5% to 10%) than in the 
middle (between the range of 30% and 50%)• 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) also observed that the 
difference between the curve and the 45 degree line con-
firms a violation of the expected utility theory. It also 
implies that decreasing from certainty to a probability of 
25% uncertainty has a greater effect than a corresponding 
reduction from 75% to 50% certainty. 
Pseudocertainty effects exist in cases where the 
decision problem is a conditional evaluation, based on an 
earlier state. Pseudocertainty can be induced by a 
sequential conditional or by the existence of 
contingencies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986)• This can be 
illustrated by the situation created by Tversky and 
Kahnemen (1981, 1986) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Tversky and Kahneman(1986) 
gave a problem to 85 respondents. The respondents were 
asked to consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, 
there is a 75% chance to end the game without any gain or 
loss and a 25% chance to go on to stage two. In the 
second stage, a choice can be made. Respondents were 
asked to make a decision before the outcome of the first 
stage is known. The options are, first, a sure win of $30 
and secondly, a 80% chance to win $45 and 20% to win 
nothing. Without the first stage, the expected values are 
$30 and $34 for the two options respectively. And when 
asked to make a choice, 78% and 22% of the respondents 
qave their preference to the two choices respectively, 
taking into account the first stage, the first choice 
gives an expected value of $7.5 and the second alternative 
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$8.0. The first option provides the benefit of certainty. 
In this two-stage game, the first option was selected by 
74% and the second by 26% of the participants. This 
result is similar to the one-stage game but is contrary to 
the recommendation of the expected utility theory. It is 
claimed that this behavior pattern demonstrates pseudocer-
tainty. An outcome (80% chance of not continuing) is 
treated as if it were certain. In other words, the re-
spondents only evaluated the information in stage two and 
ignored the data from stage one (or treated it as certain-
ty) . Similar patterns of pseudocertainty exist for physi-
cians and for college students (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986). 
The presence of the certainty effect and pseudocer-
tainty effect is suggested as an explanation for the 
behavior of escalating commitment (Whyte, 1986). A typi-
cal example of escalating commitment is seen when banks 
lend "good money after bad money"• The tendency of esca-
lating commitment has generally been viewed as a losing 
course of action motivated on the part of decision-makers 
to self-justify previous decision and to maintain the 
illusion that the earlier decision was unblemished. There 
has been many attempt to explain this behavior. Arguments 
include: whether the sunk cost should be entered into the 
analysis when considering incremental cost (de Bondt, 
Werner and Makhija, 1988), and the rationale behind the 
managerial decision in escalating commitment. Escalating 
commitment reveals behavior that is only partially ration-
al. Whyte (1986) argues that escalating commitment or 
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hypothesized, expectancy theory 
- - _ hypothesized, prospect theory 





A copy of the questionnaire is attached. This question-
naire is designed for the interviewers. Interviewer were 
encouraged to ask general questions in order to obtain 
more information and insight on the subject. These open-
ended questions, which differ from case to case, provide 
valuable insight. The interviewers were trained to use 
any opportunities to seek such information. 
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Please inform the respondent of the objective of 
the study and ask him to give a personal opinion, 
by checking the appropriate choice. Also empha-
size that the data will be kept confidential. 
Assessment of the Hong Kong Investment Climate 
We are interested in how the manager assesses the 
long-term situation in Hong Kong. (ten-year 
frame). 
Please consider the following statements and 
circle the appropriate number --
(1 = totally agree 
2 = generally agree 
3 = agree 
4 = slightly agree 
5 = slightly disagree 
6 = disagree 
7 = generally disagree 
8 = totally disagree) 
1. There is little change in the operations of 
the foreign exchange market in Hong Kong. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. The Hong Kong dollar will be easily convertible 
to foreign currency. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3. The Hong Kong dollar will remain stable. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. There will be itiinimuin price level change in NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Hong Kong. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. There is unlikely to be any restriction on 
repatriation of profit or capital in Hong Kong. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6. Labor will to abundant and available in 
Hong Kong. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7. There will be little change in the economic 
policy set by the Hong Kong government. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8. The tax rate in Hong Kong will increase 
significantly. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9. The cost of labor in Hong Kong will be low 
and competitive, in comparison to other Asian 
countries. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
10. The administrative structure of the Hong Kong 
government will remain unchanged. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
11. The labor in Hong Kong will be ... . o o . c： ^ -7 q 
remain productive and efficient. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I 
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12. There will be an increase in the number of 
industrial disputes in Hong Kong. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
13• The international image of Hong Kong will 
remain strong and positive. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
14. Hong Kong will increase its representation in 
China‘s government structure. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
15. Hong Kong will increasingly follow the 
guidelines of China. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
16. Hong Kong's autonomy will be maintained. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17. The people of Hong Kong are positive towards 
the Chinese government. (attitude) NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
18. The people of Hong Kong are supportive of 
the Chinese government. (action) NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
19. The foreign exchange system in China will 
remain unchanged. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
20. The Renminbi will depreciate. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
21. The Chinese government•s control on Renminbi 
is unlikely to change. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
22. Control on profit and capital repatriation in 
China will be maintained. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
23. Taxation policy in China will become more 
attractive to foreign partners. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
24. The government structure in China will remain 
unchanged. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
25. The economic policy and objective of the 
Chinese government will remain unchanged. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
26. Power of the opposing political parties in 
China will increase. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
27. The international image of China will be 
strong and positive. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
28. The diplomatic relationship between Hong Kong 
and the rest of the world will be friendly and 
cooperative. NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
29. The diplomatic relationship between China and … … 
the rest of the world will be friendly and NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
cooperative. 
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30. Overall, you regard the investment climate 
in Hong Kong, compared to other neighboring 










Below are a list of strategies that companies 
usually employ when faced with risk. Please 
indicate your personal preference --
(1 = extremely likely 
2 = very likely 
3 = likely 
4 = somewhat likely 
5 = someplace unlikely 
6 = unlikely 
7 = unlikely 
8 = extremely unlikely) 
1. Set a higher long term target for the 
operations in Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. Determine a higher profit margin for the 
present market NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3. Favor trading and licensing to foreign direct 
investment NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. Sell ownership in the Hong Kong subsidiary 
to a local firm NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. Sell ownership in the Hong Kong subsidiary 
to another multinational firm NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6. Favor contracts and commitment with shorter 
time span NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7 . Minimize additional investment in Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8. Market obsolete technology to Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 . Develop multi-site productions outside 
Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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10. Seek additional funds by borrowing from banks 
in Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
11. Seek additional funds for investment by NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
borrowing from banks outside of Hong Kong 
12. Limit intra-company loans and intra-company 
transfers to Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
13• Develop multi-sourcing of raw materials and 
parts NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
14. Withhold Hong Kong * s access to new technology NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
15. Develop an information system that provides 
the headquarters with updated and accurate 
information from Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
16. Act as a good citizen and follow the guide-
lines set by the Hong Kong government NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
17. Lobby for support from competitors in the 
business to seek support from the Hong 
Kong government NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
18. Lobby for support from the home government 
to seek support from the Hong Kong 
government NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
19. Create a better corporate image in Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
20. Lobby for support from competitors in the 
business to seek support from the 
Chinese government NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
21. Lobby for support from the home government 
to seek support from the Chinese 
government NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
22. Buy political insurance NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
23. Keep the Hong Kong operations at a minimal 
level NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
24. Pull out from Hong Kong NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 




You had probably set up targets at the beginning of each 
accounting period as a guideline for your actions. Think of 
the most recent target that you have set. 
1. What indicator(s) did you use in the target? 





^^^^^ Return on assets 
Profit margin 
Others (please specify) 





Others (please specify) 
3. When was the last target set? 
(month) (year) 
4. In setting this target, do you think 
Your subsidiary»s opinion has been seriously taken 
into account. 
Your subsidiary's opinion has been taken into account. 
Your subsidiary‘s opinion has been noted. 
Your subsidiary»s opinion has not been noted. 
^^^ Your subsidiary•s opinion has not received 
much attention. 
Your subsidiary»s opinion has been ignored. 
5. Regarding the target, do you think 
the target is extremely difficult to achieve 
the target is quite difficult to achieve 
the target is somewhat difficult to achieve 
the target is somewhat easy to achieve 
the target is quite easy to achieve, 
the target is extremely easy to achieve 
6. Compared to your competitors, do you think your target is 
Much higher than the competitors 
^ ^ Higher than the competitors 
About the same as the competitors 
Lower than the competitors 
Much lower than the competitors 
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7. Compared to the subsidiaries in other regions, do you 
think your target is 
Much higher than the other subsidiaries 
Higher than the other subsidiaries 
About the same as the competitors 
Lower than the other subsidiaries 
Much lower than the other subsidiaries 
8. In setting this target, do you think 
Your personal opinion has been seriously taken into 
account. 
Your personal opinion has been taken into account. 
^ ^ Your personal opinion has been noted. 
Your personal opinion has not been noted. 
Your personal opinion has not received much attention. 
Your personal opinion has been ignored. 
Personal and Company Data 
1. How many people are employed by the Hong Kong operations? 
(please round up to nearest 10) 
2 • How many years has the company been operating in Hong 
Kong? 
years 
3. The contribution of the Hong Kong operations to the 
company is 
% (please round up to the nearest 5) 
4. What is the core business of the Hong Kong operations? 
5 . What functions are performed in the subsidiary in 
Hong Kong? . 
(Please check more than one, if appropriate) 
Sourcing of materials 
^^^ Production 
Scheduling of shipments 
Marketing (for local market) 
Marketing (for overseas market) 
Service 
Technology Development . 
Coordination of activities of other subsidiaries 
(including sourcing, production, marketing etc) 
Others (please specify) 
7. Age 
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8. Number of years of working experience 
years 
9. Number of years working in the company 
years 
10. Which department do you work in? 
11. What is your job title? 
Thank you for the interview 
To be completed by interviewer 
1. In七erviewer•s name 
2. Serial No. of Interview 
(start with 1) 
3. Country Origin of Company . 
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